Migration-relevant policies in Nigeria

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MIGNEX
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MIGNEX Background Papers
MIGNEX Background Papers are scientific papers containing the documentation and analyses that underpin the project results. Selected insights from background papers are also presented in non-technical form in other formats, including MIGNEX Policy Briefs and MIGNEX Reports.

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<td>AVRR</td>
<td>assisted voluntary return and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMM</td>
<td>Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ERGP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery and Growth Plan</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUTF</td>
<td>European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>GCM</td>
<td>Global Compact on Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration</td>
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<td>GCR</td>
<td>Global Compact on Refugees</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Development Agency</td>
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<td>ICMPD</td>
<td>International Centre for Migration Policy Development</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>ILMD</td>
<td>International Labour Migration Desk</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Migration Partnership Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
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<td>NAPTIP</td>
<td>National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCFRMI</td>
<td>National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Diaspora Policy</td>
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<td>NEDC</td>
<td>Northeast Development Agency</td>
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<td>NiDCOM</td>
<td>Nigerians in Diaspora Commission</td>
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<td>Nigerians in Diaspora Organisations</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Nigeria Immigration Service</td>
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<td>NMP</td>
<td>National Migration Policy</td>
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<td>NNVS</td>
<td>Nigerian National Volunteer Service</td>
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<td>NPLM</td>
<td>National Policy on Labour Migration</td>
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<td>PMD</td>
<td>Programme Migration for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRR</td>
<td>return, readmission and reintegration</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard operating procedure</td>
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Migration-relevant policies in Nigeria

This paper presents the results of a policy review of the MIGNEX project in Nigeria. It provides an overview of the key migration policies in Nigeria and their interaction with development and development policies.

Donors have shaped the design of many recent migration policies in Nigeria and pay for much implementation.

Yet there is a mismatch between EU and Nigerian political priorities in the area of migration.

The Nigerian Government prioritises policy on diaspora remittances and investment, and legal emigration channels; the EU prioritises the reduction of irregular migration.

About the MIGNEX policy reviews

This is one of 10 MIGNEX Background Papers devoted to a review of policies in the 10 countries of origin and transit covered by the project. The term policy can refer to many different phenomena. MIGNEX adopts a broad perspective and regards policy to include the existence and effectiveness of particular laws, common practices, development initiatives, policy interventions and the broader policy environment or framework. This inclusive definition encompasses the needs of the project’s overall research.

Much of the analysis in the review involves policies that relate directly to migration and its link to development. The concept of migration-related policies includes both the migration policy environment and interventions that seek to affect the development impacts of migration. It also includes policy and projects that might have large effects on migration dynamics, even if not presented under a migration heading.

Methodological note

We undertook a systematic desk review as well as 24 semi-structured interviews with a total of 25 respondents who were policy-makers and other experts. The interviews were conducted both in person in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, and virtually, in the period June–October 2021. Tobechukwu Nneli conducted six in-person interviews, with 18 virtual interviews conducted by different combinations of the three authors. Interviews were conducted in English. The period of analysis is 14 years, from 2007 to 2021. The starting
year of 2007 was selected because the first National Conference on Migration was held that year, during which the draft National Migration Policy (NMP) was discussed by a wide range of government and non-governmental stakeholders. In 2007, a new administration came into power and since policy-making in Nigeria is closely tied to political leadership, we thus focus on the changes since President Obasanjo handed over power in 2007. There have been three other Presidents since then.

Summary of main results

Migration policies and the governance framework in Nigeria have improved tremendously since its first migration policy was published in 2007. In the last 10 years, Nigeria has published migration policies on labour migration, diaspora and internally displaced people (IDPs), a general migration policy and legislation on immigration. The coordination mechanisms between the manifold ministries and agencies involved have also been strengthened during this time. Developing stronger migration frameworks has partly been driven by the government’s concerns over the treatment of Nigerian emigrants, particularly in Libya and countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

However, the policy process has been strongly shaped by donors, particularly the European Union (EU) and European countries who have funded the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to draft many of the policies. Some respondents have noted that although inputs from national stakeholders were considered in the drafting of the policies, ultimately these policies follow standard templates designed by the EU/IOM, which may mean there is a lack of buy in or ownership by the Federal Government of Nigeria in the content of the policies (Bisong, 2021). At the same time, others have also noted that this missing commitment by the Nigerian government arises from a lack of political commitment to most aspects of migration (Arhin-Sam, 2019).

More broadly, there is a mismatch between the EU/ donors and the Nigerian government's priorities in the area of migration. There is a difference of interests, with the EU seeking to reduce irregular migration to Europe and promoting readmission of irregular Nigerian migrants and deportees, whilst Nigeria is most concerned with increased regular migration pathways and sustainable development support. The EU and the Nigerian government have spent years negotiating a readmission agreement, without reaching consensus. At the same time, while the Nigerian government has different policy objectives, it relies on donor funding in the migration area, so the aspects of policies that do get implemented in practice very much depend on donors and donors’ priorities (Altai Consulting, 2021). EU institutions and Member States fund most programmes on irregular migration, human trafficking and return and reintegration (Arhin-Sam, 2019).

The governments’ priorities instead lie in expanding legal emigration channels and fostering diaspora remittances and investment. Particularly in terms of the former priority, not much progress has been made due to a lack of convergence in policy priorities with key destination countries. Diaspora engagement has always been a priority for the Nigerian government because of the development potential of diaspora remittances. Diaspora engagement
has been strengthened and made less fragmented with a recent National Diaspora Policy (NDP) (FGN, 2021). However, links to broader economic and development policies (e.g. on improving the business environment) are still lacking, and few of the policy priorities included in migration policies have been implemented in practice.

# Emigration

## Main policies

Article 41 of the Nigerian Constitution recognises freedom of movement as a fundamental right. Thus, except in instances where an individual has or is reasonably suspected to have committed a criminal offence and where a court with the appropriate jurisdiction orders that they should be prevented from leaving the country, all Nigerian citizens are free to emigrate from the country.

Issues related to migration are part of the exclusive list of items primarily under the purview of the Federal Government of Nigeria and federal institutions are responsible for emigration-related issues such as: the issuance of travel documents and control of persons leaving Nigeria (Nigerian Immigration Service, NIS); issuance of relevant medical certification to intending migrants (Ministry of Health); guaranteeing the dignity of Nigerian citizens (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); facilitating bilateral/multilateral labour agreements and coordinating the labour migration working group (Ministry of Labour and Employment); and diaspora relations and matters (Nigerians in the Diaspora Commission, NiDCOM) etc.

Key policies and initiatives by the Nigerian government that relate to emigration include: i) National Policy on Labour Migration (NPLM) (FGN, 2015a), ii) National Migration Policy (NMP) (FGN, 2015b), iii) NDP (FGN, 2021), iv) the establishment of an International Labour Migration Desk (ILMD) within the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment; v) the ratification of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment; vi) the establishment of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP); and vii) sensitisation campaigns against irregular migration (usually done in conjunction with state-level and civil society stakeholders).

The NMP is the primary policy on migration in Nigeria and is aimed at ‘effective administration and management of migration for socioeconomic development of Nigeria’ (FGN, 2015b: 1). It is a meta document from which sectoral polices such as policy on labour migration and the diaspora policy (see Diaspora section) were developed. The NPLM aims to promote good

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1 Some states have their own diaspora agencies/structures, e.g. Anambra State Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, Culture and Tourism and the Edo State Diaspora Agency. This paper focuses on the federal level, however.

2 There are three levels of government in Nigeria: federal, state and local governments. Each level has primary responsibilities listed in the country’s Constitution.
governance of labour migration; protect Nigerian migrant workers and promote their welfare and that of families left behind; and optimise benefits of labour migration on development while mitigating its adverse impact (FGN, 2015b: 6).

The ILMD’s primary responsibilities include formulating and reviewing the NPLM, regulating activities of (local and international) private employment agencies, and protecting the employment and social rights of Nigerian migrant workers. It also oversees the National Electronic Labour Exchange (NELEX) Project (an electronic meeting place for local and international jobseekers and employers) as well as the Migrants Resource Centres established to provide services such as international job searches, validation of the certificates of technicians and low-skilled workers, counselling, and pre-departure briefings to Nigerians who wish to emigrate.

Issues around border management and trafficking, on the other hand, sit with the NIS and NAPTIP. Although the Nigerian law does not criminalise migration through irregular routes, there have been instances where national courts have adopted restrictive interpretation of immigration laws and have convicted migrants who have attempted to emigrate to Europe through irregular routes (Bisong, 2021). Government-led sensitisation campaigns against irregular migration and human trafficking are common but are often organised through/by the National Migration Technical Working Group members (see organogram in Figure 1). There are also other international – donor-driven – recruitment and regular migration facilitation initiatives, alongside the wide-spread sensitisation campaigns that discourage irregular migration.

In addition to other international conventions and statutes, Nigeria is signatory to and has ratified (since 1980), the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment which grants ECOWAS citizens the right to free entry and exit within ECOWAS states. Nigeria does not have bilateral labour migration agreements with any country yet. However, respondents noted that there are ongoing bilateral labour agreement conversations between Nigeria and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The country also has a migration partnership agreement with Switzerland aimed at facilitating capacity-building for Nigerians who want to work in Switzerland and it is negotiating similar agreements with other countries, such as Germany. The African Continental Free Trade Agreement also contains a protocol for free movement of persons; however, Nigeria has not signed the mobility of persons component.

**Trends**

Emigration has been a reoccurring topic in Nigeria since the 1980s when economic and political instability changed Nigeria’s status from a key

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3 There are six NELEX job centres in the respective geopolitical zones in Nigeria and three Migrants Resource Centres in Lagos, Abuja and Benin city.

4 Nigeria has ratified the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 97 (fair treatment of labour migrants and facilitate labour migration through regular means) and the 1990 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Nigeria has not ratified the Africa wide protocol on free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment brokered by the African Union in 2018.
destination country (especially for African migrants) to a net emigration country (FGN, 2015b). Three major emigration-related trends in Nigeria within the last 15 years are: i) policy development, ii) stakeholder coordination, and iii) a change in destination-country preferences by Nigerians.

Migration policy development started with the work of the inter-ministerial committee that was set up by the Federal Government in 2006, supported by an IOM grant. The initial policy draft was further reviewed by government and non-government stakeholders during the first National Conference on Migration (held in April 2007). The NMP had subsequent iterations but was finally approved by the Federal Executive Council in 2015. Other migration-related policies that were developed within the last decade include the NPLM (2014) and the NDP (2021). On a small scale, the Nigerian government is also negotiating partnerships regarding regular migration with key destination countries, though these tend to permit only low numbers of Nigerians to migrate (see the Externalisation of EU migration policies section).

The second trend relates to improving migration stakeholder coordination. Following recommendations by the 2006 inter-ministerial committee, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced persons (NCFRMI) was appointed the focal government agency for coordination of all themes of migration and implementation of migration policy. NCFRMI currently acts as the Chair of the Technical Working Group on migration and as the secretariat for the inter-ministerial committee on migration. The stakeholder committee on migration has been incrementally expanded within the last decade to include representatives from civil society organisations, academia and subnational governments.

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5 The NMP and NPLM are currently under review and are expected to be revised.
There has also been a change in the choice of destination countries by Nigerians. European and North American countries used to be key target destination countries but, since the 2000s, Asian and Gulf countries have increasingly become a destination country of choice (FGN, 2015b). This is primarily due to the relatively easier immigration laws of these countries and their high demand for domestic workers. Furthermore, travel out of Nigeria, particularly for the purpose of education, has been on the increase especially by rich and middle-class citizens. Nigeria is the number-one origin country for international students from Africa studying in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Malaysia, among others. Bilateral Education Agreements between Nigeria and some countries⁶ have further increased the number of Nigerians emigrating for the purpose of studying (IOM, 2021a).

Impacts on emigration

Policies of the Nigerian government have had minimal impact on emigration. Respondents and evaluations of migration campaigns (see, for example, Government Communication Service International, 2020) have suggested that there is an increased awareness against irregular migration.

Figure 1: Organogram of key migration actors in the Federal Government of Nigeria

Source: The authors

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⁶ Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Korea, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine. More information from https://education.gov.ng/fsb/bilateral-education-agreement/
However, the absence of any bilateral migration agreements with other countries has made regular migration increasingly difficult for Nigerians and has led to involuntary emigration (trafficking in persons and other forms of forced migration) becoming increasingly common as victims are usually promised access to employment and other opportunities abroad (Usman, 2018).

Moreover, most destination countries in Europe and North America have very strict immigration requirements which has led to a high rate of visa refusals for Nigerians. The implication is that in addition to ECOWAS countries, most prospective migrants aim to legally migrate to either Asian and Gulf countries or attempt to migrate to Europe through irregular routes.

**Impacts on development**

Given that the evidence on the impact of state policies on emigration is scant, the extent to which emigration policies is linked to development is limited. The greatest recognised impact of emigration is through remittances. The Nigerian government has severally acknowledged this fact and has introduced some initiatives to encourage remittances from abroad (see Diaspora section). Human capital has been a recurrent theme in the emigration and development discourse, with policy direction favouring skill retention in Nigeria.

Lack of strategic policies on emigration and development may have led to a loss of highly skilled workers in Nigeria which could negatively impact development in the country. For example, the Nigerian healthcare system has increasingly lost many healthcare practitioners who are highly sought after by rich countries. This is even when the current doctor–patient ratio in the country is 1:5,000 – the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommends a ratio of 1:600 (Muanya and Onyenucheya, 2021). Although there is no concrete data to assess the extent of such brain drain and its impacts, it is common knowledge that many skilled professionals have left Nigeria within the last decade (World Bank, 2021).

Furthermore, the fact that only well-educated, highly skilled and well-off Nigerians have opportunities to emigrate leads to a situation where low-skilled and poor Nigerians are unable to access migration and are more likely to seek emigration through irregular routes (ibid.).

**Key incoherence across policies**

The Nigerian government recognises migration as a fundamental right, advocates regular migration and is keen to improve diaspora remittances.

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7 See Schengenvisainfo.com, an independent platform that provides information on the Schengen Visa, notes that, in 2020, Nigeria ranked third among African countries with the highest Schengen Visa application denials; 51% of visa applications to EU countries were denied within the period.

8 Data on the UK General Medical Council website suggests that there are 8,178 medical doctors of Nigerian origin working in the UK.
Nigeria does not have any signed bilateral labour agreement with any country despite previous attempts at reaching one, and labour attaches are often not deployed (within Nigerian diplomatic missions abroad) to promote the welfare of Nigerian migrants. While there are over 500 private employment agencies (PEAs) listed as licensed on the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment website, an unidentified number of PEAs continue to operate on the market. This has contributed to poor oversight of PEAs that conduct international recruitment in Nigeria as some of the PEAs finalise foreign placements without recourse to the Ministry (ibid.). At the same time, NAPTIP also plays a role in regulating the activities of PEAs, making it unclear where responsibilities lie.

Excessive focus on irregular migration driven by donors who shape Nigeria’s migration agenda has led to Nigeria missing opportunities to negotiate more legal pathways for migration for its citizens. Furthermore, potential destination countries seem to have views on emigration that contrast with the Nigerian government. For example, while EU countries encourage Nigerian citizens to develop technical skills that would require them to be gainfully employed in-country; the Nigerian government prioritises increased investment/remittances from Nigerians in the diaspora.

**Interaction with development policies**

The NPLM was intended to be consistent with the National Development Plan (FGN, 2015a), while the NDP took note of the recent Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP 2017–2020) during its development (FGN, 2021). However, there are no formal structures that ensure that migration policies feed into development policies in Nigeria, or vice versa.

**Diaspora**

**Main policies**

There are a number of policies related to diaspora issues, which have the main objective to increase financial and knowledge remittances and attract investments by the diaspora to the economy. The issue of financial remittances is seen to be particularly important to the Nigerian government because they are a key source of foreign exchange.

In May 2021, the IOM published the NDP for the Federal Government of Nigeria, funded by the European Commission (EC) (FGN, 2021). This policy is ‘anchored’ on the existing NMP (FGN, 2015b) and the NPLM (FGN, 2015a) and is the first comprehensive policy document on diaspora issues, also referred to as the 2021 Diaspora strategy below. Its objective is to ‘enhance, mobilize and harness the potentials of Nigerians in the Diaspora for sustainable national development’ (FGN, 2021: 21), hence clearly linking diaspora policies to development. The policy celebrates the Nigerian diaspora and their contributions to the development of Nigeria: for example, it highlights

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9 There is a Draft National Policy on Diaspora Matters from 2016, which was never finalized.
National Diaspora Day (25 July of each year) to recognise and celebrate the contributions of the diaspora.

The policy lays out the institutional framework, specific objectives and a plan of action along nine key priorities: i) coordination of diaspora activities; ii) developing the culture and tourism sectors, iii) facilitate political inclusion and participation of the diaspora, iv) engage the diaspora in the delivery of health services (e.g., customs duty waived for health equipment), v) cooperate with the diaspora in educational development, vi) promote significant investment in the economy by the diaspora (e.g., through public–private partnerships, creating incentives for investment), vii) facilitate cost-effective remittances, viii) enhance the contribution of organised labour migration (e.g., portability of benefits), and ix) engage the diaspora to develop science, technology and innovation for the industrial and technological development of the country.

Figure 2: Advertisement for a quarterly lecture organised by NiDCOM


This policy builds on earlier policies that focused particularly on attracting investment. For instance, since 2019 an annual multi-day diaspora summit has been organised by the Nigerian government to encourage investment of the diaspora10 into Nigeria.

The Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) 2020 National Policy on Inclusive Volunteerism for Nigeria also relates to diaspora issues. Its overall objective is to ‘serve as a guide for engagement, retention and management of volunteers’, with the actions of volunteers in Nigeria and the diaspora contributing to the government’s efforts in achieving the 2020 Agenda on Sustainable Development and the Transformation Agenda. Diaspora Nigerians are named as a set of stakeholders who might support community

10 For example, the Central Bank of Nigeria recently introduced a naira-for-dollar scheme which means that recipients of international remittances would be paid 5 naira for every $1 received. The government has also twice floated diaspora bonds (in 2013 and 2017) as a means to raise foreign exchange and reduce the government budget. In both cases, the bonds were fully subscribed, though issues were raised around the poor regulation of the bond (IOM, 2021a).
development projects or help during humanitarian relief situations amongst other actions, though we did not come across any concrete examples in our interviews. Prior to the formal policy being in place, the NNVS already facilitated diaspora-led medical outreach in rural parts of Nigeria, funded through diaspora hometown/state associations.

**Trends**

There are two key trends in diaspora policy.\(^\text{11}\) The first is the increasing institutionalisation of diaspora policy. The engagement of the diaspora seems to have always been a part of government strategy. For example, the entity Nigerians in Diaspora Organisations (NIDO) was initiated by the government in 2000, National Diaspora Day was initiated in 2006 and a draft diaspora strategy was published in 2016. However, like other migration policy areas in Nigeria, diaspora policy has been fragmented.

Prior to the establishment of NiDCOM, the NNVS was the primary government agency that engaged with Nigerians in the diaspora. NiDCOM was set up in 2019 based on the enactment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (Establishment) Act, 2017. It is housed under the Office of Secretary to the Government of the Federation, with a mandate to ‘provide for the engagement of Nigerians in Diaspora in the policies, projects and participation in the development of Nigeria and to utilize the human capital and material resources of Nigerians in Diaspora towards the overall socio-economic, cultural and political development of Nigeria and for related matters’ (FGN, 2021: 4). NiDCOM now leads and coordinates diaspora issues across all agencies. The 2021 NDP gives it a legal framework and is described as a further mechanism to take a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to diaspora issues. It is now seen as a ‘direct link for Nigerians in Diaspora to participate in the development of the nation’ (ibid: 16).

The second key trend is the broadening remit of diaspora issues. While the 2021 NDP still places central focus on the economic aspects of diaspora engagements, it now clearly has a wider focus, including to facilitate political inclusion and participation of the diaspora. The diaspora has long lobbied for the right to vote from Nigerian embassies abroad (Arhin-Sam, 2019). The policy makes a commitment to facilitate a change in legislation, though at this point it seems unlikely that such legislation will be passed soon given lack of interest from the National Assembly and the Executive.

**Impacts on development**

Nigeria is one of the largest remittance-receiving countries in the world in absolute terms, receiving about one-third of remittances going to sub-Saharan Africa. In 2018, remittances were 11 times that of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 7.4 times larger than official development assistance (ODA) (Nevin and Omosomi, 2019). The total volume of informal remittances is about 50% of the official Nigerian remittance figures (IOM, 2021a; World Bank, 2021). Recorded remittances dropped by 27% in 2020 because of economic pressures driven by Covid-19 (Adhikari et al., 2021). However,

\(^{11}\) Another trend is the increasing role of state governments engaging with the diaspora, but as discussed above this paper focuses on the federal level.
given that there are no policies that specifically incentivise remittance sending, these trends are unlikely to correlate with government policy.

Some studies indicate positive impacts of remittances, including on the economy (Iheke, 2012), unemployment (Okeke, 2021) and household welfare (Ajaero et al., 2018), amongst other outcomes. However, remittances are aimed at supporting loved ones and not necessarily as a way of contributing to the development of Nigeria. Other studies highlight barriers to positive impacts on development, for instance political instability, ineffectiveness of the financial sector, bureaucracy and corruption (Oluwafemi and Ayandibu, 2014). The cost of sending remittances to Nigeria has remained stubbornly high, diminishing their potential impact on development (Adhikari et al., 2021). This remains a key gap in the implementation of government policy.

The Nigerian government has also floated diaspora bonds to reduce the government deficit. While, for example, it raised US$300 million in 2017 (Kazeem, 2017), this is only just over 1% of the $23 billion deficit that year.

The Nigerian diaspora invest heavily in a wide range of sectors, with the impact largest in the information and communications and technology (ICT) sector, real estate, entertainment (Nollywood) and financial and other services. Again, while the diaspora policies talk about promoting the investment of the diaspora, it is not clear to what extent these investments are happening because of these policies.

**Key incoherence across policies**

As with other migration policy areas in Nigeria, the remit of diaspora issues is split across different institutions and committees. Key informants noted that the lack of effective inter-sectoral coordination and clear delineation of responsibilities and authority, duplication of efforts and inter-agency rivalry have hampered efforts to effectively manage and enhance diaspora engagement. The establishment of NiDCOM means that there is now the potential for more effective coordination of diaspora-related activities. One objective of the 2021 Diaspora strategy is to ‘enhance policy coherence and consistency through strategies that facilitate synergy between existing Diaspora actions’ (FGN, 2021: 21), suggesting there are incoherencies across existing actions. This was confirmed by key informants, who noted that subtle rivalries and lack of coordination still exist, even with the establishment of NiDCOM and the new policy.

One obvious incoherence is between, on the one hand, long-standing campaigns celebrating the diaspora and their contributions such as remittance sending (such as the annual diaspora day celebrated since 2006) and, on the other hand, the lack of effective policies to support the diaspora (e.g., to reduce the high cost for sending remittances, the dearth of financial and investment information to guide economic decisions of those in the diaspora and poor consular services provided to Nigerians in the diaspora) (Emelike and Okeke, 2019). Moreover, respondents mentioned that the government does very little for Nigerians in the diaspora which has led to personal or community-focused diaspora investments rather than targeted/formal investment in the Nigerian economy by the diaspora. Furthermore, there is incoherence between calls for diaspora investment...
while the barriers to effective investment remain high (e.g., due to corruption, bureaucracy). The 2021 Diaspora Strategy talks about the responsibility of the government to provide an enabling environment in terms of security, infrastructure and regulations; however, it does not acknowledge any of the barriers or mention specific actions concretely.

Interestingly, the NDP also talks about improving portability of social security for the Nigerian diaspora, yet there is no reference to migrants or portability issues in the 2016 National Social Protection Strategy (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2016). The NDP does not talk about the specific actions to take to improve portability, or the links to make with the Social Protection Strategy.

**Interaction with development policies**

The drafting and development of the 2021 NDP considered the national Economic Growth and Recovery Plan and ‘aims to complement the processes of achieving the regional and international development targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’ (FGN, 2021: 14). There are three areas that stand out as clear overlaps between the NDP and development policies. One is the focus on fostering skills and education, with concrete actions on involvement of the diaspora. This is an area the diaspora is already active in through NIDO. Likewise, the policy proposes a role for the diaspora in facilitating growth of the tourism and culture sector. The policy also has an objective to reduce the cost of remittance transfers, which relates specifically to SDG Target 10.c.

**Transit migration**

**Main policies**

Transit migration\(^{12}\) does not appear to be an important priority within domestic policy-making in Nigeria. However, it has received increased attention with the externalisation of EU migration policies, border management to reduce transit and potential irregular migration to Europe and a growing interest in understanding mixed movements of migrants.

There is a single reference specifically to transit migration within migration policy documents. The handbook that operationalises the Presidential Executive Order One (Eo1) of the Nigeria Immigration Service sets out requirements for transit migrants (Nigeria Immigration Service, 2017). Transit visas are valid for 48 hours if applied for on arrival, and for seven days if obtained from a Nigerian mission in advance (ibid). The Handbook also states that transit migrants are not eligible for employment in Nigeria.

Transit migrants from ECOWAS and other countries which Nigeria has visa abolition agreements with (namely Cameroon and Chad) do not need to apply for a transit visa (see also section on Immigration).

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\(^{12}\) As per MIGNEX’s definition, transit migration here does not include the study of nomadic movements (Carling, 2019).
Much of the EU’s programming is focused on reducing irregular migration to Europe (see also section on Externalisation of EU migration policies) by preventing transit through West Africa through improved border control efforts and regular travel checks in the region (Bisong, 2021). In Nigeria, this includes the training and equipping of immigration officials to ensure improved border management on behalf of European countries (ibid.), including the use of FRONTEX software (Vanguard, 2019). This includes a training centre to combat illegal migration, run by the NIS and funded by the IOM, the Netherlands and other international partners. One aim of improved border management is to register non-citizens who have stayed in Nigeria for more than 90 days (Punch, 2019). Nigeria is also a signatory to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants (United Nations, 2000) and has several policies on anti-trafficking (see section on Emigration). Depending on how this is interpreted, it can also be used by immigration officials to restrict the movements of transit migrants (Bisong, 2021).

**Trends**

Nigeria is an important transit country within the region. The IOM captures data on displacement and transit migration through its Displacement Tracking Matrix’s Flow Monitoring at two key transit locations in Sokoto (north-east entry point) and Kano (central-north entry point), covering major migration routes. Comparing the earliest date for which data is available (June 2017) to the most recent report (January–March 2021), the following trends stand out:

- The number of daily individuals recorded at the Kano monitoring point has increased, rising to an average of 1,134 individuals recorded from 440 (IOM, 2017; 2021c).

- In 2017, the vast majority of individuals recorded were from Nigeria or Niger, though some were also from Mali and Senegal at the Kano location (IOM, 2017). In January–March 2021, these nationalities were no longer observed; however, a small number of transit migrants from Cameroon and Chad were recorded (IOM, 2021b).

In terms of policy, a key trend is the vastly increased border controls around border crossings in northern Nigeria to prevent both Nigerians and transit migrants from crossing to Europe (see also sections on Emigration and Externalisation of EU migration policies). This is facilitated by donor funding: more than half of the €771 million the EU and EU countries spent on migration in Nigeria in 2019 was on border control (Vermeulen et al., 2019).

**Impacts on immigration and transit migration**

The increasing focus on reducing irregular migration in the West African region seems to have influenced transit migration to Nigeria. Immigration authorities have increasingly arrested circular or seasonal migrants for irregular entry and overstay (Bisong, 2021). This is making immigration to and transit migration through Nigeria more difficult and riskier.
Impacts on development
The increased focus on border management and criminalisation of migration in the region could have a negative effect on development because regional mobility is a notable source for socioeconomic development based on historical and social ties (Bisong, 2021; Zanker et al., 2020). Disrupting these flows then disrupts these cross-border, mobility, trade and other exchanges, which bring livelihood opportunities.

Key incoherence across policies
There is incoherence between the border management policies funded by international partners and the ECOWAS Protocol and the African Union pact. The increased focus on border management and curtailing regional migration flows towards Europe disrupts free movement in the region (e.g., through increased border checks). This contradicts the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol of which Nigeria is a signatory (Zanker et al., 2020). Moreover, the arrests and deportations of circular or seasonal migrants are not carried out in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the ECOWAS regulations, flaunting regional human rights commitments (Bisong, 2021).

Interaction with development policies
Increased efforts to improve border management have other aims that are more consistent with broader development policies, including the control of transnational terrorism and curbing transborder crimes (e.g., the smuggling of drugs and weapons) (NIS, 2019).

Return migration
Main policies
The remit for return policy issues sits with the NCFRMI, which coordinates return, readmission and reintegration (RRR) initiatives across the other ministries and agencies involved. While there are no return-migration legal frameworks and there is no specific stand-alone policy on return migration, other migration policies refer to it and there is a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on return and reintegration – an operational document.

The 2014 NPLM has a section dedicated to return migration (FGN, 2015a). The aim of the policy is to facilitate the voluntary return and reintegration of Nigerian migrant workers. The policy condemns forced returns and describes four areas for government action to achieve its objectives on return migration: i) collaboration between Nigeria and host countries on return and reintegration programmes, ii) ensuring returnees can apply their skills and expertise to the development of Nigeria through reintegration programmes, iii) reducing bottlenecks associated with registration of companies to incentivise returnees to invest in Nigeria, and iv) more generally creating an environment conducive to attracting the return of Nigerian talents (ibid.). These intentions to ensure more sustainable returns and reintegration are also mirrored in the 2021 NDP, which also sets out
plans to establish and coordinate channels for the return of skilled Nigerians into the labour marked (FGN, 2021).

The 2015 NMP emphasises that repatriation must be done in a safe, dignified, human-rights-based manner and with the cooperation and agreement of the Nigerian government. As such, it calls for bilateral agreements regarding voluntary returns\(^\text{13}\) which also include a training and education component for returnees and promotes the use of assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes as well as training more generally for returnees (FGN, 2015b). It also established a working group now called Forced Migration and Return, Readmission and Reintegration, which updates the SOPs for RRR every five years (ibid.).

The implemented programming is largely driven and reliant on international donor funding and as such driven by the interests of donors and development partners (Bisong, 2022), which are linked to countries of destination of Nigerian migrants. It is one of the key issues IOM Nigeria is involved with, likewise driven by the availability of funding for this particular issue. There are currently nine RRR initiatives fostering voluntary returns, which are largely donor-driven and implemented by the IOM (ICMPD, 2021). All but one have a reintegration objective, for example business, vocational or skills training (ibid.). In contrast, there are no government-driven or funded RRR initiatives.

**Trends**

Some key informants noted that there has been an increasing focus on returns and reintegration by international donors in the past 10 years owing to rises in irregular migration from Nigeria. Another factor that likely feeds into this focus is the increasing attention within EU policies in recent years on migration control (see also the Externalisation of EU migration policies).

**Main policies**

In 2015, Nigeria was the first country to sign a joint declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) with the EU, a non-legally binding arrangement which seeks to build upon existing agreements

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\(^{13}\) Nigeria now has bilateral agreements with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, while it has been in negotiations with the EU regarding a readmission agreement since 2016.
and ‘further develop dialogue and cooperation’ in four priority areas (EU and Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015):

1. Better organising legal migration and fostering well-managed mobility;
2. Preventing and combating irregular migration and tackling trafficking in human beings;
3. Maximising the development impact of migration and mobility;
4. Promoting international protection.

Under this framework, the EU cooperates with Nigeria in several aspects of migration policy by supporting evidence-based research on migration; building the capacity of the Nigerian government to collect, analyse, respond to and monitor information on migration and to deliver border management; collaborating with relevant ministries on how to facilitate labour migration between Nigeria and EU countries; supporting improvements to the legal framework for migration governance in Nigeria; supporting diaspora networks and regular migrants to contribute to development in both Nigeria and destination countries; and strengthening inter-agency cooperation and exchange of information within Nigeria and between Nigeria and the EU. However, in practice, some of these areas have received more attention than others. Table 1 highlights key migration-related projects in Nigeria funded by the EU.

### Table 1. Migration-related projects in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major migration-related projects in Nigeria, funded by the EU</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Source of funding</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration</td>
<td>€146.9 Million</td>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>2006–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria</td>
<td>€10.15 Million</td>
<td>11th EDF</td>
<td>2018–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Reintegration and Reconciliation of Former Armed Non-State Combatants and Boko Haram Associates</td>
<td>€15 Million</td>
<td>11th EDF</td>
<td>2019–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Stability in Nigeria’s North-East</td>
<td>€5.5 Million</td>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>2016–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Sector Support to the Displaced in Adamawa and Borno States</td>
<td>€4 Million</td>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>2016–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Resilience and Peaceful Coexistence Amongst Displacement Affected Communities in North-East Nigeria</td>
<td>€2.123 Million</td>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>2016–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Migration Governance in Nigeria and Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants</td>
<td>€15.5 Million</td>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>2016–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria</td>
<td>€15 million</td>
<td>10th EDF</td>
<td>2008–13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arhin–Sam (2019).

The primary focus of the EU and its Member States is directed towards border control and preventing irregular migration, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Since 2012 Nigeria has had an agreement with the EU’s external borders agency FRONTEX, and currently Germany has two projects underway via the IOM to design a data system for the NIS while
Denmark through the IOM is setting up a training and knowledge centre for the NIS.

EU-funded initiatives to address human trafficking and smuggling include: Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria (ATIPSOM – launched in 2018 by the EU delegation and the Nigerian Federal Government and implemented by International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP) (a member institution of the the Spanish government cooperation agency); and regional schemes such as the West Africa Coalition Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants, and the Interpol-implemented West Africa Police Information System (WAPIS) Programme, which trains and connects police in the ECOWAS region to combat crime including smuggling and human trafficking. Also, in conjunction with ECOWAS and the Government of Germany, the EU recently launched the Organised Crime: West African Response (OCWAR) projects supporting ECOWAS Member States to counter criminal activities (such as trafficking of persons, cybercrime, financial crimes, terrorism etc.) in the region.

Another key area of cooperation is in return and reintegration. There are two large projects funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in the area of return and reintegration, both in cooperation with the IOM as the implementing partner. One is a national project (Strengthening the Management and Governance of Migration and the Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants to Nigeria (2017-2021)) and one is regional (Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Regional Action for the Sahel and Lake Chad Region (2017–2020)).

Another return project funded by the EU and implemented by the Government of Nigeria and the IOM is the Protection and Reintegration of Nigerian Migrants Returned from Libya Under the Federal Government of Nigeria-Facilitated Chartered Flights, which has supported the return of stranded migrants along the irregular central Mediterranean route since 2015 (ICDPM, 2021). Several EU Member States also run their own AVRR programmes, often in cooperation with the IOM. However, while Nigeria has no readmission agreement with the EU (see Trends section), the country did sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Switzerland in 2011 to agree cooperation on return and reintegration, as well as bilateral agreements with a few other European countries (see the Return migration section).

Most recently, the EU has funded several pilot projects on legal migration pathways, as part of its Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) initiative, which has been in operation since 2016 and is implemented by ICMPD. The MPF seeks to assist the operationalisation of its mobility partnerships, including CAMMs. These pilot projects aim to test the modalities of cooperation in terms of legal and particularly labour migration between EU Member States and selected partner countries. Designated EU Member States offer legal pathways for migration expected to favour both origin and destination countries, though the number of places is expected to be low. The Lithuanian Digital Explorers pilot project is an example that has supported young professionals from Nigeria who had never been recruited abroad previously.
to take up employment in mostly small- and medium-sized organisations in Lithuanian IT companies (Stefanescu, 2020).

Trends

The EU has recently pledged a stronger commitment to its partnership with Nigeria, with ‘peace, migration and human development’ being one of its focal points of the partnership (EU, 2022). Nigeria is also one of the EU’s five priority countries for managing and reducing the flow of migrants and asylum seekers from Africa to the EU (Zandonini, 2020). Over the past decade, there has been a clear trend in the EU increasing its efforts to cooperate with Nigeria on migration issues, especially within the past five years. This increased impetus started firstly with the signing of the CAMM in 2015, and next with the launch of the MPF in 2016, in which the EU named Nigeria as a priority country for migration cooperation (EU, 2016). Following this, dialogue and political engagement ‘stepped up significantly’ (Castillejo, 2017: 24).

The MPF was initiated with the aim of mobilising instruments, resources and the influence of both the EU and Member States to establish cooperation with partner countries to curb migration flows to Europe. However, this programme has been criticised as operating against good development practice due to its use of development aid as both a carrot and a stick to ensure cooperation of African partners on migration issues, and in some cases undermining the EU’s development and human rights principles especially as they relate to migrants (ibid.). Furthermore, most of the projects implemented through the EUTF in MPF partner countries are said to lack adequate local ownership, and are minimally aligned to local priorities and systems and therefore not sustainable (ibid.). In addition to these general trends, three more policy trends are specific to Nigeria.

The first trend is the EU’s efforts in funding and drafting the overhaul of Nigeria’s national migration policies since 2014. Under the framework of the 10th European Development Fund, the EU, together with the IOM, supported the development of the NPLM 2014, the NPM 2015 and the Immigration Act 2015 (FGN, 2015a, b, c) through the Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria (PBMMN) project (EUTF, 2017). Since then, the EUTF has supported the development of several other policies. Nigeria’s NDP (FGN, 2021) is the most recent example of policy development supported by EU funding, together with the IOM (see Error! Reference source not found. section).

The second policy trend is the clear thematic focus of the EU’s efforts, with the majority of programming focused on reducing irregular migration – border control efforts, labour migration data, return and reintegration, and development projects to ‘tackle the root causes of migration’ (FGN, 2015b). Most times, these priorities often contradict with the aspirations of Nigerian policy-makers (see sections on Interaction with development policies and Key incoherence across policies).

The final policy trend is the continued efforts to negotiate a readmission agreement between the EU and Nigeria. Negotiations for such a readmission agreement (funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, AMIF)
were launched in 2016 but soon stalled, in part due to different perspectives between the two parties (see section on Key incoherence across policies). However, negotiations resumed in early 2021 (EC, 2021). In the National Migration Policy Action Plan 2019–2023, the Nigerian government sets out to conclude negotiations by 2023 (FGN, 2019c).

**Impacts on immigration, emigration, return migration and transit migration**

In recent years, the numbers of irregular migrants from Nigeria arriving in Europe have vastly reduced. While Eurostat recorded 14,580 irregular Nigerian migrants in 2016, this was down by 41% to 7,995 in 2020 (Eurostat, 2021). There is no evidence attributing this drop to Nigerian migration policies, however. Others argue it is more likely the result of measures taken to combat irregular migration in Niger and Libya (Idrissa, 2019).

One key informant noted that the efforts of international partners, including the EU and the IOM, the Government of Switzerland and GIZ, have contributed towards increased awareness among citizens on the dangers of irregular migration. This has also been shown in a survey conducted by Government Communication Service International (2020). While increased awareness has not necessarily reduced aspirations for migration, stricter border control policies and changes to immigration laws supported by the EU likely have the effect of disrupting regional immigration into emigration out of and transit migration through Nigeria (Bisong, 2021).

In the area of legal pathways, pilot projects for skills partnership have had minor impact on development, given the small size of projects. Indeed, the lack of legal migration opportunities is linked to irregular emigration journeys, as individuals find themselves with no other option but to move (Arhin-Sam, 2019; Uzomah, 2021).

A 2021 audit of the EU’s return policies from 2015 to 2020 finds that inefficiencies in the return system has encouraged irregular migration (European Court of Auditors, 2021). Reasons for this include difficulties in cooperating with countries of origin, and the fact that it is well-known among migrants that returns are not effective (European Court of Auditors, 2021; MacGregor, 2021). Furthermore, returnees often appear to have high re-migration aspirations due to the ineffectiveness of return and reintegration support (see section on Return migration).

**Impacts on development**

As discussed in the Return migration section, return and reintegration programming funded by the EU is unlikely to have had lasting impacts on development, as returnees are often worse off than prior to migration.

EU externalisation of migration policy through increased border control, which disrupts migration flows within the region, may have a negative impact on development. This is because these movements are important for socioeconomic development (Bisong, 2021).

The lack of legal pathways in Nigeria means that routes for regular migration are limited largely to the highly educated and those from high-
income backgrounds (Arhin-Sam, 2019). This may contribute towards inequality as remittance-recipient households are those already from higher-income backgrounds.

**Key incoherence across policies**

There are four sources of incoherence in the area of EU–Nigeria migration cooperation. First are conflicts between aspects of EU cooperation and regional and international commitments, including contradictions with ECOWAS membership and both the UN Global Compact on Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (Bisong, 2021). For instance, the EU’s efforts, for instance through FRONTEX, for stricter border controls to reduce movement to Europe disrupts free movement in the region, which contradicts the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and also the Support to Free Movement in West Africa programme which the EU co-funds (Zanker et al., 2020). Similarly, the EU efforts to increase returns may conflict with commitments under the GCM in ‘facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration’ (Objective 21) (Bisong, 2021). Several proposals under the New Pact for Asylum and Migration may further undermine the EU and Nigeria’s commitments under the GCR and GCM (ibid.).

The second incoherence is the mismatch between EU and Nigerian political priorities in the area of migration cooperation. There is a difference of interests here, with the EU seeking to reduce irregular migration to Europe and promoting readmission, whilst Nigeria is most concerned with increased regular migration pathways and sustainable development support. Nigeria and the EU thus entered the CAMM with differing priorities (Arhin-Sam, 2019).

A clear example of this mismatch is demonstrated by ongoing – and to date unsuccessful – negotiations for a readmission agreement. The EU has a strong interest in increased cooperation on return and reintegration, with Nigeria being an important country of origin in terms of migration to Europe as well as an important strategic partner in the region for the EU (Castillejo, 2017). Meanwhile, the Nigerian government is not much interested in the return of irregular migrants and deportees from Europe. It is concerned that returnees may weaken political and socioeconomic infrastructures and believes that there is no point in returning people to the country if they will simply proceed to re-migrate again (Castillejo, 2017; Zanker et al., 2020). The EU’s preferred approach to returns would be to return a person from the EU to Nigeria, as soon as their irregular migrant status is identified (e.g., an asylum seeker application is unsuccessful). Meanwhile the Nigerian authorities would prefer to exhaust remedies in the host Member State before return is conducted (Bisong, 2021).

Moreover, the Nigerian government wants to have bilateral migration agreements, which would offer legal pathways for tens of thousands of people, as was done historically (e.g., for Turkey). However, such an agreement does not form part of any current discussions. The economic incentives offered by the EU to Nigeria in negotiations are an insufficient ‘carrot’ for cooperation in the area of readmission (Idrissa, 2019) and, as of 2021, negotiations for a readmission agreement are still ongoing (EC, 2021).
Another source of incoherence relates to the EU’s role in developing national migration policies. Some commentators have noted that although inputs from national stakeholders were considered in the drafting of the policies, ultimately these policies follow standard templates designed by the EU/IOM. This may mean there is a lack of buy in or ownership by the Federal Government in the content of the policies (Bisong, 2021). Related to this is the issue of conflict between state governments and the Federal Government over the mandate relating to migration. Bisong (2021) notes that this conflict between state and federal agencies is an outcome of EU external migration management policies which have led to competition between these actors in the Nigerian federal system.

A final source of incoherence is a lack of funding in the federal budget for migration activities, meaning that the implementation of these policies remains very much dependent on donors and donor priorities (Altai Consulting, 2021). EU institutions and Member States fund most programmes on irregular migration, human trafficking, and return and reintegration (Arhin-Sam, 2019). Therefore, this incoherence may be connected to the mismatch in political priorities as the Nigerian government may not consider the current EU agenda on migration to be aligned with the country’s priorities. Remittances not development aid are prioritised by the Nigerian government and migration programmes which do not create opportunities for legal migration by Nigerians may not receive necessary funding.

An overview by ICMPD of RRR shows a first flurry of programmes around the year 2000, and then a greater number of programmes from 2016 onwards, following the so-called ‘migration crisis’. These second-wave programmes tend to be larger in scale, though still covering a small number of beneficiaries (see next sub section on Impacts). The majority of programmes are multi-annual and still ongoing.

This increased focus on funding from donors has led to greater specialisation in government ministries and a more coordinated governance framework on return and reintegration, now led by the NCFRMI. As mentioned briefly above, there are significant differences at the state level. The Edo state government has developed more comprehensive frameworks in return and reintegration than other states or the federal level, with more direct involvement from the state government through state assistance to returnees and by providing a framework to guide the activities of international partners, and non-governmental and civil society organisations (Bisong, 2022). This is partly because of the sheer number of returnees originally from Edo state.

**Impacts on return migration**

The impacts of existing policies on return migration can be assessed in two ways. One potential impact is the extent to which available programming makes voluntary returns possible and potentially leads to an increase in return migration. The other impact to be considered is the extent to which
policies and programming make return safer and more sustainable for voluntary returnees and returned people, reducing re-migration.

While Nigeria has bilateral readmission agreements with several European countries, the numbers returned are still low compared to the overall number of Nigerian migrants. For the EU as a whole, around 3,000 Nigerians were returned yearly between 2014 and 2018, which is a quarter of those ordered to leave and return, as such policies are generally seen as ineffective (European Court of Auditors, 2020). Returns from African countries such as Libya have occurred in higher numbers, with support of international organisations such as the IOM funded by the EU or its Member States (Bisong, 2021).

Lack of data and monitoring on returnees is seen as a key gap both amongst government departments that do not yet collect systematic data on returned migrants or other returnees, but also for donor-funded RRR programmes, not all of which have data on the number of beneficiaries. While the RRR smaller programmes do not collect data or have supported returns of fewer than 1,000 beneficiaries, there is some data for the bigger programmes. For example, the IOM has assisted voluntary return and reintegration of more than 18,000 migrants from Libya and Europe since 2017; the German Development Agency (GIZ) has supported over 20,000 migrants in their voluntary return from Germany; and more than 17,000 Nigerian migrants have received support through the EU–IOM Joint Initiative since 2017 (ICMPD, 2021).

While the total number of returned people and other returnees is not known, with an estimated number of around 1.3 million Nigerian migrants in 2020, the share of returnees is likely marginal. In any case, the impact of policies on return migration cannot be assessed without knowing the demand for voluntary returns amongst Nigerian migrants, but there is no data on this. It is also not known what share of returns are skilled workers, as envisioned in the migration and diaspora policies.

In terms of the impacts of return programming for returnees, again there is limited systematic or rigorous evidence. It seems that a fair number of returned migrants have been repatriated from exploitative labour situations in Libya and other transit countries (Bisong, 2021; ICDPM, 2021). However, return migrants often face stigma and/or abuse when returning home, being seen as ‘failed migrants’ and are often in a precarious financial situation due to debts, loss of assets and challenges in resuming livelihoods (ibid.). Having to repay migration loans and without sufficient employment or business opportunities in their return communities (see also the next sub-section on impacts on development), aspirations for re-migration are often high (Bisong, 2021). Beyond RRR programming specifically, returnees appear to generally lack support from the Federal Government of Nigeria as well as access to health and social protection services (ICDPM, 2021), so it seems the conducive environment for returnees envisioned by migration policies is still a work in progress. More generally, there is lack of effective implementation and monitoring of relevant laws, policies and interventions (ibid.), so it is likely that effects of these policies on return migration are limited.
For RRR programming there is also a lack of long-term monitoring/tracking data on longer-term migration and livelihood outcomes for graduated beneficiaries. However, key informants estimate that at least 50% of beneficiaries of GIZ’s Programme Migration for Development (PMD) have become gainfully employed and that reintegration activities have reduced re-migration in Nigeria. With regards to the EU–IOM Joint Initiative, another major reintegration programme, the majority of returnees interviewed noted their increased ability to cope with the drivers of migration (ICMPD, 2021). Media accounts paint a more sceptical picture, highlighting the challenges in making a living for returnees and the strong pressures to remigrate (Vermeulen, 2020; Zandonini, 2020; see also next section on impacts on development).

**Impacts on development**

There is a strong narrative threaded through the 2014 NPLM, the 2015 NMP and the 2021 NDP that (skilled) return migration will have positive impacts on Nigeria’s development, particularly through skills and knowledge transfers. There is also interest amongst federal and state-level government officials towards promoting job creation and entrepreneurship activities for returnees as well as ‘potential’ migrants in areas of origin. As such, donor return and reintegration activities have also expanded to include communities, not just beneficiaries.

There is no systematic data available to show how returned people and other returnees have affected development in Nigeria, however. With policies not effectively implemented and returnees often receiving little government support (ICDPM, 2021), it is likely that impacts on developments are small. Most returnees run their own business and a generally inhibiting environment for micro, small or medium businesses in Nigeria limits their potential impacts on development – success rates of businesses are likely low (Bisong, 2021, 2022; ICDPM, 2021; Vermeulen, 2020).

Most donor-funded RRR programmes also have the ambition to positively impact development, beyond direct impacts on beneficiaries. For example, the EU–IOM Joint Initiative includes community-based interventions, such as a pineapple factory in Edo state, which employs 42 returnees and further benefits 250 community members (ICDPM, 2021). The GIZ-funded PMD programme targets 20% return migrants and 80% unemployed and underemployed Nigerians in its Centres for Jobs, Migration and Reintegration in Benin city, Lagos and Abuja, which provide trainings, information on job opportunities and options for regular migration to Germany. Again, data on impacts is lacking, however, with coverage so low it is unlikely that the impacts are substantial.

**Key incoherence across policies**

The Nigerian policies that cover return migration are fairly coherent and have similar objectives. Coordination across different actors is perceived to have been improved with the 2015 NMP, the SOPs clarifying roles and responsibilities, and management of return issues by the NCFRMI (ibid.). Nevertheless, funding shortages and coordination challenges – which are present across all migration policy areas in Nigeria – still hamper the
implementation of policy. This also means that returns and reintegration are often not sustainable, as discussed above, which is inconsistent with the objectives of return migration policies.

In contrast, government and international donor priorities are not always aligned (ibid.), (see also section on Externalisation of EU migration policies). For instance, Nigerian policies prioritise the return of highly skilled migrants to enable knowledge and skills transfer, whereas those returned through AVRR schemes tend to be less-skilled irregular migrants. As the government does not have any RRR initiatives of its own, the schemes that do get implemented are not fully aligned with the objectives of Nigerian government policies. Moreover, the Nigerian government prioritises exhausting all other channels before accepting Nigerians through readmission agreements, whereas EU countries prefer returning irregular migrants as soon as identified; these differences in attitudes have led to challenges in returns through these readmission agreements (Bisong, 2021).

Interaction with development policies

Policies on return and reintegration are not explicitly linked to national development plans yet (ICMPD, 2021). This is not surprising, given that return and reintegration policy-making is driven by donors with a very specific agenda in mind.

Immigration

Main policies

Nigeria’s immigration laws are documented in the Immigration Act of 2015 (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2015). This Act is supported by Immigration Regulation 2017 which outlines the rules that should guide immigration officers (FGN, 2017a). The NIS is the primary institution with the statutory function of controlling persons entering or leaving Nigeria, the issuance of travel documents to Nigerian citizens, the documentation of immigrants, the issuance of residence permits to foreigners in Nigeria, border surveillance and patrol, and other paramilitary duties required of the service within the Immigration Act. Under the current Federal Executive Council structure, the NIS is one of the agencies under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.

Key policy areas on immigration in Nigeria are: i) immigration control and border management; ii) visa waivers and expanded opportunities for legal immigration into Nigeria; and iii) protection of Persons of Concern (refugees, stateless persons, victims of human trafficking).

On border management, Nigerian law stipulates that anybody who seeks entry into Nigeria (through air, sea, or land borders) shall be examined by immigration, health and customs officials to ensure they have appropriate

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14 The NIS was originally established on 1 August 1963 by an Act of Parliament, Cap 171, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. This law was repealed when the 2015 Immigration Act was signed.
documentation (visa or resident permit) and that they do not pose a risk to public health, public interest or national security before they can be admitted into the country. The National Border Management Strategy and the donor-funded Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) are recent initiatives implemented by the Nigerian government to ensure adequate border control and efficient management of data from Nigerian borders (FGN, 2019a).\(^{15}\)

Citizens of ECOWAS countries and other countries (e.g., Cameroon and Chad) with whom Nigeria has visa abolition agreements are allowed entry into Nigeria without a visa. Nigeria has ratified the 2003 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (FGN, 2015b). Although the 2020 National Policy on Inclusive Volunteerism for Nigeria recognises the possibility of having foreigners and diaspora Nigerians working as volunteers, the Nigerian National Volunteer Service does not have a record of such volunteers as yet (FGN, 2020a).

Another aspect of immigration policy in Nigeria is refugee management and the protection of victims of human trafficking. Refugees are meant to register with the NCFRMI, which has primary responsibility for ensuring that refugee rights are protected. According to legislation, refugees are accorded the right to work and to access elementary education. The federal response to issues of human trafficking include the establishment of NAPTIP, an initiative that has led to increased awareness of human trafficking and reduced irregular/involuntary migration. Since its establishment through an Act of Parliament in 2003 (amended in 2015), NAPTIP has prosecuted about 480 traffickers while over 16,000 victims of human trafficking have been rescued and rehabilitated.

**Trends**

Immigration to Nigeria from neighbouring and ECOWAS countries dates back as far as 1914 when the Nigerian colonial state was formed (Arhin-Sam, 2019). Key immigration trends over the last decade relate to immigration governance, border management, the profile and number of immigrants, and refugee management.

Besides the 2015 Immigration Act (FGN, 2015c) and 2017 Immigration Regulations (FGN, 2019b), the Nigerian migration governance framework was improved through the establishment of five thematic groups including a stakeholder forum on border management (information based on interviews).

A Joint Border Task Force\(^{16}\) was also established within this period with the mandate of conducting effective investigations on border crimes and prosecuting offenders. The Task Force is fully operational at the Lagos and Kano airports. The Nigerian government in August 2019 decided to shut all

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\(^{15}\) Nigeria’s official borderline covers up to 4,047 km. It also has five international airports; 84 recognised land entry points; and six operational seaports for passenger arrivals (30 more official land entry points were approved in 2018) (FGN, 2019a).

\(^{16}\) This initiative was funded by the UK Government through the Nigeria Countering Organised Crime and Corruption Programme.
land borders as a way to stave off cross-border banditry and smuggling (of prohibited goods) into Nigeria (Agbota, 2019). However, the borders were reopened after 16 months in 2020 as the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement implementation deadline of January 2021 approached (Adekoya et al., 2020).

Data on the profile and number of immigrants in Nigeria are scant and incomplete due to the porosity of borders and the ease with which migrants from countries with shared religions, language, markets and culture integrate with Nigerian communities. For example, citizens of neighbouring countries like Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin are known to easily integrate into Nigerian societies through marriage and business partnerships (Arhin-Sam, 2019). Nonetheless, three different migration profiles have been published (by IOM in conjunction with the Federal Government of Nigeria) within the past 15 years in 2009, 2016 and 2021 (IOM, 2015, 2016, 2021). Data has also been captured on immigrants/transit migrants through the Displacement Tracking Matrix’s Flow Monitoring (see section on Transit migration trends).

Attention to refugee management by the Nigerian government has increased in recent times. This is due to the influx of refugees into Nigeria driven by the global financial crisis and insecurity within the Lake Chad basin. Currently, there are over 65,000 Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria and there are also refugees from Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Eritrea, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR, 2021). Furthermore, the mandate of the National Commission for Refugees was expanded beyond registration, profiling and the provision of basic support to refugees in 2009 to also include migration management and the resettlement and rehabilitation of IDPs.

**Impacts on immigration**

The 2015 Immigration Act and other policies introduced by the Nigerian government regarding management of immigration have ensured a more coordinated national response to border surveillance, human trafficking and refugee management (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2015). However, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which these policies have had an impact on immigration.

Instead, immigration into Nigeria (especially by ECOWAS citizens)\(^\text{17}\) is usually driven by the economic situation of Nigeria, migrants’ perception of the economic opportunities available and the ease of access into the country. Insecurity and humanitarian crises in neighbouring countries determine the flow of refugees into the country as well. Regular migrants from other parts of the world are also primarily attracted by the large Nigerian market and the economic opportunities this presents. Most Lebanese, Chinese and Indian communities in Nigeria own businesses, are hired by Nigerian

\(^\text{17}\) There are over 1 million economic immigrants from ECOWAS countries in Nigeria (Ojukwu et al., 2020).
entrepreneurs, and are involved in infrastructural projects or the extractive industry (Mohan and Lampert, 2013; Odutola, 2019).

The ECOWAS Protocol on free movement and similarities between citizens of neighbouring countries and Nigeria have amplified the challenges of migrant smuggling, trafficking and cross-border terrorism as border officials find it difficult to police the borders and control irregular migration into Nigeria (FGN, 2015b). However, it has been suggested that heavy securitisation and militarisation of migration around Nigerian borders has led to arrests and deportations that were not carried out in accordance with the ECOWAS 1979 Regulations (Bisong, 2021).

**Impacts on development**

The ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of persons and goods was designed to facilitate development, regional integration and cooperation among West African states. However, it is difficult to measure in accurate terms the extent to which this policy has led to development in Nigeria. This is due to the paucity of migration data, especially in terms of migrants who access Nigeria through the county's porous land borders.

Moreover, most ECOWAS immigrants are low-skilled, thus they may not contribute substantially to the growth and economic development of Nigeria (Mbachi and Ikeanyibe, 2017). Nonetheless, artisans from ECOWAS countries provide cheap labour in the real estate industry in Nigeria. There is also a significant Chinese, Lebanese and Indian community in Nigeria, most of whom are involved in construction projects, manufacturing operations and other types of businesses.

**Key incoherence across policies**

The primary source of policy incoherence on immigration is the poor sharing of migration data among relevant agencies. Respondents noted that the process of assessing data on the profile and number of migrants coming through Nigeria’s borders is complex and bureaucratic. This could be because of subtle inter-agency rivalry amongst government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) that work or interact with migrants. The establishment of the working groups within the Nigerian migration governance framework was meant to address this and while respondents acknowledged that there has been some improvement, some noted that information sharing amongst relevant agencies is still poor.

Moreover, the rationale behind the decision of the Federal Government of Nigeria to move NAPTIP from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development was considered an example of incoherent policies. This is because the government did not consider that NAPTIP had prosecuting powers based on its establishment law and that such powers would be best deployed as an agency of the Ministry of Justice, with the move this is more challenging.

It has also been suggested that due to huge involvement of international organisations in migration activities and the development of migration policies, local ownership of the policies is contestable (Bisong, 2021).
Moreover, some of the donor-supported border control initiatives contradict the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons and goods (see Transit migration section).

**Interaction with development policies**

Recent immigration policies in Nigeria were all designed to support the 2017–2020 ERGP of the Federal Government following the 2015 economic recession (FGN, 2017b).

Moreover, development partnerships have implications for migration. For example, the number of Asian migrants in Nigeria increased after the Nigerian government signed loan and infrastructural development concession agreements with China.

Other government policies such as the 2020 National Visa Policy prioritise the ease of doing business and attracting FDI into the country (FGN, 2020b).

**Internal migration**

**Main policies**

There are no restrictions to internal migration in Nigeria. According to Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, 'every citizen of Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof, and no citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereby or exit therefrom' (FGN, 1999). While there are government initiatives such as rural electrification programmes aimed at providing basic amenities in rural areas and discouraging massive rural-to-urban migration, there is no official government policy that restricts mobility from one part of the country to another. Thus, even though conflict between host communities and migrant settlers is common in different parts of Nigeria, the government has been consistent in emphasising that all Nigerians are free to move to, reside and vote in any part of the country.

Following the government's ratification of the African Union (Kampala) Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, a national policy on IDPs was drafted in 2012 (FGN, 2013). This built on the efforts of the 2006 Presidential Committee on IDPs Policy and the 2003 National Policy on IDPs Drafting Committee (FGN, 2013). The 2012 IDPs Policy highlighted the general rights of IDPs, especially those considered vulnerable such as women, children, elderly persons, people with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS.

An updated version of the IDPs Policy was approved by the Federal Executive Council in 2021. This recognises the role of the Ministry of Communications and Digital Economy in managing the digital identities of IDPs in collaboration with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. It aims to strengthen institutional mechanisms and frameworks for protecting the

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18 Though some states have at various times expelled non-residents, e.g., Lagos state (Vanguard, 2013).
rights of IDPs, and proposes solutions that will mitigate the impact of internal displacement in Nigeria (Ayeni, 2021).

Trends

Issues related to internal migration are topical and have raised policy concerns in Nigeria. This is due to humanitarian crises, insecurity and conflicts that are emerging because of internal migration. Internal displacement of persons in Nigeria used to be caused predominantly by natural disasters such as flooding, but within the last decade there has been an exponential increase in IDPs mostly because of man-made factors such as terrorism in the north-east and the farmer–herdsman/indigene–settler crisis mostly in the north-central parts of Nigeria (IDMC, 2021). Climate change has also been a driving factor. In 2020 alone, conflict and violence led to the displacement of 169,000 Nigerians, increasing the total number of IDPs in Nigeria to 2,730,000 (ibid.).

To address this issue, some states (especially in southern Nigeria) agreed to ban open grazing and movement of cattle in their region (Kabir, 2021). The Federal Government of Nigeria, on the other hand, insists that no Nigerian should be prevented from carrying out their legitimate business and have instead advocated the establishment of grazing routes for nomads and their cattle (Nnodim and Alagbe, 2021).

To ensure an adequate national response to humanitarian issues and those of internal displacement in Nigeria, the Federal Government in 2019 created the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development as the primary government agency responsible for policy formulation and coordinating support for IDPs. The Ministry has oversight responsibilities for other government agencies involved in providing support to IDPs in Nigeria, including: NCFRMI, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), NAPTIP and the Northeast Development Agency (NEDO).

Impacts on internal migration

Given the level of insecurity in Nigeria, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which existing laws and policy initiatives of the Nigerian government have had an impact on internal migration. However, most internal migrants in Nigeria move due to economic reasons or humanitarian crisis regardless of federal or state policies. Although there are instances where nomadic associations have directed their members to relocate from states where open grazing is banned, there is no data confirming that herders have left southern Nigeria in large numbers (Oyewole, 2021).

Impacts on development

A lack of clear policies on internal migration has led to increased pressure on public infrastructure in urban areas as well as the development of periphery towns close to cities. For example, peri-urban growth has been intense from different borders of Lagos metropolis along the south-west end of Ojo-Badagry Expressway, the south-east along the Lekki-Epe corridor, the north-east along Ikorodu corridor, the Alimosho-Igando-Iba-Lasu corridor in the north-west and the Lagos-Ibadan axis towards the north of the metropolis.
Development has also extended to corridors along the Lagos-Ogun state borders including towns such as Ota, Ibafo-Mowe, Ojodu-Akute and Ogijo areas (Salau et al., 2013).

Incoherent policies on internal migration also have social development impacts especially on food insecurity, health and education (IOM, 2021a). The increasing number of young people who move from rural areas (predominantly agrarian) to cities has reduced the manpower available to work on farms (Eze and Olumide, 2017). Also, insecurity and incidence of internal displacement especially in northern Nigeria has worsened food security issues in the country and has put more pressure on infrastructures in IDP host communities (George et al., 2020; FGN, 2013).

The establishment of a new ministry primarily responsible for coordinating support to IDPs and the introduction of the IDP Policy is expected to lead to an improved situation for those who are internally displaced in Nigeria. While the new ministry has made some gains especially in terms of coordinating support to IDPs, it is too early to ascertain the impact of the IDP Policy as it was only approved by the Federal Executive Council in 2021.

**Key incoherence across policies**

A major source of incoherence on internal migration is the disagreement between states and the Federal Government concerning movement of persons especially cattle herders. This has been compounded by the fact that there are no comprehensive and up to date data on internal migration in Nigeria. For example, the most recent migration survey conducted in Nigeria was in 2010, while the last official census was done in 2006. This has implications for policy-making on internal migration as it is difficult for the government to ascertain patterns and trends on internal migration.

Other challenges include instances of inter-agency rivalry and mistrust regarding key migration-related responsibilities such as the management of IDP camps and support to IDPs.

**Interaction with development policies**

Internal migration is not explicitly discussed in Nigeria’s 2017–2020 ERGP (FGN, 2017b). However, social inclusion of vulnerable persons (including IDPs) especially in the north-east is identified as a key priority, and targeted social investment programmes have been designed for people in that region. Furthermore, the NEDC has a clear mandate to support IDPs in the region.
Externalisation of EU migration policies

Main policies

In 2015, Nigeria was the first country to sign a joint declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) with the EU, a non-legally binding arrangement which seeks to build upon existing agreements and ‘further develop dialogue and cooperation’ in four priority areas (EU and Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015):

5. Better organising legal migration and fostering well-managed mobility;
6. Preventing and combating irregular migration and tackling trafficking in human beings;
7. Maximising the development impact of migration and mobility;
8. Promoting international protection.

Under this framework, the EU cooperates with Nigeria in several aspects of migration policy by supporting evidence-based research on migration; building the capacity of the Nigerian government to collect, analyse, respond to and monitor information on migration and to deliver border management; collaborating with relevant ministries on how to facilitate labour migration between Nigeria and EU countries; supporting improvements to the legal framework for migration governance in Nigeria; supporting diaspora networks and regular migrants to contribute to development in both Nigeria and destination countries; and strengthening inter-agency cooperation and exchange of information within Nigeria and between Nigeria and the EU. However, in practice, some of these areas have received more attention than others. Table 1 highlights key migration-related projects in Nigeria funded by the EU.

19 Seven Mobility Partnership (MP) declarations have been signed so far by the EU with: Cape Verde, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan and Tunisia, as well as two CAMMs with Ethiopia and Nigeria. The main difference between the two types of agreement relates to visa facilitation (easier visa issuance granting access to the EU for up to three months) and readmission agreements that are to be negotiated under MPs, but not CAMMs.
The primary focus of the EU and its Member States is directed towards border control and preventing irregular migration, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Since 2012 Nigeria has had an agreement with the EU’s external borders agency FRONTEX, and currently Germany has two projects underway via the IOM to design a data system for the NIS while Denmark through the IOM is setting up a training and knowledge centre for the NIS.

EU-funded initiatives to address human trafficking and smuggling include: Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria (ATIPSOM – launched in 2018 by the EU delegation and the Nigerian Federal Government and implemented by International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP) (a member institution of the the Spanish government cooperation agency); and regional schemes such as the West Africa Coalition Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants, and the Interpol-implemented West Africa Police Information System (WAPIS) Programme, which trains and connects police in the ECOWAS region to combat crime including smuggling and human trafficking. Also, in conjunction with ECOWAS and the Government of Germany, the EU recently launched the Organised Crime: West African Response (OCWAR) projects supporting ECOWAS Member States to counter criminal activities (such as trafficking of persons, cybercrime, financial crimes, terrorism etc.) in the region.

Another key area of cooperation is in return and reintegration. There are two large projects funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in the area of return and reintegration, both in cooperation with the IOM as the implementing partner. One is a national project (Strengthening the Management and Governance of Migration and the Sustainable
Reintegration of Returning Migrants to Nigeria (2017-2021) and one is regional (Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Regional Action for the Sahel and Lake Chad Region (2017–2020)).

Another return project funded by the EU and implemented by the Government of Nigeria and the IOM is the Protection and Reintegration of Nigerian Migrants Returned from Libya Under the Federal Government of Nigeria-Facilitated Chartered Flights, which has supported the return of stranded migrants along the irregular central Mediterranean route since 2015 (ICDPM, 2021). Several EU Member States also run their own AVRR programmes, often in cooperation with the IOM. However, while Nigeria has no readmission agreement with the EU (see Trends section), the country did sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Switzerland in 2011 to agree cooperation on return and reintegration, as well as bilateral agreements with a few other European countries (see the Return migration section).

Most recently, the EU has funded several pilot projects on legal migration pathways, as part of its Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) initiative, which has been in operation since 2016 and is implemented by ICMPD. The MPF seeks to assist the operationalisation of its mobility partnerships, including CAMMs. These pilot projects aim to test the modalities of cooperation in terms of legal and particularly labour migration between EU Member States and selected partner countries. Designated EU Member States offer legal pathways for migration expected to favour both origin and destination countries, though the number of places is expected to be low. The Lithuanian Digital Explorers pilot project is an example that has supported young professionals from Nigeria who had never been recruited abroad previously to take up employment in mostly small- and medium-sized organisations in Lithuanian IT companies (Stefanescu, 2020).

**Trends**

The EU has recently pledged a stronger commitment to its partnership with Nigeria, with ‘peace, migration and human development’ being one of its focal points of the partnership (EU, 2022). Nigeria is also one of the EU’s five priority countries for managing and reducing the flow of migrants and asylum seekers from Africa to the EU (Zandonini, 2020). Over the past decade, there has been a clear trend in the EU increasing its efforts to cooperate with Nigeria on migration issues, especially within the past five years. This increased impetus started firstly with the signing of the CAMM in 2015, and next with the launch of the MPF in 2016, in which the EU named Nigeria as a priority country for migration cooperation (EU, 2016). Following this, dialogue and political engagement ‘stepped up significantly’ (Castillejo, 2017: 24).

The MPF was initiated with the aim of mobilising instruments, resources and the influence of both the EU and Member States to establish cooperation with partner countries to curb migration flows to Europe. However, this programme has been criticised as operating against good development practice due to its use of development aid as both a carrot and a stick to

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20 Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.
ensure cooperation of African partners on migration issues, and in some cases undermining the EU’s development and human rights principles especially as they relate to migrants (ibid.). Furthermore, most of the projects implemented through the EUTF in MPF partner countries are said to lack adequate local ownership, and are minimally aligned to local priorities and systems and therefore not sustainable (ibid.). In addition to these general trends, three more policy trends are specific to Nigeria.

The first trend is the EU’s efforts in funding and drafting the overhaul of Nigeria’s national migration policies since 2014. Under the framework of the 10th European Development Fund, the EU, together with the IOM, supported the development of the NPLM 2014, the NPM 2015 and the Immigration Act 2015 (FGN, 2015a, b, c) through the Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria (PBMMN) project (EUTF, 2017). Since then, the EUTF has supported the development of several other policies. Nigeria’s NDP (FGN, 2021) is the most recent example of policy development supported by EU funding, together with the IOM (see Error! Reference source not found. section).

The second policy trend is the clear thematic focus of the EU’s efforts, with the majority of programming focused on reducing irregular migration – border control efforts, labour migration data, return and reintegration, and development projects to ‘tackle the root causes of migration’ (FGN, 2015b). Most times, these priorities often contradict with the aspirations of Nigerian policy-makers (see sections on Interaction with development policies and Key incoherence across policies).

The final policy trend is the continued efforts to negotiate a readmission agreement between the EU and Nigeria. Negotiations for such a readmission agreement (funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, AMIF) were launched in 2016 but soon stalled, in part due to different perspectives between the two parties (see section on Key incoherence across policies). However, negotiations resumed in early 2021 (EC, 2021). In the National Migration Policy Action Plan 2019–2023, the Nigerian government sets out to conclude negotiations by 2023 (FGN, 2019c).

Impacts on immigration, emigration, return migration and transit migration

In recent years, the numbers of irregular migrants from Nigeria arriving in Europe have vastly reduced. While Eurostat recorded 14,580 irregular Nigerian migrants in 2016, this was down by 41% to 7,995 in 2020 (Eurostat, 2021). There is no evidence attributing this drop to Nigerian migration policies, however. Others argue it is more likely the result of measures taken to combat irregular migration in Niger and Libya (Idrissa, 2019).

One key informant noted that the efforts of international partners, including the EU and the IOM, the Government of Switzerland and GIZ, have contributed towards increased awareness among citizens on the dangers of irregular migration. This has also been shown in a survey conducted by Government Communication Service International (2020). While increased awareness has not necessarily reduced aspirations for migration, stricter border control policies and changes to immigration laws supported by the
EU likely have the effect of disrupting regional immigration into emigration out of and transit migration through Nigeria (Bisong, 2021).

In the area of legal pathways, pilot projects for skills partnership have had minor impact on development, given the small size of projects. Indeed, the lack of legal migration opportunities is linked to irregular emigration journeys, as individuals find themselves with no other option but to move (Arhin-Sam, 2019; Uzomah, 2021).

A 2021 audit of the EU’s return policies from 2015 to 2020 finds that inefficiencies in the return system has encouraged irregular migration (European Court of Auditors, 2021). Reasons for this include difficulties in cooperating with countries of origin, and the fact that it is well-known among migrants that returns are not effective (European Court of Auditors, 2021; MacGregor, 2021). Furthermore, returnees often appear to have high re-migration aspirations due to the ineffectiveness of return and reintegration support (see section on Return migration).

**Impacts on development**

As discussed in the Return migration section, return and reintegration programming funded by the EU is unlikely to have had lasting impacts on development, as returnees are often worse off than prior to migration.

EU externalisation of migration policy through increased border control, which disrupts migration flows within the region, may have a negative impact on development. This is because these movements are important for socioeconomic development (Bisong, 2021).

The lack of legal pathways in Nigeria means that routes for regular migration are limited largely to the highly educated and those from high-income backgrounds (Arhin-Sam, 2019). This may contribute towards inequality as remittance-recipient households are those already from higher-income backgrounds.

**Key incoherence across policies**

There are four sources of incoherence in the area of EU–Nigeria migration cooperation. First are conflicts between aspects of EU cooperation and regional and international commitments, including contradictions with ECOWAS membership and both the UN Global Compact on Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (Bisong, 2021). For instance, the EU’s efforts, for instance through FRONTEX, for stricter border controls to reduce movement to Europe disrupts free movement in the region, which contradicts the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and also the Support to Free Movement in West Africa programme which the EU co-funds (Zanker et al., 2020). Similarly, the EU efforts to increase returns may conflict with commitments under the GCM in ‘facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration’ (Objective 21) (Bisong, 2021). Several proposals under the New Pact for Asylum and Migration may further undermine the EU and Nigeria’s commitments under the GCR and GCM (ibid.).
The second incoherence is the mismatch between EU and Nigerian political priorities in the area of migration cooperation. There is a difference of interests here, with the EU seeking to reduce irregular migration to Europe and promoting readmission, whilst Nigeria is most concerned with increased regular migration pathways and sustainable development support. Nigeria and the EU thus entered the CAMM with differing priorities (Arhin-Sam, 2019).

A clear example of this mismatch is demonstrated by ongoing – and to date unsuccessful – negotiations for a readmission agreement. The EU has a strong interest in increased cooperation on return and reintegration, with Nigeria being an important country of origin in terms of migration to Europe as well as an important strategic partner in the region for the EU (Castillejo, 2017). Meanwhile, the Nigerian government is not much interested in the return of irregular migrants and deportees from Europe. It is concerned that returnees may weaken political and socioeconomic infrastructures and believes that there is no point in returning people to the country if they will simply proceed to re-migrate again (Castillejo, 2017; Zanker et al., 2020). The EU’s preferred approach to returns would be to return a person from the EU to Nigeria, as soon as their irregular migrant status is identified (e.g., an asylum seeker application is unsuccessful). Meanwhile the Nigerian authorities would prefer to exhaust remedies in the host Member State before return is conducted (Bisong, 2021).

Moreover, the Nigerian government wants to have bilateral migration agreements, which would offer legal pathways for tens of thousands of people, as was done historically (e.g., for Turkey). However, such an agreement does not form part of any current discussions. The economic incentives offered by the EU to Nigeria in negotiations are an insufficient ‘carrot’ for cooperation in the area of readmission (Idrissa, 2019) and, as of 2021, negotiations for a readmission agreement are still ongoing (EC, 2021).

Another source of incoherence relates to the EU’s role in developing national migration policies. Some commentators have noted that although inputs from national stakeholders were considered in the drafting of the policies, ultimately these policies follow standard templates designed by the EU/IOM. This may mean there is a lack of buy in or ownership by the Federal Government in the content of the policies (Bisong, 2021). Related to this is the issue of conflict between state governments and the Federal Government over the mandate relating to migration. Bisong (2021) notes that this conflict between state and federal agencies is an outcome of EU external migration management policies which have led to competition between these actors in the Nigerian federal system.

A final source of incoherence is a lack of funding in the federal budget for migration activities, meaning that the implementation of these policies remains very much dependent on donors and donor priorities (Altai Consulting, 2021). EU institutions and Member States fund most programmes on irregular migration, human trafficking, and return and reintegration (Arhin-Sam, 2019). Therefore, this incoherence may be connected to the mismatch in political priorities as the Nigerian government may not consider the current EU agenda on migration to be aligned with the country’s priorities. Remittances not development aid are prioritised by the
Nigerian government and migration programmes which do not create opportunities for legal migration by Nigerians may not receive necessary funding.

**Interaction with development policies**

There are two ways in which the development agenda in Nigeria of the EU and EU Member States interacts with migration policy. Firstly, the EU’s aid development agenda as outlined in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014–2020 explicitly incorporates migration objectives (EU, 2014). The NIP 2014–2020 states that in Nigeria management of both internal and international migration is ‘critical to ensure the development agenda’ (ibid:22). The third pillar of the plan – rule of law, governance and democracy – includes migration objectives, seeking to improve border management and enhance capacities to manage migration, increase the ‘proportion of regular migration flows’, and implement the CAMM (ibid:23). The most recent development plan from the EU is set to continue this. The 2021 Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), which will replace the European Development Fund (EDF), includes a spending target of 10% for migration governance, including tackling the root causes of (irregular) migration including forced displacement (EU, 2021).

Secondly, many EU development projects have explicit objectives to ‘tackle the root causes of migration’ by targeting potential migrants or returnee migrants, among whom re-migration aspirations are often high. After border control, the bulk of the EU’s (including Member States’) migration-related spending in Nigeria relates to job creation (Vermeulen et al., 2019). For instance, in 2018, Germany – the largest donor in this area in Nigeria – and Nigeria signed three MoUs to increase economic opportunities in Nigeria in the areas of commerce, agriculture and automobiles, in order to reduce the rate of irregular migration towards Germany (The Migrant Project, 2018). Another project is the Skills Development for Youth Employment (SKYE), which has the objective of improving ‘the prospects of income-generating employment for Nigerian youths by promoting [technical and vocational education and training], addressing the supply and demand sides of the integrated employment approach, and supporting public private dialogue about TVET’. Other programmes by the German government in Nigeria include the PMD through which GIZ partnered with Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment to establish and manage Nigerian–German Centres for Jobs, Migration and Reintegration in Benin city, Lagos and Abuja. The centres provide information and advice on job opportunities and (employability and entrepreneurship) training for unemployed and underemployed youths in Nigeria as well as returnee migrants.

Lastly, it is worth noting that commentators have highlighted a recent and ‘problematic’ trend in EU development aid, including in Nigeria – namely, the use of conditionalities attached to aid to force cooperation on migration issues in key countries of origin (ECRE, 2020; Bisong, 2021). For instance, in Nigeria development cooperation has been used to fund training for immigration authorities, with the goal of enforcing migration control for EU countries in Nigeria (Bisong, 2021).
Main development policies

The selected policies

Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has explored numerous five-year National Development Plans (NDPs), one structural adjustment programme, two three-year rolling plans, and four presidential visions and strategies. The latter include President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s Seven Point Agenda, President Goodluck Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda and the ERGP of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration. All of these efforts are broadly aimed at addressing development challenges of Nigeria; however, the extent of their success is in doubt as the country is still battling with key development challenges (Uche, 2019).

Although there is a recent (2021–2025) NDP approved by the Federal Executive Council, the final draft is not publicly available yet. This section therefore briefly discusses the ERGP (2017–2020) which was developed in 2017 as medium-term plan that will restore Nigeria’s economic growth following the challenges of the 2016 economic recession (FGN, 2017b).

The ERGP broadly aimed to restore economic growth, increase investment in Nigerian people and build a globally competitive economy.

To ensure an improved economy, the policy aimed to achieve macroeconomic stability and economic diversification by undertaking fiscal stimulus, ensuring monetary stability, improving Nigeria’s external balance of trade, focus on sectors (such as agriculture, energy) that can lead to economic growth, and leverage science and technology in improving manufacturing and related services. The policy also highlighted the role of Nigerians in diaspora through investing in diaspora bonds, participating in public–private partnerships on infrastructure development and social housing programmes.

On human capital development, the policy identified ensuring social inclusion, job creation and youth empowerment, and improved health and education services as top priorities. Developing the Diaspora Medical Assistance Programme to attract and encourage Nigerian medical professionals abroad to provide volunteer health services in Nigeria is one of the activities highlighted within the plan.

To build a globally competitive economy, the ERGP aimed to tackle the obstacles hindering the competitiveness of Nigerian businesses such as poor or non-existent infrastructural facilities and the difficult business environment. It also identified strengthening border security to track migration, curb transborder crimes and enhance the National Identity Card Management System. The role of key migration agencies such as the NIS in achieving these objectives were well outlined in the policy.

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21 The most recent is the 2021–2025 NDP approved by the Federal Executive Council on 11 November 2021. The first four development plans were introduced before 1990. This suggests that, until recently, development policies in Nigeria have been driven more by specific visions and strategies of each government than a cross-administration development plan.
Interactions with migration-related policies

Improving Nigeria’s economy and human capital index relates to key migration policies of the Nigerian government. For example, the NMP 2015, the NDP 2021 and NPLM 2014 (FGN, 2015a, b; FGN, 2021) all emphasise the expected role of Nigerians in the diaspora towards the economic and social development in Nigeria.

However, the extent to which development strategies of the Nigerian government shape migration is limited. The ERGP highlighted the role of the diaspora but it was relatively silent on policies/initiatives that can facilitate legal migration or even support Nigerians in the diaspora. This relates to the point made by one of the respondents that the Nigerian government emphasises what the country can benefit from citizens in the diaspora without considering what the country can do for the diaspora as well.

Examples of impact on migration

Although Nigeria’s migration governance architecture and policy frameworks on migration have improved in recent times, there is no data on the impact on migration outcomes. Weak or non-existent linkages between development and migration policies implies that impacts on migration outcomes are likely limited.

Any additional information related to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic led to lockdowns and restrictions on international travel, especially during the second quarter of 2020. Such measures could not be sustained in Nigeria due to economic and social reasons. There have also been a few instances of reciprocal travel bans with some countries related to COVID-19; however, international travel has remained relatively constant to date.

The pandemic affected formal diaspora remittances which are said to have been reduced by 28% (World Bank, 2021). Nonetheless, there is a possibility that informal remittances remained high during the period in question, as Nigerians usually send money to their loved ones through friends who travel home during festive periods like Christmas and New year.

References


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