



MIGNEX Background Paper

Migration-relevant policies in Somalia

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Suggested citation

Chapman, M., Majidi, N. and Nicolle, H. (2023) Migration-relevant policies in Somalia. MIGNEX Background Paper (v2). Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo. Available at www.mignex.org/som

MIGNEX

MIGNEX (Aligning Migration Management and the Migration-Development Nexus) is a five-year research project (2018–2023) with the core ambition of creating new knowledge on migration, development and policy. It is carried out by a consortium of nine partners in Europe, Africa and Asia: the Peace Research Institute Oslo (coordinator), Danube University Krems, University of Ghana, Koç University, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Maastricht University, the Overseas Development Institute, the University of Oxford and Samuel Hall.

See www.mignex.org.



MIGNEX has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 770453.

MIGNEX Background Papers

MIGNEX Background Papers are scientific papers containing the documentation and analyses that underpin the project results. Selected insights from background papers are also presented in non-technical form in other formats, including MIGNEX Policy Briefs and MIGNEX Reports.

Acknowledgements

This document was reviewed by Marie Godin and Carlos Vargas-Silva as part of MIGNEX quality assurance and review procedures. Abdullahi Abdi Hassan (Solutions Manager at the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS)) conducted an external review in order to solicit additional constructive comments on the full background paper. The content of the document, including opinions expressed and any remaining errors, is the responsibility of the authors.

Publication information

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Peace Research Institute Oslo, Oslo, Norway

February 2023 (Version 2)

ISBN (print):
978-82-343-0195-7

ISBN (online):
978-82-343-0196-4

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History of changes

Version	Date	Changes
1	1 December 2022	Version submitted as official deliverable to the EC.
2	3 February 2023	Revised version with corrections submitted on the website

Contents

Migration-relevant policies in Somalia 1

About the MIGNEX policy reviews 1

Methodological note 1

Summary of main results 2

Emigration 4

Main policies 4

Trends 6

Impacts on emigration 7

Impacts on development 7

Key incoherence across policies 8

Interaction with development policies 8

Diaspora 9

Main policies 9

Trends 10

Impacts on development 10

Key incoherence across policies 12

Interaction with development policies 12

Transit migration 12

Main policies 12

Trends 14

Impacts on return migration 15

Impacts on development 15

Key incoherence across policies 15

Interaction with development policies 15

Return migration 16

Main policies 16

Trends 17

Impacts on return migration 18

Impacts on development 19

Key incoherence across policies 19

Interaction with development policies 20

Immigration 21

Main policies 21

Trends 23

Impacts on development 24

Key incoherence across policies 24

Interaction with development policies 24

Internal migration 24

Main policies 24

National Eviction Guidelines 24

National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons 25

Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons 26

Local and municipal policies and INGO programmes 26

Trends 27

Impacts on internal migration 29

Impacts on development 30

Key incoherence across policies 30

Interaction with development policies	32
Externalisation of EU migration policies	33
Main policies	33
Trends	34
Impacts on immigration, emigration, return migration and transit migration	35
Impacts on development	35
Key incoherence across policies	35
Interaction with development policies	36
Main development policies	36
The selected policies	37
Interactions with migration-related policies	39
Any additional information related to COVID-19	40
References	41

List of acronyms

AVR	Assisted Voluntary Return
BMM	Better Migration Management Programme
BRA	Benadir Regional Administration
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel Saharan States
FGoS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
IBM	Immigration and Border Management programme
IBMC	Integrated Border Management Committee
ID	(National) Identification Document
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IND	Immigration and Naturalization Directorate
INGO	International Non-Governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MIDAS	Migration Information and Data Analysis System
MMTF	Mixed Migration Task Force
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MPF	Migration Policy Framework
MRC	Migrant Response Centre
MRP	Migrant Response Plan
NCRI	National Commission for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
NDRA	National Displacement and Refugee Agency
NDP	National Development Plan
NDSS	National Durable Solutions Strategy

NPRRI	National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SSPP	Somalia Social Protection Policy
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States

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Migration-relevant policies in Somalia

This paper presents the results of a policy review of the MIGNEX project in Somalia. It provides an overview of the key migration policies in Somalia and their interaction with development and development policies.

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Advancements have been made in the assistance provided to Somali returnees and IDPs, based on the adoption of durable solutions approaches.

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However, policy implementation is negatively impacted by poor coordination between government actors and a lack of monitoring and coordination mechanisms.

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Given conflicts over natural resources, land and property, tenure security and anti-eviction laws will continue to be central to the protection and reintegration of IDPs and returnees.

About the MIGNEX policy reviews

This is one of 10 MIGNEX Background Papers devoted to a review of policies in the 10 countries of origin and transit covered by the project. The term **policy** can refer to many different phenomena. MIGNEX adopts a broad perspective and regards policy to include the existence and effectiveness of particular laws, common practices, development initiatives, policy interventions and the broader policy environment or framework. This inclusive definition encompasses the needs of the project's overall research.

Much of the analysis in the review involves policies that relate directly to migration and its link to development. The concept of **migration-related policies** includes both the migration policy environment and interventions that seek to affect the development impacts of migration. It also includes policy and projects that might have large effects on migration dynamics, even if not presented under a migration heading.

Methodological note

The literature review for this MIGNEX policy brief was conducted between January and March 2022. In addition, 18 semi-structured interviews were

conducted, covering a range of actors from government representatives to durable solutions programmes, humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development organisations, as well as researchers active in the migration field. Of the 18 interviews, 14 were conducted between February and March 2022, while earlier perspectives were provided through four interviews in 2021. All interviews were conducted in English, either by telephone or video call.

Nassim Majidi and Hervé Nicolle led the research team with data collection supported by Hafsa Ali, Fatuma Ahmad, Camille Kasavan, Jared Owuor and Carly Seedall-Vasic. Madison Chapman led the drafting of this MIGNEX Background Paper, with editing by Francesca Chiavaroli and Cyrus Ettihadieh. The interviews were facilitated by the Samuel Hall team in Nairobi, which enabled access to interviewees due to their established network with migration, displacement and policy experts in Somalia.

Summary of main results

Three key takeaways emerge from this paper: 1) advancements have been made in the assistance provided to Somali returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) since the adoption of the National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (NPRRI) (FGoS, 2019a) and Somalia's ninth National Development Plan (NDP-9) for 2020–2024 (FGoS, 2020a); 2) progress has been impacted by poor coordination between government actors (namely, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGoS) and Federal Member States (FMS)); and 3) housing, land and property (HLP), tenure security, and anti-eviction laws have played an increasing role in the reintegration of IDPs and returnees, and the importance of the rule of law and monitoring is recognised in the implementation of these policies.

NPRRI and NDP-9 both address socioeconomic development for IDPs, returnees and host communities under a durable-solutions, self-reliance framework. These policies are distinct but they interact in their goals: to limit emigration while building resilience in IDP and returnee communities for reintegration and poverty alleviation. The NDP additionally focuses on border security, combating human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and stronger coordination of border management and ports of entry as key mechanisms to increase protection for IDP and returnee communities in Somalia. However, challenges have been faced in the implementation of these policies due to the fragmented nature of Somali federal politics, and lack of coordination between FGoS and FMS ministries, authorities and policy-makers.

Developing durable solutions strategies and linking migration policies to development policies represents an important first step towards centering the experiences of migrants and refugees in Somalia's policy-making. However, these policies may fail to achieve their full potential without strong coordination mechanisms that consider localization, the impacts of rapid urbanization on evictions, monitoring, clan dynamics, drought, and the realities of secondary and cyclical migration.

The lack of clear coordination between state and federal authorities has also presented challenges for immigration, emigration and transit migration by straining border management efforts. Ports of entry continue to be alternately policed by rival clans, informal militias, Al Shabaab operatives, and formal state and federal authorities.

European Union (EU) funding and training – namely through Frontex and the European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – have worked to improve capacity-building in the federal government for border management. Trainings have been delivered on data collection and tools (e.g., biometric data collection) by the EU-funded Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme, yet the borders remain porous and dangerous to cross. The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting border closures have contributed to protection risks, leaving migrants stranded in transit. Further, the lack of a national identification (ID card) policy and stringent visa requirements to travel between Somalia's FMS limit the mobility of internal migrants and returnees, and can make it difficult for them to return to their places of origin, to reunite with clan social networks and to access basic services in different areas of the country. This mismanaged ID and border policy can contribute to migrants seeking more dangerous routes and to secondary migration.

HLP also continues to be a primary concern for both migration and development policies in Somalia. The collapse of the Somali state led to the emergence of multiple authorities in the country and the creation of a hybrid governance model. This complex scenario has contributed to the current HLP crisis, as different actors came to control natural resources, including land. Additionally, lack of land tenure in rural areas contributes to the concentration of migrants in urban zones, namely in Mogadishu, as well as areas of Kismayo and Baidoa.

Rapid urbanization and the lack of tenure security can create secondary and cyclical migration for IDPs and returnees. It can also push migrants to move into areas where they may face discrimination due to different clan affiliations, or where they struggle to access basic services and humanitarian assistance. Offering humanitarian assistance in cities to the exclusion of host communities also stokes tensions, however. While the National Eviction Guidelines (FGoS, 2019b) are an important step towards mainstreaming land tenure and tenure security across Somalia, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that evictions continue at high rates in the country, and that additional monitoring, data collection, capacity-building and coordination will be necessary for the Guidelines to be implemented effectively and equitably.




Figure 1: Migration and return routes, Yemen and Horn of Africa

Source: IOM, Regional Migrant Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen 2021 - 2024

Emigration

Main policies

The primary drivers of emigration from Somalia are conflict, drought and competition for pasture land and other scarce natural resources (ReDSS, 2022a). This also includes secondary and cyclical displacement of IDPs and returnees migrating onward due to a lack of land tenure, evictions and insufficient access to humanitarian support. Up to February 2021, the United States (US) Department of State reported that over 900,000 Somalis had registered for refugee status worldwide (US Department of State, 2021). However, Somalis also emigrate to explore labour, employment and other economic opportunities outside of Somalia, and often express more than one reason for emigrating. Considering this, it may be more appropriate to characterise Somali emigration as ‘mixed migration’.

Somalia does not have a single, clear emigration policy, though it does have a significant diaspora community and is a member of regional policies and frameworks related to refugees. These include the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (emerging from the Global Compact for Refugees)

and the Nairobi declaration on Durable solutions for Somali refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia (IGAD, 2017). These regional policies seek to generate a ‘comprehensive regional approach to find and deliver durable solutions for Somali refugees and to create an enabling environment for the reintegration of Somalis when they return home’ (UNHCR, 2021a). UNHCR reports that, in 2017, Somali regional and federal government officials came together in a National Forum on Durable Solutions for Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons to discuss and decide how to best operationalise and institutionalise the Nairobi Declaration in Somalia, leading to a ‘draft National Policy to support the roll-out of the Nairobi Declaration in Somalia’ (the National Action Plan on Durable Solutions for Somali Returnees and IDPs 2018–2020) (ibid.). These policies are discussed in further detail in the sections on the Diaspora and on Return migration.

National identification policies and labour migration policies also contribute to the emigration policy landscape in Somalia. Somalia has been called an ‘ID Dark Zone’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020) without a civil authority tasked with registration and the issuance of IDs. In comparison, Somaliland and Puntland have more established and institutionalised ID policies. Somaliland offers a passport through its issuing authority and a separate identity document for incoming asylum seekers and refugees through the National Displacement and Refugee Agency (NDRA) in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021). Puntland has its own Puntland ID Card offered to members of the host community and IDPs, with a different ‘certificate’ available for refugees and asylum seekers. The Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) also offers an ID card and passport, and the EU has supported funding (implemented through international organizations) of biometric IDs. Obtaining these cards and passports is procedurally complex and expensive for ordinary citizens, returnees and IDPs, however, and these documents are not widely accepted across Somalia. None are issued in a standardised manner through the FGoS (ibid.).

Though Somalis do not require identification for domestic movement (and, due to porous land borders, may not require them to leave and enter Somalia from neighbouring countries), the lack of a national ID card policy may impact emigrants’ access to services both abroad and upon return to Somalia (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020). Various checkpoints across Somalia (which may be operated by the government, allies, militias or Al Shabaab operatives) may, but do not typically, require ID, but they do evaluate ‘clan status’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020). However, the application of these means of verification for potential emigrants moving within or seeking to leave Somalia is not consistent (ibid.). According to an Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report, Somalia lacks technologically advanced entry and exit procedures, and does not monitor ‘illegal departures’ in a centralised way (DFAT, cited in Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020), especially as checkpoints remain diffuse due to the length of Somalia’s border and limited capacity to establish border controls. As the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada found in a Country of Origin report, ‘documentation will be checked in offices located on either side of the

border; however, the existence of border control is inconsistent due to the length of the border' - King's College London Lecturer (2020, cited in Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2022).

In 2019, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) expressed a possible interest in working towards a national ID policy and single registry as part of the Somalia Social Protection Policy (SSPP) (MOLSA, 2019), though progress on this initiative remains unclear to date. Identity documents may allow for more free travel across and outside of Somalia for potential emigrants.

On the labour migration front, in 2021 the FGoS started working with the Regional Migrant Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen 2021–2024 (henceforth 'MRP') to establish a path towards bilateral labour agreements with Gulf State nations through MOLSA. This effort included collaboration and capacity-strengthening, namely in bolstering data access and ownership related to migrant 'admission, readmission, return, and reintegration' (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021). However, there is limited information on labour migration to or from Somalia, though there are instances of members of the Somali diaspora becoming entrepreneurs in foreign countries (The Vatican, n.d.). Labour emigrants from Somalia generally earn low to moderate incomes with jobs in livestock and agriculture, and generally have low levels of formal education (The Vatican, n.d.).

Trends

As noted, conflict, drought, and competition for pasture land and other scarce natural resources are the primary drivers of emigration from Somalia. This has been consistent over the last decade, with primary destination countries continuing to be Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen, as well as other neighbouring countries to Somalia (Whitaker, 2020). Often, irregular secondary movements to the US, United Kingdom (UK) and Scandinavian countries are also common (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017), due in part to 'host country policies that limit free movement of refugees and deny integration' in countries of first migration (Mohamud, 2020: 122).

Host countries maintain distinct policies and attitudes toward Somali refugees and asylum seekers. For example, in Kenya, the proposed closure of the Dadaab Refugee Camp emerged from security concerns directed at the Somali (and other) refugee population. Discrimination is not always the case, however. In Tanzania, Somali refugees and asylum seekers have been more warmly accepted, with Tanzania offering citizenship to the Somali population (Whitaker, 2020).

The Southern Route through East Africa and the Horn of Africa has remained a popular approach for migrating Somalis, as well as their Ethiopian and Eritrean peers (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021). In 2021, migrants continued to emigrate from Somalia, with a net migration rate of -2.98 migrants (Migration Policy Institute, n.d.). Flooding, conflict, and the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as persistent drought, led to nearly 1,092,000

displaced Somalis (both internally displaced and otherwise) between January and August 2020 (OCHA, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2021).

MIGNEX
Background
Paper

Finally, key informants noted a trend in which Somali emigration policy consistently targets low-income families and communities, especially those with lower levels of education, as the primary source of out-migration. However, there is limited acknowledgement in emigration policy instruments of the large numbers of Somalis with tertiary education who emigrate, failing to reflect their unique needs and challenges in policy development. This points to challenges in developing a coherent labour migration policy. According to key informants, government agencies such as MOLSA have been in need of significant, but under-provided, technical support to develop a national labour migration policy. Insufficient data on labour market gaps and skill assessments, and insufficient triangulated data between government ministries, add to the challenge of creating a labour migration policy. Experts suggested that a data collection initiative is ‘in the works’ between the Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration, MOLSA, the Bureau of National Statistics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Outside of Somalia’s domestic policy, key informants noted that bilateral labour agreements are being developed with Qatar ahead of the 2022 World Cup, with Kuwait, and possibly with Saudi Arabia in the near future.

Impacts on emigration

Forced displacement from Somalia has been the subject of much debate and policy development in the Horn of Africa region and in the EU. Migration out of Somalia predictably outpaces immigration to Somalia, and the transit migration policies have focused on stemming human trafficking. Emigration continues to fuel an industry for smuggling, which contributes to human trafficking in Somalia. Trafficking and smuggling are key to transit migration policies in Somalia and are discussed further in the section on Transit migration.

Impacts on development

Emigration (notably, forced displacement) from Somalia impacts development both by draining the country’s human capital, by reducing the population of work-age young people and by impacting attitudes and future plans for Somali refugees and asylum seekers in camps. The median age of Somali migrants in 2020, for example, was 28.3 years. Of the total population of Somalia, 0.4% had emigrated in 2020 (UNDESA, 2020). This reflects trends from 2015, which demonstrate a ‘bubble’ of young and work-aged Somalis migrating (UNDESA 2015, cited in Maastricht Graduate School of Governance 2017: Figure 2).




Figure 2: Somalia migration profile

Source: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (2017), based on UNDESA data.

Research also suggests that settling in Kenya's Dadaab Refugee Camp can contribute to 'self-defeating attributes' amongst refugees who 'slowly lose agency, self-worth, and ultimately, their dignity' while in camp, contributing to 'multigenerational dependency and low self-esteem' (Mohamud, 2020: 123). While the extent to which Somali refugees in camps are dependent on aid remains a topic of discussion and research, protracted displacement and difficulty finding employment outside of Somalia may impact development by stalling education (thus restricting the growth of diaspora human capital) and restricting remittances.

The lack of a standardised Somali ID card and clear bilateral labour policy agreements may also impact development outcomes in Somalia, though the direct impacts of these policy gaps are under-studied in the humanitarian and development literature.

Key incoherence across policies

Incoherence in Somalia's emigration policies lies primarily in the lack of a national policy. Additional focus on labour migration policies and bilateral agreements with states to which Somali migrants travel for work may generate positive development impacts, such as more institutionalised tracking of remittances. However, the general lack of a clear policy to date makes it difficult to identifying inconsistencies.

Interaction with development policies

NDP-9 of the FGoS contains little reference to refugees, asylum seekers or labour migration (FGoS, 2020a). It does not identify or consider in policy planning the impact of significant Somali emigration on development in the

country (though it does briefly mention the diaspora, as discussed in the next section). NDP-9 does, however, highlight the importance of national ID cards in the context of establishing prerequisites for a national social protection programme, which requires registration. NDP-9 notes that ‘persistently low levels of Somali ownership of national identification requires an early intervention’ (ibid: 33.). Yet the extent to which this impacts emigration remains untested.

Diaspora

Main policies

Somalia has a significant diaspora community – reaching over two million in 2021 (DEMAC, 2021) – but the country has only placed limited emphasis on developing formal diaspora policies. According to Shandy and Das (2016, cited in Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017, p.8), ‘independent government activities do not seem to use this potential sufficiently’ and data on remittances – which are typically sent through *dahabshiil* and Islamic or informal banks, such as the *hawala* system – are difficult to gather. Further, diaspora communities often invest in enterprises (shops, restaurants, buildings) with quick returns, which are also difficult to monitor. The diaspora does not often invest in agriculture, industrialization, and other areas of interest to the FGoS.

Diaspora policy in Somalia is often delegated to states within Somalia’s federal government structure through state-level diaspora offices. It remained, until 2020, unclear the extent to which the Federal Office for Diaspora Affairs, established in 2013, was active in developing and implementing diaspora policies. In part for this reason, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been working with the FGoS to develop a National Diaspora Policy. In July 2021, IOM and the FGoS launched a project that intends to lead towards the development of a National Diaspora Policy, facilitated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (IOM, 2021a). This policy would allow the FGoS to ‘harness the contribution of the diaspora for the sustainable development of the country’ (IOM Somalia, 2022) and is currently in development. The FGoS and researchers have recognised, through findings shared in the Somalia Diaspora Investment Survey Report, the need for more skilled members of the diaspora to return to the country in order to contribute to Somalia’s development. This report encourages the FGoS to further develop trade and investment laws to better equip Somalia to take advantage of the diaspora’s skills and to encourage the return of skilled workers (ibid.).

At the FMS level, efforts are being undertaken to regroup diaspora communities to address displacement issues. For example, the Jubbaland administration formed a diaspora unit within the Ministry of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs to encourage the diaspora to support the drought-affected population in Somalia. However, these efforts remained sporadic and isolated, as a coordination framework was lacking.

In addition to the development of a National Diaspora Policy, members of the diaspora enjoy some political rights. These include dual citizenship and the right to vote in national elections while living abroad (ibid.).

Trends

As previously noted, the Somali diaspora is widespread, with a particular presence in the US due to the continuing temporary protected status (TPS) granted to Somalis (USCIS, 2021). Between 1990 and 2015, the global diaspora population nearly doubled in size (Connor and Krogstad, 2016: Figure 2).

Remittances have played a significant role in Somalia's gross domestic product (GDP) since the fall of the state in 1991 (Mohamud, 2020). In a report published in 2021, remittances were reported at 35.3% of the national GDP, with an inflow of US\$1,735 million (AFFORD and EUDIF, 2021), from US\$2 billion in 2019 (IOM, 2021). Remittances are not only financial, but, as some researchers suggest, a social obligation that, 'in the absence of a central authority to regulate the economy and enhance economic development', will be used for household rather than development spending (Hammond, cited in Mohamud, 2020: 126).

Trends in the last decade primarily point to interactions between the existence of the Somali diaspora and development goals and policies, as well as failings underscored by the lack of a unified National Diaspora Policy. For more on this topic, see the next subsection and also the subsection on Interaction with development policies.

Impacts on development

The diaspora has a limited, but growing, impact on development in Somalia. While the diaspora community has historically contributed to the Somali economy and national development through remittances, it is increasingly contributing to governance, policy reform and investment as well (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017; AFFORD and EUDIF, 2021). This includes running for political office either upon return to Somalia or in their 'diasporic home country' (Shandy and Das, 2016: 8), and transferring skills, education and experiences to Somali nationals. These activities contribute to what some research describes as 'investing in and building Somalia' (ibid: 10).

Diaspora contributions have also included organised remittances and funding flows to pay for schools, hospitals, teacher salaries, boarding schools and the maintenance of these development projects (Mohamud, 2020), and in some cases, support for Somali refugees living outside of the country in camps (Shandy and Das, 2016). The diaspora has also invested in new companies and, in turn, has fostered entrepreneurship and the return of entrepreneurs from abroad (AFFORD and EUDIF, 2021). The same goes for the government, which is heavily populated by former, returned members of the Somali diaspora (ibid.). Diaspora members have also contributed their capacities in institutional management to organise and launch development projects (e.g., the schools, hospitals and capacity-building for university staff, mentioned above) from abroad (Abdirahman, n.d.).

Further, the Somali diaspora has become increasingly more involved in humanitarian responses in the country. A DEMAC (2021) case study finds that of 22 formal or semi-formal Somali diaspora organisations interviewed, primarily in Europe and North America, most were engaged in various interventions related to livelihoods, women's empowerment and education, with additional focus on immediate aid for rapid-onset disasters such as flooding, as well as longer-term emergencies pegged to armed conflict and drought. These organisations received funding from diaspora members, religious and community organisations, and donor governments, in some cases (DEMAC, 2021). DEMAC finds that of the diaspora organisations' efforts, 'some were project-based interventions dependent on sporadic diaspora contributions implemented by contacts on the ground with no interaction with institutional humanitarian actors. Others focused on humanitarian and development interventions supported by institutional donors and implemented with local partners who participate in humanitarian coordination mechanisms' (ibid: 10).

However, interviews with key informants suggest that certain diaspora investments into Somalia (and diaspora assumption of key ministerial roles) are not always perceived to be positive. There are reports of diaspora members who purchase and secure land for future investment, leaving it undeveloped and unusable by local communities. These tendencies are perceived to encourage land speculation and drive up the price of land. As one respondent noted, 'land is the bank system of Somalia'. On the administrative/ministerial front, one key informant noted that members of the diaspora are often ill-equipped for the high-level advisory jobs they receive upon return to Somalia, which experts suggested they may receive simply because of their connections and resources. Their higher-than-average salaries can create parallel structures that effectively distance the diaspora from their local communities, generating isolation and social tension that presents a challenge for engaging the diaspora in development.

While diaspora organisations often work with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), local grassroots NGOs, specific national ministries (e.g., diaspora health workers via the Ministry of Health) and UN agencies, they are also beginning to establish their own offices and field staff in Somalia to 'coordinate their activities directly through these institutional partners', and may even participate in humanitarian cluster or inter-agency systems (DEMAC, 2021: 11). However, given that 'regions of Somalia with stronger and wealthier diaspora receive greater support in general' and reliance on clan affiliations remain strong in targeting aid (ibid: 11), support from diaspora organisations for humanitarian and development assistance is not necessarily an equitable tool for assistance, and should be used in concert with other aid modalities. One key informant suggests that more equity could be attained with policy coordination, as many philanthropic diaspora members would be more incentivised to invest in economic development and humanitarian projects if there were clear guidelines for investment (along with corresponding security infrastructure). There have been some positive efforts to this end in Baidoa, where the Chamber of Commerce has been more active in private-sector diaspora engagement (but still lacks coordination with the FGoS Ministry of Foreign Affairs on humanitarian and development engagement of the diaspora).

Key incoherence across policies

As AFFORD and EUDIF (2021: 3) note in their research on the Somali diaspora, ‘most diaspora contributions to Somalia remain diaspora – rather than state – led, and informal in nature’. This is incoherent with the national development goals Somalia has put forth in both its NDP-9 (FGoS, 2020a) and in the National Durable Solutions Strategy (NDSS) (FGoS, 2020b). As Shandy and Das (2016) note, diaspora communities are keen to contribute to discussions about durable solutions and have unprecedented access to certain communities of refugees and internal migrants in Somalia due to clan ties. However, the lack of a finalised National Diaspora Policy makes it difficult to systematically engage with the diaspora to leverage these connections and their innovative ideas for sustainable development and durable solutions.

Interaction with development policies

Somalia’s movement toward a National Diaspora Policy to coordinate diaspora engagements and investments is in line with the country’s eighth NDP (NDP-8) (FGoS, 2017) (which highlights crucial diaspora investment and remittances) and the more recent NDP-9 (FGoS, 2020a). NDP-8 ‘included the following goals: remittances link with social and economic priorities; diaspora expertise support to public sector initiatives; new business development through diaspora capital; and technical expertise and links to international/regional markets’ (AFFORD and EUDIF, 2021: 2). NDP-9 takes this further by elaborating on how the Somali diaspora may contribute to policies at the humanitarian–development nexus (ibid.). The FGoS has also floated a possible National Human Capital Strategy based out of the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, which will seek to harness skills and capacities from highly skilled diaspora returnees (ibid.). This Strategy has yet to be finalised, yet such policies are an important step towards formalising diaspora engagement.

As it stands, the Somali diaspora is engaged primarily through private-sector initiatives. Examples exist, however, of alternate modes of engagement. For example, in Jubaland, a diaspora-led committee has supported local development. One expert suggests that this kind of model could be scaled up nationally.

Transit migration

Main policies

While primarily a country of refugee origin, internal displacement and destination for returnees, Somalia also serves as a thoroughfare for transit and a ‘source and transit’ country for migrant smuggling (US Department of State, 2016). Somalia lies on the Eastern Route to Yemen and other destinations, with the port of Bosasso used as a key jumping-off point for Somalis and Ethiopians (ibid.). Yet, from a transit migration perspective, Somalia serves, most notably, as a route for human trafficking. For this reason, most transit migration policies centre around stemming human trafficking. The primary policies related to human trafficking and transit in

Somalia are the country's engagement in the Khartoum Process (i.e., the EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (IOM, n.d.)), the Regional Migrant Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen (the MRP; see (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Legal developments within Somalia and INGO and donor-led programmes have also targeted human trafficking and smuggling. One key informant noted that Somalia is currently working on a counter- trafficking policy with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Better Migration Management (BMM) programme, the British Council and the German Agency of International Cooperation (GIZ), though desk research was not able to confirm this.

The Khartoum Process, which started in 2014 and is structured on the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 'aims at the elimination of human trafficking and smuggling networks by collaborating in the identification and prosecution of criminal networks, in the establishment and management of reception centers, in the support and protection of victims and their rights, and in the promotion of sustainable development as a mechanism to tackle the root causes of irregular migration' (The Vatican, n.d.; see also IOM, n.d.; Sullivan, 2021). The goals 'preventing and combatting irregular migration and eradicating human trafficking' factor crucially into the framework of the Khartoum Process, which partially oversees funds provided by the EUTF (Sullivan, 2021).

IGAD, which began in 2012, seeks to 'harmonise' regional and national policies on migration management and the combating of human trafficking. The MRP stipulates working with IGAD states to 'standardise' monitoring, data collection, and a database of child rights violations in Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, and to maintain other online data collection systems (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021). Information-sharing is key to stemming abuses along transit routes within IGAD states and forms a policy pillar for combating human trafficking in Somalia. However, the MRP does not specifically include returnees and IDPs in transit as part of their response plan (ibid.).

Legal developments and various INGO- and donor-led programmes have also sought to limit the flow of human trafficking through Somalia. On the legal front, the Somaliland House of Representatives passed an anti-human-trafficking and smuggling law in 2022 (Somalidispatch, 2022). In 2019, Somaliland also drafted the Countering Trafficking in Person and Smuggling of Migrants Act, though current information is limited on the progress made as a result of this legislation (EUCAP Somalia, 2019). INGO- and donor-led assistance has included the BMM programme, which coordinates programmes related to human trafficking across federal and regional jurisdictions and 'supports the Federal Government of Somalia in developing and improving national migration policies and frameworks and in contributing to regional migration governance' (GIZ, 2021: 2). BMM's collaboration with the FGoS has contributed to the federal government establishing various entities focused on irregular migration management and transit, such as the Technical Task Force on Human Trafficking and Smuggling, the Technical Task Force on Return and Readmission, and the High-Level Task Force on Migration Management (ibid.). Many of these bodies developed programmes focusing on coast guard training, institutional

coordination between border management agencies and on bolstering regional coordination (ibid.).

Trends

In addition to the externally led and regionally focused initiatives discussed above, the FGoS and regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland have made some inroads in curbing human trafficking in the last decade. The FGoS expanded border processing and its Border Management Information Systems in 2015 and has supported awareness-raising public relations campaigns about trafficking (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017). However, these inroads remain minimal: for the last decade, the US Department of State has consistently rated Somalia as a ‘Special Case’ country for human trafficking in its annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* (TiP Report), and in 2020 noted that ‘the FGS, Somaliland, and Puntland authorities sustained minimal efforts to combat trafficking during the reporting period. Due to the protracted campaign to degrade Al Shabaab and establish law and order in Somalia, law enforcement, prosecutorial personnel, and judicial offices remained understaffed, undertrained, and lacked capacity to effectively enforce anti-trafficking laws’ (US Department of State, 2020).

For example, a 2017 effort to pass a draft human-trafficking law in Somaliland failed, and the relevant government institutions working on human trafficking and smuggling (the Special Envoy for Children’s and Migrants’ Rights, in particular) remained under-staffed and lacked technical expertise on combating trafficking (ibid.). According to the 2020 TiP Report, Somaliland authorities ‘relied predominantly on immigration legislation to prosecute trafficking crimes’ (ibid.), though they received support from UNODC in 2016–2017 to begin discussing human-trafficking legislation. UNODC has also supported the FGoS to this end through funding mechanisms in BMM and the EUTF. In Puntland, on the other hand, the gradual development of a Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF) with the IOM has opened the door to coordinating transit migration policies. Harmonisation of data, transfer of migration management issues to the Puntland Ministry of the Interior, and advocacy for developing a migrant smuggling law have been issues of discussion within the MMTF since 2016 (AMMi, 2017).

Further, Somalia is historically a member of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which provides for free movement of people and capital provisions, and includes an agreement on Free Movement and Establishment of Persons within the Territory of Member States of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Abebe, 2017). CEN-SAD developed a regional approach to managing transit migration and promoting free movement, though it has not focused on issues related to human trafficking and smuggling.

Despite these incremental improvements, there have been no significant improvements to transit migration policy or protection for victims of human trafficking and smuggling in Somalia in the last decade. Somalia continues to not be a signatory to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime or its supplementary protocols on smuggling of migrants or trafficking

in persons, and the country has not passed legislation related to migrant smuggling (AMMi, 2017).

Impacts on return migration

As the FGoS and regional governments of Puntland and Somaliland continue to lack influence in reducing human trafficking and migrant smuggling, Somalia increasingly becomes a dangerous country of transit. Protection issues are common, with ethnic groups such as the Bantus and Midgaan especially vulnerable to exploitation by smuggling networks and powerful clan leaders (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017). Somalis also get caught in human-trafficking schemes. Forced labour is common along trafficking routes, and women and girls remain especially vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence and forced sex work in transit. Lack of regulation and national policy on transit migrants and human trafficking leaves fertile ground for these protection abuses to expand.

Impacts on development

The lack of enforceable federal and regional human-trafficking and migrant-smuggling laws, data collection and monitoring of migrant transit opens the door for corruption. While exact data on such abuses are not available, the 2016 TiP Report cites instances of traffickers bribing police and border guards at checkpoints, and federal government officials and employment agencies providing travel documents to smugglers (US Department of State 2016). These examples demonstrate how the continued lack of a clear, enforceable and monitored transit policy stalls progress on good governance and institution-strengthening objectives laid out both in NDP-9 (FGoS, 2020a: Section 8.4.1, under Social Development), which focuses on delivery of basic services, and the emphasis on the rule of law that runs as a cross-cutting theme throughout NDP-9. It also counteracts the objectives of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Key incoherence across policies

Given the lack of federal and regional policies on transit migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, there is no clear incoherence across policies (with the exception of incoherence between development policies and goals and reality on the ground, as discussed above).

Interaction with development policies

Information on interaction between transit migration and development policies in Somalia is limited. At the time of writing this MIGNEX Background Paper, there is no meaningful or significant interaction between transit migration policies in Somalia and development policies such as NDP-9. Human-trafficking and migrant-smuggling initiatives continue to receive funding through the BMM and the EUTF, but anti-smuggling and trafficking policies are not integrated into existing development frameworks.

Return migration

MIGNEX
Background
Paper

Main policies

Many of the main policies related to return migration in Somalia are tied into or overlap with policies (and programme interventions) related to IDPs. These include the Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, the National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (NPRRI), the National Eviction Guidelines (FGoS, 2019a, b and c), and policies related to national development, as well as local and municipal policies and INGO programmes (see the main policies described in the section on Internal migration).

To avoid repetition, this section does not describe these policies in detail, which apply broadly to both IDPs and refugee-returnees (save in instances where elements of a policy are directly targeted at returnees and *not* IDPs). Rather, this section refers readers to the Internal migration section. Here, we address policies specific to or with a particular focus on refugee-returnees, focusing on assisted voluntary return (AVR) in the MRP and the Migrant Response Centres (MRCs) in Mogadishu.

The Policy on Returnees to Somalia is a 2016 policy that seeks to protect security gains and human rights in Somalia, while setting out ‘criteria for voluntary and involuntary return of Somali nationals, including a risk assessment process and safeguards’ (AFFORD and EUDIF, 2021: 2). Since 2016, this Policy as well as the more recent NPRRI (see section on Internal migration) have served as the primary policies governing return and reintegration of returnees in Somalia.

AVR continues to impact the return policy landscape in Somalia. AVR is an initiative supported by Somalia’s participation in the Nairobi Declaration and the MRP. Through its participation in the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions (IGAD, 2017), which applies to IGAD states, Somalia is involved in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. Part of the Nairobi Declaration’s commitment is, in addition to managing refugees in the IGAD region, to creating ‘an enabling environment for the safe, sustainable and voluntary return and reintegration of Somali refugees’ (Owigo and Yusuf, 2020). As a result, the Nairobi Declaration and related commitments seek to strengthen reintegration support as well as AVR. The Strategic Objective of the MRP highlights a need to ‘strengthen reintegration assistance for returning migrants by providing livelihoods assistance (both skills building in promising economic sectors based on local market assessments, as well as enhancing entrepreneurial activities), creating a business enabling environment through individual and institutional capacity-building, promotion of business creativity and innovation through adoption of new approaches, provision ... support for income generating activities as well access to credit’ (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021: 39). However, the extent to which Somalia has achieved these goals, and the weight these commitments are given compared to advancing AVR and facilitating returns, remain unclear.

The MRP and partners have also been involved in creating an MRC in Somalia. While not strictly a policy, the MRC programme intervention helps build capacity for ‘frontline officials’ related to child protection and return, provides immediate assistance to returnees (basic services, information, counselling, referrals) and support for reintegration for both returnees and trafficking survivors in a ‘one-stop-shop’ model (ibid.). The relevant organisers passed control and operation of the MRC to the BRA in Mogadishu in September 2020 (ibid.).

Trends

Return migration has continued to generate momentum in Somalia, with over 85,000 Somalis returned from Kenya between 2014 and 2019 (Owigo and Yusuf, 2020). This occurred as part of the 2013 Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR, Kenya and Somalia. Yet, as one key informant noted, a common trend in the last decade is that Somali returnees from Kenya have ended up in IDP camps, where the reality of life is not what they had expected – many likely would have chosen to stay had they known the real conditions in IDP settlements.

Returnees from Yemen, Saudi Arabia and EU Member States have also become increasingly common in the last decade (ibid.), many of whom are ethnically Somali. Returns have come through a mix of AVR and spontaneous returns, precipitated by ‘political changes’ in Kenya, where many Somalis resided in the Dadaab Refugee Camp (which has been in a stalled process of closing over recent years, after Kenya suspended refugee registration in Dadaab in 2015 due in part to the ‘slow rate of returns under the Tripartite Agreement’), and in Somalia (Amnesty International 2017; IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021). This trend of increasing returns has existed since 2013 due to what Majidi (2017, p.3) calls ‘push and pull factors’ – ‘shrinking of asylum space in Kenya, increase in arbitrary arrest and harassment by the police in Kenya, food aid cuts and perceived stability, greater livelihood opportunities, and prospects for family reunification and access to land in Somalia’.

Since the Tripartite Agreement, return has been seen as a preferred durable solution for Somali refugees living in protracted displacement in Kenya (ibid.). It may also be a result of Kenya revoking *prima facie* refugee status from Somalis in 2016. According to numbers from UNHCR (2017, cited in Amnesty International, 2017, p. 6), ‘the number of refugees who returned to Somalia under the Tripartite Agreement’s voluntary repatriation program rose sharply in the aftermath of the government’s directive to close the camp: in 2015, 5,616 refugees returned, compared to 33,213 and 32,863 in 2016 and 2017 respectively’. Further, not all of these returns from Kenya were voluntary. Another Amnesty International study finds that ‘coercion and misinformation techniques were deployed by the Kenyan government in order to convince the refugees that they had no other option but to repatriate’ (Mohamud; 2020: 121).

Return has also increased from North Africa and the Middle East. Second only to Kenya in the number of Somali refugees it hosts, Somali returnees have also increased their return from Yemen due to growing instability in that country since 2017 (IOM Somalia, 2019). Somalis are also increasingly

returning from Saudi Arabia, with ‘more than 4,000 migrants ... returned from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with limited support upon arrival due to the absence of post arrival and reintegration assistance tailored to this group’ (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021: 37). Spending time in detention centres is common for Somali returnees from Saudi Arabia, but this has become more common throughout the COVID-19 pandemic (ibid.). Returnees require ‘immediate post- arrival assistance, including medical attention and psychosocial support, as well as onward transportation assistance to their areas of origin’ (ibid: 37).

Yet not all key informants agree that return – especially to rural areas – has been occurring at the rates desired by the FGoS and FMS. One key informant suggested secondary cities as a possible solution to the lack of rural return and rapid urbanisation (which can contribute to evictions). Yet there is doubt amongst experts as to whether these innovative policy recommendations can take root. Despite a working group between the World Bank, UN Habitat, the EU and other key stakeholders in Somalia investigating innovative policies to manage return and reintegration, not enough coordination and action has been taken at the local, regional and national levels to bring these ideas to fruition. As a result, refugee-returnees continue to return not to their rural home villages but to cities, contributing to challenges associated with rapid urbanisation in Somalia. This also contributes to the concentration of returnees in areas such as Kismayo and Baidoa, where refugee-returnees may travel for both perceived economic opportunities and to capitalise on existing clan-based social networks – overwhelming reintegration programmes in the process.

Finally, recent trends suggest that IDPs and returnees have been increasingly arriving in Baidoa since 2021 (and that those returning from Yemen will soon have to register, per a new law, as one key informant suggested). AVR continues to be an attractive reason for some Somalis (especially from Dadaab in Kenya) to return, given that they receive US\$200, medical assistance, temporary accommodation and a six-month food allowance.

Impacts on return migration

Returnees, as with IDPs and refugees, are susceptible to trafficking and migrant smuggling. This is especially true for those attempting to return to Somalia spontaneously and by navigating the country’s often dangerous and porous decentralised border management regime. According to Migrants & Refugees, a research and reporting initiative of the Vatican, ‘the governments [of South-Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland] have a limited capacity to deliver basic state functions on account of the influence of Xeer traditional law and sharia law. The state’s limited capacity results in inadequate responses to human trafficking and smuggling, and the non-unified national legal system complicates the prosecution of traffickers and the management of migration outside UNHCR channels’ (The Vatican, n.d.). In part for this reason, efforts through the NPRRI focus on HLP, livelihoods and human rights, as well as good governance, government coordination of migration issues, peacebuilding within Somalia, and institutional strengthening (ibid.).

Impacts on development

INGO and UN initiatives on HLP, tenure security, basic services, education, livelihoods and health help Somalia work towards its development priorities, both by supporting IDPs and returnees (including returnees living in IDP settlements due to land occupation), as well as host communities (Samuel Hall, 2015a). Yet, according to UNHCR (2021a), 'lack of access in many hard-to-reach areas, limited information on opportunities and limited vocational skills training options continue to hinder the full achievement of self-reliance objectives for every individual', restricting the efficacy and scope of returnee- (and IDP-) oriented resilience programming.

Returnees have expressed concern over a perceived lack of humanitarian and reintegration support, which contributed to the establishment of the UN-supported AVR programme (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017). Further, return may contribute to social tensions and social conflict, as evidenced through the cases of migrants who return to their homes and lands, only to find long-term settlers who believe they have an equal claim to the property (Samuel Hall, 2015a), or are pushed to return to areas of insecurity or areas outside of their clan network (where they may be discriminated against). Social issues surrounding access to education for returnees, access to quality food and water, and discrimination against returnees continue to pose development challenges as well (ibid.).

Further, the increased rate of Somali returns from Kenya since the Kenyan government announced its intention to close Dadaab have outpaced Somalia's capacity to sustainably reintegrate returnees, especially in cities. This exacerbates eviction challenges. Moreover, it is possible that return at the scale of both spontaneous return and AVR to Somalia has contributed to an increase in commodity prices and decreased remittances, which impact long-term development (ReDSS, 2022b). While this, as well as other factors, have built interest in unrestricted cash and voucher assistance (CVA), social protection, social welfare and safety nets as possible responses to large-scale return and internal displacement (see discussion of the SSPP in the section on Internal migration), these interventions cannot completely reverse the potential adverse development impacts of unsustainable return. As ReDSS suggests, linking to the SDGs, NDP processes and other development projects may be necessary to address the fallout of unprecedented rates of return in the context of COVID-19 (ibid.).

Beyond the challenges to return, return migration can contribute to development through the leveraging of returnee skills and education to open new businesses and create jobs for other Somalis. However, no policies are currently in place to explicitly harness and foster these opportunities.

Key incoherence across policies

As with all policies in Somalia, the structure of Somalia's federation means that while the FGoS can set policies and implement some initiatives, various policy mandates also fall to the states. ReDSS (2019a: 21) offers a detailed list

of regional and state-based policies related to not only returnees but IDPs and refugees as well.¹

While providing an exhaustive list of these policies is outside of the scope of this background paper, the fragmentation of the Somali policy landscape speaks to a key policy incoherence: coordination. Though INGO- and UN-supported initiatives have worked to help build capacity across Somali government agencies and foster conversation and information-sharing between different state authorities, additional coordination is required to streamline and harmonise Somali policies related to return, reintegration, IDPs and refugees. The same goes for border management and immigration policies. Somalia is an outlier in this respect – of the IGAD countries, only Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan lack National Coordination Mechanisms (NCMs), ‘government-led inter-agency coordination platforms tasked with discussing migration issues and facilitating cooperation among relevant stakeholders with migration-related mandates, thereby contributing to better migration management and governance’ (Migration Data Portal, 2021).

Interaction with development policies

Various development policies in Somalia seek to address returnees’ needs specifically. NDP-9 (FGoS, 2020a) allows refugee and returnee youth to receive public education and, for all returnees residing in a state with a primary healthcare initiative, youth and adults can receive healthcare (UNHCR, 2021a). Development initiatives to strengthen the rule of law, provide documentation, and increase access to services and basic needs (such as water) also specifically consider returnees’ unique needs. However, key informants noted that when these benefits and access to basic services (as one expert called it, a ‘support package’) runs out, refugee-returnees who have not fully reintegrated may return to Kenya or migrate onward, promoting cyclical migration. This is especially true as it remains difficult for returnees and IDPs to access the labour market (particularly college graduates and returnees with higher education, for whom jobs may not be available). This challenge also generates secondary migration. On the other hand, key informants also warned that social protection programmes that are adequately funded and implemented may also cause repeated displacement, as IDPs move from one location to another to receive benefits and services.

Finally, Somalia’s National Action Plan on Durable Solutions for Somali Returnees and IDPs (2018–2020) seeks to operationalise commitments made as part of the Nairobi Declaration, and ‘remains the main framework for the implementation of the GCR in the country’ (Owigo and Yusuf, 2020: 5). The NDSS (FGoS, 2020b) directly focuses on building government capacity as related to returnee reintegration, through training of trainers, strengthening

¹ At the national level, the Somalia NDSS 2020–2024 outlines the strategic visions and goals to achieve durable solutions for displacement-affected communities (FGoS, 2020b). Several FMS frameworks have been developed at the sub-national level, including: BRA’s Internally Displaced Person and Refugee-Returnees Policy (BRA, 2019); Puntland’s Local Integration for IDPs National Strategic Plan, 2017–2018; the Puntland Policy Guidelines on Displacement (Puntland Government of Somalia, 2014); and the Puntland Development Plan (PDP) 2020–2024 (Puntland State of Somalia, 2020).

local coordination mechanisms, and deploying regional task forces on evictions and durable solutions (ReDSS, 2022). ReDSS has supported these NDSS work plans and the roll-out of returnee- and IDP-focused initiatives across the FGoS, as well as at state level.

Immigration

Main policies

As with emigration, there is limited literature on immigration policies in Somalia. The majority of literature points to bureaucratic procedures for entry into Somalia, and centres on legal frameworks that encourage or bar labour immigration or temporary residence in the state.

As noted in the Emigration section, Somalia has a net negative migration rate (meaning there is more outward emigration than incoming immigration). Research suggests that ‘regular migration to Somalia seems limited largely to Somali migrants returning to invest in their country of origin’ (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017, p. 4).

However, Somalia does host a number of migrant workers and a limited number of refugees and asylum seekers, primarily from Yemen and Ethiopia (ibid.). Syrians also live and work in Somalia (though more often in highly skilled professions such as medicine). According to one key informant, other foreign nationals face greater difficulty in immigrating, as they must pay up to US\$800 for a visa and need a letter of invitation and job offer.

The Puntland Refugee Protection Law of 2017 allows refugees in that state to access the labour market (UNHCR, 2021a). MOLSA counted 25,000 migrant workers from the IGAD region in Mogadishu in 2018, with 7,000 work permits granted to ‘skilled migrants from India, the UK, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uganda, and Kenya, who work as doctors, teachers, and cleaners, or have jobs in construction, in hotels or in NGOs, and for the United Nations’ (The Vatican, n.d.). These include short-term immigrants working with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (ibid.).

The right to immigrate to Somalia to seek work is enshrined in various legal frameworks, including the CEN-SAD Treaty. CEN-SAD states that ‘that the rights, advantages and obligations of a member state’s own citizens will apply to nationals of signatory countries as well’ and that entrants to CEN-SAD states must only present an entry visa, valid passport, medical certificate and a clean criminal record upon arrival (Abebe, 2017). Members of the CEN-SAD Treaty enjoy ‘the right of establishment’, depending on the length and reason for their stay in Somalia (ibid.). In 2021, the UNHCR Universal Periodic Review also found that Somalia is beginning consultations to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), which may impact immigration openness for foreign workers in the country (UNHCR, 2021b).

Procedurally, Somalia uses the IOM-managed Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) at ports of entry to screen travellers. The

Immigration and Naturalization Directorate (IND) manages immigration to the FGoS as well as managing issues related to Somalia's porous borders (IOM Somalia, 2022). According to Somali news outlets, MIDAS 'screens travellers to improve security and generates statistics needed for policy formulation' (Goobjoog News, 2014). IOM also reports that MIDAS takes photos of incoming travellers, reads passports and compares these data points to a national database to determine whether a traveller has right of entry. This may also include a visa-on-arrival approval letter (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020). Border checkpoints can be dangerous, and are alternately staffed and operated by the FGoS, armed groups such as Al Shabaab, allied groups, militias and clan factions (ibid.).

As far as border management is concerned, Somalia also receives EUTF funds, funnelled through BMM's Border Management Unit. These funds are used to deal with the Immigration and Naturalization Directorate in Somalia, to provide new border constructions and to offer marine equipment as well as other equipment (which is also offered through IOM's MIDA programme, such as biometric data tools and trainings for police and border officials to combat human trafficking (IOM, 2022)). The BMM project is also working on developing Integrated Border Management Committees (IBMCs) throughout Somalia with EUTF funds, which will help coordinate inter-agency migration management. This also involves training, through MIDA, on migrant smuggling and recognising and preventing human trafficking. IOM's Immigration and Border Management (IBM) programme has also led to IOM's collaboration with the Immigration and Naturalization Directorate (IND) of the FGoS to the drafting of the Immigration Act (2019), the Passport Law (2019), and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for frontline immigration officers in recent years (IOM Somalia, 2020).

From a legal and policy perspective, refugee status recognition is ongoing in Somalia, including through the continued issuance of *prima facie* refugee status to Yemenis across Somalia, and to Afghans, Syrians and Palestinians in Somaliland (subject to refugee status determination or RSD) (UNHCR, 2022). These processes continue to be led by the National Commission for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (NCRI) in south and central Somalia, the National Displacement and Refugee Agency (NDRA) in Somaliland, and the Human Protection Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Democratization (HPD-MoIFAD) in Puntland (ibid.).

Somalia consistently ranks high on the African Development Bank's (AfDB) *Visa Openness Report*, with a visa-on-arrival system for tourists (though this may have changed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and information on potential shifts to this policy is not available). This openness may be further facilitated by the proposed pan-African passport, which has been discussed since as early as 2016. While UN sources suggested that the African Union had launched such a passport in 2016, it remains unclear whether the passport is currently operational, how accessing the passport might be possible for Somalis given the lack of national registration and identification policies in Somalia, and whether the passport would apply to potential immigrants (as opposed to short-term tourists or business travellers) (Mukeredzi, 2016).

However, moving across Somalia's borders is not always as simple as the *Visa Openness Report* (African Development Bank, 2022) would suggest. As one key informant noted, immigration to Somalia is complicated by the fact that Somalia is governed on a state level. For example, while the border between Ethiopia and Somaliland is not difficult to cross, and many people have Ethiopian passports, the border between the Federal Republic of Somalia and Puntland requires a visa to cross, and visas or authorisation tend to be very expensive. An expert suggested that there remains tension surrounding immigration in areas of Somalia, most notably Somaliland, because at the state level regions try to demonstrate their sovereignty and therefore shy away from coordination or blanket policies from the FGoS.

Trends

In the last decade, immigration policy in Somalia, while still largely under-developed, has trended towards consolidating traveller data. In 2014, Somalia began to collect additional data for immigrants, tourists and other travellers entering the country. The Somali Immigration Department, only recently re-established at the time, began to mandate that foreigners self-register in Mogadishu upon arrival in Somalia (Sabahi, 2013). Meanwhile, Somalia began to enjoy IOM support for MIDAS at ports of entry, which registers travellers' passport details and biometric data at 11 key ports of entry (Goobjoog News, 2014). However, it remains unclear the extent to which such data collection has impacted policy development on immigration and border openness to date.

In 2015, these shifts in data collection at the border may have contributed to changing or strengthening attitudes about foreign workers. While it is unclear (and evidence is limited) as to whether or not the FGoS or Somaliland and Puntland administrations did put restrictions in place, sources suggest that in 2015 the Office of Somalia's Prime minister expressed frustration that 'foreigners' were taking jobs that 'locals are willing to do' (Horseed Media, 2015). Since 2015, the MMTF (funded through BMM) has continued to work on capacity-building and strengthening a 'whole-of-government approach and assisted in the development of a strategic plan and implementing measures related to migration and anti-trafficking' (GIZ, 2021: 2), with the MMTF acting as a coordination body.

Further, there have been some 'informal agreements' on immigration between Somalia and neighbouring countries in recent years. According to one expert, informal agreements recently existed between Somalia and Uganda, and many Somalis travelled to Kampala regularly. Yet these informal agreements stalled and became more difficult after a terror attack in Kampala. Many resident Somalis are citizens of Uganda, Kenya or Ethiopia, and regularly travel between those countries. Another key informant suggested that 'high-level' regional immigration discussions are currently taking place between Somalia and Ethiopia, though these are far from being finalized and implemented, and there is no information on their content or stage of development (we were not able to confirm this report). Despite these advances, the trend in Somalia throughout the last decade remains one of limited immigration policy and minimal coordination across regional administrations and the FGoS, with porous borders and uneven data collection.

Impacts on development

It is unclear what the impacts of limited immigration policies and porous borders have had on development in Somalia. Protection efforts mentioned in this section aim to reduce insecurity at the border and enhance cooperation across border actors, which may in turn impact development by strengthening coordination and the rule of law. However, the fragmented nature of Somalia's immigration system (i.e., different clans and armed groups monitoring ports of entry) continues to pose a challenge to establishing a unified immigration policy with respect for human rights and the rule of law within the FGoS.

Key incoherence across policies

Given the relative lack of immigration policies in Somalia, it is difficult to highlight policy incoherence.

Interaction with development policies

Given the relative lack of immigration policies in Somalia, it is difficult to highlight interaction with development policies.

Internal migration

Main policies

Internal migration is a primary policy focus for Somalia, especially given the significant number of internally displaced Somalis and returnees who find themselves in secondary displacement (see section on Return migration). This has been especially true since 2019/2020, when Somalia signed the Kampala Convention, in which the country 'accepted legally binding terms that would hold them accountable for protecting and aiding those who have been internally displaced' (Burgess, 2021: 6). In 2021, these efforts contributed to the FGoS developing a Durable Solutions Secretariat to help regions adopt the NPRRI and the National Eviction Guidelines (ibid.).

In many cases, policies targeted at IDPs and returnees have significant overlap (see the NPPRI). In recent years, Somalia has made a few notable strides in developing policies for IDPs and in integrating durable solutions for IDPs and returnees into its NDP-9 and other development frameworks. The primary policies related to internal migration in Somalia in recent years are the National Eviction Guidelines (FGoS, 2019b); the NPRRI (FGoS, 2019a); the Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (FGoS, 2019c); and various local and municipal policies, paired with INGO programmes.

National Eviction Guidelines

Evictions remain one of the greatest challenges for IDPs in Somalia. As of 2021, IOM estimated that there were nearly 2.6 million IDPs in Somalia, over 350,000 of whom resided on private land in Baidoa alone, with 'no rights over the land or security to stay there' (IOM Somalia, 2021). IOM and other

INGOs have long worked in Somalia to relocate IDPs threatened with eviction to other parts of Somalia with safer and more stable living conditions. Many of these IDPs build informal structures where they can be ‘constantly ... forcefully evicted’ after leaving IDP camps or being turned away due to over-capacity issues in camps (Amnesty International, 2020), and are often taken advantage of. For example, Mumin (cited in Burgess, 2019) finds that IDPs who sign up for World Food Programme assistance in Mogadishu are often extorted by ‘gatekeepers’ in the city who take a cut of up to 30% of IDP food. Non-compliance results in forced eviction (ibid.).

In 2019, the FGoS developed its National Eviction Guidelines stating that evictions ‘may be carried out only in exceptional and unavoidable circumstances, and resorted to only where no other alternative or practical measures of intervention exist. ... Such exceptional circumstances exist where – (a) there is legitimate and compelling need to reclaim public land or buildings occupied by IDPs; (b) it is necessary to uphold and restore proprietary rights, or lawful claims over land, to the legitimate owners; or (c) any overriding public interest’ (FGoS, 2019b: 8). In circumstances where evictions are necessary and lawful, the Guidelines also stipulate that evictions must take place with consideration for the Somali Constitution and international human rights, undertaken for ‘overriding’ public interest, an application by a private landowner, or as a ‘measure of last resort’ (ibid.). The Guidelines require, as part of eviction procedures, due notification, fair judicial review and appeal, and the right to legal aid for IDPs facing eviction (ibid.). It is unclear the extent to which this policy has been appropriately implemented, however. INGOs and UN agencies continue to monitor Somalia’s progress on evictions.

National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons

The NPRRI (FGoS, 2019a), in addition to being part of the implementation portion of Somalia’s National Action Plan (NAP), states its purpose as: ensuring that refugee-returnees and IDPs receive protection and humanitarian assistance; protecting Somali citizens from ‘arbitrary’ displacement, including development-induced displacement and displacement due to forced evictions and natural disasters; searching for durable solutions and mitigating secondary or tertiary displacement; and ‘facilitating’ voluntary return, relocation and local reintegration for both returnees and IDPs (FGoS 2019a). The policy is also interested in ensuring that returnees and IDPs enjoy the same rights and services as other Somali nationals, in ensuring ‘individual responsibility for acts of arbitrary displacement in accordance with domestic and international criminal law’, and in devoting resources to achieve these goals for IDPs (ibid: 10).

The NPRRI seeks to address the issue of protracted displacement in Somalia while strengthening the capacity of federal and regional government institutions to do the same, so as to deliver more effective aid, strengthen security for IDPs, and work towards peacebuilding and reconciliation (ibid.). It also includes monitoring and coordination efforts between the FGoS, regional bodies, and international humanitarian and development actors, as well as integrating policies oriented towards IDPs and returnees into national development planning (ibid.).

By taking what may be called a rights-based approach, the NPPRI recognises the urgent need to coordinate protection and assistance to the IDP and returnee population, and seeks to include supporting IDPs and returnees at all levels in the long-term ‘whether those refugee-returnees or IDPs live in settlements, as individuals or with host families, in rural or urban settings, in their province of origin or elsewhere in the country’ (ibid: 13). The FGoS is described as playing a ‘lead role in designing policies’ and the BRA and local authorities in implementation roles. In short, the NPPRI seeks to serve as the central coordinating and organising platform for policies related to IDPs, returnees and durable solutions in Somalia, across sectors and with assistance and collaboration between actors in the humanitarian, development, human rights and peacebuilding fields, ‘in accordance with the National Development Plan’ (ibid.).

Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons

The Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (henceforth the Interim Protocol; FGoS, 2019c) focuses on IDP and returnee tenure security within the HLP dialogue in humanitarian spaces (one key informant also suggested the presence of a National IDP Policy and Land Distribution Protocol, which this research was not able to confirm). It guarantees ‘the full spectrum of the fundamental rights to housing, land and property held under statutory or customary law tenure or informally, and including both public and private assets comprised of housing, land and property’ (ibid: 5). In order to be eligible for HLP support within the Interim Protocol, a refugee-returnee must have a valid, FGoS-issued registration or hold a voluntary repatriation form (VRF) and not own land or a house under their name or the names of their spouse or children. ‘Spontaneous’ (non-VRF) returnees must show an ‘authenticated document’ proving they have been a refugee abroad (ibid.).

An eligible IDP must hold a document from the FGoS with their IDP status, or offer a sworn statement by members of their community proving the individual is an IDP. The IDP may also not own land (i.e., possess a title deed, or the right of claim founded on community-based ownership or other customary land tenure). As per the Interim Protocol, ‘where public land is not available for distribution in any particular district, eligible IDPs and refugee-returnees may be referred for resettlement in neighbouring regions in close consultation with competent authorities, and alternative settlements (having the capacity for absorption) shall be secured with the approval of the host municipality’, upon consultation and determination with the BRA, district councils and municipal governments, and the NCRI (ibid: 7).

Local and municipal policies and INGO programmes

Local and municipal policies and programmes have also helped to advance protections and rights for IDPs (and returnees) in Somalia. For example, the BRA has conducted IDP profiling exercises and established a BRA Durable Solutions Policy, focusing on more accurate data collection and establishing an IDP database (UNHCR, 2021b). Puntland has built IDP infrastructure, and the FGoS has built coordination mechanisms to manage regional state-led responses (ibid.). According to the 2021 Universal Periodic Review, the BRA

has also established a Durable Solutions Unit and a forced evictions risk assessment in Mogadishu, focusing on ‘durable solutions through local integration’ (Yarnell, 2019, p. 17). This is followed by municipal efforts in Mogadishu focused on eliminating internal displacement within the city by 2023 (BRA, 2019).

The Mayor of Mogadishu, with the BRA, established the first IDP Policy for the BRA as part of BRA’s 2018–2023 Strategic Plan. The BRA’s IDP Policy situates itself as an example of Mogadishu’s commitment to Somalia’s NDP; addresses growing urbanisation in Somalia and notes that urbanisation demands a durable solutions-oriented approach; underscores the importance of protection, creating opportunities for IDPs, HLP and livelihoods; and aims to enhance the city’s absorption capacity for basic services for IDPs and returnees (ibid.). It also seeks to build ‘collaboration between private land and property owners to find ways in which access to land and shelter will be better assured for IDPs living in [Mogadishu]’ (ibid, p. 7). The policy recognises frequent security threats for IDPs and provides a gender lens, noting the relevance of sexual and gender-based violence for IDPs, establishes an Eviction Committee, and floats the idea of a referral mechanism for sexual and gender-based violence and training for police and the justice sector (ibid.).

In Baidoa, community-level action plans are also a policy focus, which bring together IDPs, host communities, government stakeholders and the private sector to decide on the support needed and to determine priorities for displacement and development. Durable solutions in Baidoa have also engaged the private sector to construct markets and infrastructure for energy and sanitation. The diaspora has also contributed to IDP-focused local development initiatives, including a community and sports centre constructed in Baidoa that will encourage IDPs to settle there.

INGO programmes seek to bolster and support new policies at the local and municipal level, as well as at the state and federal level. These include supporting the BRA in creating IDP policies to coordinate responses with the city of Mogadishu and the FGoS; programmes related to durable solutions with a focus on land, tenure security, documentation, social inclusion, and access to services and livelihoods; and programmes aimed at capacity-building and training, as well as monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEAL) (Tana Copenhagen, 2019).

Trends

A Samuel Hall (2021) report for IOM and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) emphasises the fact that climate-induced IDPs are caught between ‘contradictory dynamics’. It describes the added risks for them of falling in a trap of precariousness because of the lack of urban planning and governance, at a policy level, adapted to their profiles as cyclical and forced IDPs. This precariousness is not only due to this policy gap, but also because of the absence of socioeconomic integration mechanisms at the community level, and of what the report highlights as short-term maladaptive strategies at the household level. Three dimensions are of particular concern for Somalia’s IDPs: housing, healthcare and education. They face the fear of forced eviction, experience low healthcare scores tied to poor living

conditions and inadequate sanitation and hygiene, and suffer from the absence of primary or secondary schools in informal settlements as well as within urban contexts or on their margins (ibid.).

In the last decade, Somalia has progressively moved towards national policies that address HLP, protection, tenure security and human rights for IDPs, some of which have been led by IDPs themselves. This began as a result of domestic political changes from 2011 to 2013. Burgess (2021: 5–6) describes the policy developments best:

Two years after the terrorist group Al Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu in 2011, Somali government officials put forward a bill that would require all IDPs to return to their original homes within six months. This presented multiple problems, as the homelands of many IDPs were no longer in a secure state, leaving many to be evicted from their current living situations and pushed back to other dangerous outskirts of Mogadishu, where unsafe conditions prevented humanitarian aid workers from accessing IDPs. As the congestion of IDPs at the city limits increased and the unsafe conditions rose within Mogadishu communities, federal and local officials shifted towards policies that would facilitate local integration rather than attempting to force them to return home.

In 2014, the Ministry of Interior and Federalism (2014) responded to this challenge through the Policy Framework on Displacement Within Somalia. This provided ‘a common basis and policy guidance to facilitate activities aimed at preventing new displacement or secondary displacement of returning refugees, responding to displacement, improving living conditions and asserting rights, and to overcome protracted displacement by identifying policy benchmarks and measures to create conditions conducive to solutions for IDPs and returning refugees’ (ibid, p. 4). It also recognised the importance of clan dynamics in creating and resolving internal displacement in Somalia, which recent research into Somali IDPs and various key informant responses have also highlighted (see Mohamed Salah, 2017).² This Policy Framework formed the basis for future policy planning related to IDPs in Somalia, culminating in the NPRRI and other policies discussed above.

While the Policy Framework did not address every pressing IDP issue in Somalia – for example, it did not provide for special administrative status for IDPs or registration not linked to a specific purpose (such as receiving assistance) – it did introduce the idea of IDP profiling and coordination on minimum standards and rights for IDPs as essential to the FGoS and regional governments (ibid.). It also identified the government ministries responsible for IDP policy, and set out initial evictions rules and procedures, such as that evictions ‘should not render individuals homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights’ (ibid, p.10). Many of the policies identified in the Policy Framework were later included in the National Eviction Guidelines five years later, such as the focus on durable solutions via HLP and tenure rights. Unlike the NPRRI and other frameworks, however, this 2014 Policy Framework placed the responsibility for implementation

² Key informants highlighted that harmonious clans can facilitate integration (as observed in Somaliland), and that some IDPs avoid crossing borders for onward migration so as to remain with their clans. Experts also noted that there is often more trust in informal clan protection and support than formal social protection programmes, which should be developed in parallel with clan approaches.

squarely with the FGoS, rather than delegating some responsibilities to regional authorities. Finally, the 2014 Policy Framework established the NCRI, which continues to serve as the primary administrative body for refugees, returnees and IDPs in Somalia.

In 2016, the FGoS and the UN established the Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI), which focused on long-term solutions and government capacity-strengthening to support local integration for IDPs (Chawla, 2021). The DSI drafting process allowed different actors to openly discuss drought-related displacement and other slow-onset displacement, which received new attention during this process. Through the DSI, IDPs can ‘present their ideas for community infrastructure projects along with strategies to become self-reliant’ (ibid.). Midnimo I is one such project that received funding around this time. The project helped ‘communities define and drive their own recovery — most prominently through community action plans (CAPs), documents that lay out local priorities for community-driven recovery’, and involved IOM training government officials to ‘engage displaced persons in visioning exercises to help them articulate their short-term needs and present ideas on strategies to move toward greater self-reliance’ (ibid.). The DSI continues to promote and fund community-led initiatives on durable solutions and self-reliance amongst IDPs in Somalia.

As IDPs have become more urbanised, others have moved outside of cities such as Mogadishu to claim land (Mohamud, 2020). Meanwhile, the FGoS has increasingly recognised that climate-induced internal displacement poses a threat in Somalia and impacts capacity at IDP camps such as the Mogadishu-adjacent Badbaado camp (Chawla, 2021). Labour market issues and livelihoods continue to pose a challenge for IDPs as well. The sweeping reforms and policy developments of 2019 served as a pivotal moment in the last decade, but these policies act as just one step towards more effective and rights-based IDP and returnee policies in Somalia. The COVID-19 pandemic, drought and intensified Al Shabaab attacks introduced new issues and have required new legislation, such as the moratorium on forced evictions in Baidoa in 2020 (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Along with these issues, political upheaval and delayed elections pose a challenge to continuing the momentum built in 2019 on IDP and returnee policy, and thus call into question future trends and next steps (IDMC Somalia, 2022).

Commitments to supporting long-term durable solutions approaches need to be further reinforced, but to date they include integrating durable solutions under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) Resilience pillar and, in turn, including resilience in the regional durable solutions strategies. For instance, Samuel Hall (2021) finds that the Joint Durable Solutions Programmes (whether EU’s RE-INTEG, Midnimo or Danwadaag), under government leadership, provide the basis to effectively include climate-induced IDPs into policy and programmatic responses.

Impacts on internal migration

It is unclear, and data (and research) are limited, on the extent to which internal migration policies in Somalia impact migration within the country, as well as immigration and transit migration. This is due to the fact that IDP policies are not linked to anti-trafficking or border security initiatives in

Somalia. However, forced evictions and the slow roll-out of the 2019 NPRRI and other initiatives do expose IDPs to protection risks, such as migrant smuggling.

Impacts on development

Efforts towards developing IDP (and returnee) policies have impacted development by opening the door to funding for new programmes and by providing IDPs with pathways to integration, livelihoods development and self-reliance. The DSI, discussed above, offers one example of this. Another is RE-INTEG, an approximately €50 million EUTF initiative that seeks to ‘support the sustainable (re)integration of refugees, returnees and IDPs in Somalia by creating economic and employment opportunities’ (Owigo and Yusuf, 2020: 2). To this end, RE-INTEG helps foster government IDP policy and strategy.

Limiting forced evictions also stands to significantly impact Somalia’s development. Evictions interrupt and disturb reintegration and durable solutions, serving as a ‘multiplier’ of protracted displacement in Somalia (ReDSS, 2019b). While the National Eviction Guidelines have been created, as of late 2019, they have yet to be signed by the Council of Ministers into law (ibid.). Actions to limit forced evictions stand to either help catapult development or stymie it. On the other hand, strong IDP policies will be necessary to counter the increasing trend of development-induced displacement in Somalia, where privately owned development projects are accelerating evictions in primarily urban and drought-impacted areas (ibid.). This is due in part to the cyclical relationship between humanitarian assistance to IDPs and development.

One key informant cited Boxnanno, a programme incorporating cash assistance for IDPs, as potentially encouraging displacement through ‘humanitarian dependency’ – though, in an apparent contradiction, another noted that the same programme helped IDPs build necessary resilience, encouraging some potential migrants to remain in place. Key informants also noted that when IDPs live in peri-urban areas, it increases the value of that land due to growing humanitarian infrastructure and housing built for IDPs and returnees. ‘Gatekeeper’ landlords can exploit this situation for profit, raising land and rental prices, which can contribute to eviction and secondary or cyclical displacement. In some cases, this results in IDPs emigrating out of Somalia. Key informants suggest that this is common, though Somalia’s NCRI has, surprisingly, not recorded any cases of this happening. Key informants also suggested developing ‘secondary cities’ closer to their homes of origin to encourage seasonal migration to local hub cities, allowing IDP and returnee communities to build resilience and evade cyclical migration patterns. Land titling offers another potential solution – one key informant cited the inter-agency Barwaaqo programme of providing title deeds in Baidoa as critical to minimising eviction.

Key incoherence across policies

The primary incoherence between policies relating to IDPs is the lack of clear commitment to operationalising them, namely in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lack of focus on groups left out of existing policies. By

late-2020, while the BRA had instituted a moratorium on evictions, there remained no nationwide eviction ban nor a clear moratorium in Puntland or Somaliland. As the Somalia Protection Cluster (2020) notes, such a policy would send a signal that the FGoS and regional (state) administrations are committed to supporting IDPs and returnees facing eviction in Somalia, and recognise eviction as a key barrier to reintegration and livelihoods development. It would also signal that the FGoS continues to see itself as the primary actor responsible for implementing the policies developed in 2019 to prevent further ‘economic upheaval’ from the pandemic and continued displacement (ibid.). However, the lack of concrete and immediate action related to forced evictions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic contrasts with progress made on evictions and reintegration since 2019 and highlights a key inconsistency that merits additional monitoring. Multiple experts and key informants underscored this issue, noting a need to incentivise ownership and implementation of development and migration policies in the FGoS and FMS by the EU and other donors funding government actors directly instead of routing support through UN agencies.

Experts also highlighted the continued challenges to policy implementation. One key informant suggested that the main challenge in migration and displacement policy-making in Somalia is the prioritisation of support to policy development rather than implementation. This key informant noted that policies often do not reflect local needs and contexts and are developed solely by consultants working for international organisations. They are written in English and then translated into Somali. A shift in focus from policy development to establishing the tools for implementation – such as rule of law, monitoring and evaluation, and technical capacity-building – emerged as a key theme amongst key informants commenting on development progress in Somalia.

Further, certain IDP groups appear to be left out of new migration policies such as the NPRRI and NDP-9 (FGoS, 2019a and 2020a). These include, according to one key informant, youth IDPs and former agro-pastoralists who are displaced to cities and require additional livelihoods support to learn ‘urban’ skills.

A core mismatch between reality and policy is that of ‘(mis)managed urban spaces’ and ‘urban (mis)planning’ (Samuel Hall, 2021). The lack of urban planning impacts IDPs and host communities alike, who find themselves living in flood-risk areas, or adding to a demographic explosion in cities such as Baidoa that can result ‘in tension in some neighbourhoods characterised by illegal land occupation, land conflicts and a lack of infrastructure and basic services’ (Samuel Hall, 2021: 98). The fact that IDPs and poor communities rely on settlements that are not stable or sustainable exposes them to disasters and to a cycle of displacement, which only development policies and urban planning can help address. A key for policy coherence in Somalia will be to ensure that sustainable urban planning and land management approaches can factor in future expansion of cities with the continued influx of displaced populations, building on data, technical expertise and social accountability processes.

Interaction with development policies

MIGNEX
Background
Paper

The policies outlined in this section interact both with Somalia's NDP-9 and the SSPP. The SSPP stipulates that 'all IDPs and returning Somali refugees enjoy the full equality and obtain the same rights that the National Constitution, all other laws of Somalia, as well as international humanitarian and human rights' laws' (MOLSA, 2019: 21). It also calls for the 're-establishment of livelihoods and alternative livelihood options, and the implementation of social welfare schemes', while committing to 'establishing safety nets for minimal social protection in areas where communities are or will be permanently or seasonally at risk to natural shocks upon return' (ibid: 21).

The policies indicated in this section, most notably the National Eviction Guidelines and the NPRRI (FGoS, 2019a and 2019b), directly interact with, build on and were developed in accordance with both the NSPP and NDP-9, so as to coordinate and centralise policy frameworks and best practices. According to ReDSS (2019a, p. 8), 'the process of developing and implementing durable solutions in Somalia is formally recognized as a priority by all levels of government' – which has been the case since Somalia's NDP-8 included durable solutions.

Indeed, the NDSS 2020–2024 (FGoS, 2020b), another key recent element of Somali development policy, highlights land tenure, tenure security, protection, integration, and livelihoods for IDPs and returnees as key to establishing durable solutions for displacement and supporting development. It contributed to the National Durable Solutions Secretariat, which is required as per NDP-9 and coordinates all durable solutions initiatives in Somalia (OHCHR, 2021). As ReDSS suggested in 2019, 'it is now necessary to operationalize these political commitments' (ReDSS, 2019a: p. 8).

However, NDP-9 and its related development policies are not without challenges. Key informants suggest that federal and state institutions continue to lack capacity to enforce land rights and the rule of law to prevent evictions, and that NDP-9 may not go far enough in challenging customary, religious and informal laws that limit access to justice in land disputes for evicted IDPs. As a result, private landowners tend to triumph in such disputes. Experts also suggest that NDP-9 is not specific enough about focusing on IDP return as a form of urbanisation management, and it does not recognise the positive contributions IDPs can make outside of their communities of origin. NDP-9 also places limited emphasis on establishing ID cards for IDPs and returnees and coordinating recognition of IDs across FMS. This poses a challenge to development because, within Somalia's fragmented state system, IDPs living outside of their FMS or origin may not be eligible to access employment and basic services, which can also spur secondary displacement.

Key informants highlighted the need for stronger coordination across ministries and departments at the federal and state level in implementing IDP policies. According to another key informant, NDP-9 is also not adequately streamlined across localities, and it neglects to establish a national land ownership policy – critical to resolving challenges emerging from high levels of urbanisation amongst IDPs and returnees, and the resulting conflicts with host communities. Experts suggest that when

international aid does follow IDPs to cities in Somalia, it should carefully consider the effects of clan orientation and also extend benefits to host communities so as to minimise conflict and build urban–rural linkages. This may also better support IDPs who have been displaced or who are living in IDP settlements for the majority of their lives, therefore socially, if not legally, falling into a grey area.

Externalisation of EU migration policies

Main policies

The main frameworks related to the externalisation of EU policies in Somalia revolve around funding, namely through the EUTF; securitisation, via the EU border agency, Frontex; and security and humanitarian cooperation promoted by both the MRP and the Migration Policy Framework (MPF), which involve multiple African countries.

As of 2020, Somalia received the greatest amount of EUTF funding in the Horn of Africa. This was often through direct budget support and additionally through ‘the provision of basic services and improving financial management’ in order to reduce Somalia’s debt burden and encourage international donors to support Somalia’s debt relief (Raty and Shilhay, 2020: 16). EU funding tends to focus on strengthening government capacity in Somalia, raising awareness about human trafficking and smuggling, finding alternatives to irregular migration, supporting livelihoods, funding MIDAS border surveillance equipment at ports of entry via IOM, and building social protection schemes. Example programmes include:

- Enhancing security and rule of law in Somalia (€40 million)
- Inclusive Local and Economic Development (ILED) (€83 million)
- The Somalia State and Resilience Building Contract (€100 million)

Key informants suggested that recent EU initiatives are also beginning to consider climate change adaptation and secondary cities, economic programmes to create a ‘pull’ factor for return, and ‘skills partnerships’ to provide regular migration routes for migrants of different skill levels. EU programmes tend to focus on resilience and self-reliance within durable solutions frameworks. One key informant highlighted the existence of a technical working group, funded by the EU, to reintegrate IDPs in northern Somalia.

Securitisation of the border via Frontex and other mechanisms is also a key element of the externalisation of EU policies in Somalia. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) has also been involved in Somalia to monitor human rights and the effects of EU-sponsored training of Somali government officials (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Frontex has also been involved in enhancing border security efforts in Somalia, in accordance with EU policy priorities. A project running from 2017 to 2020, Strengthening the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community, provided a €4 million grant to various African countries including Somalia, to ‘consolidate... inter-regional information sharing... improve operational capabilities ... to dismantle organized crime networks ... [and] to draft and share strategic and

operational risk analyses/assessments on regular/irregular migration flows, border security, and cross-border criminality' (Frontex, n.d.). This focus is backed by the the Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015, of which Somalia was involved), which sought to improve military and security cooperation across Africa, including via intelligence-sharing (Akkerman, 2018).

The Valletta Summit set the stage for various efforts to improve cooperation across Africa for both border security and humanitarian/development initiatives, of which Somalia has consistently remained a part. This includes the Partnership Framework on Migration (2016), which 'puts migration at the heart of the EU's external policy, where "the full range of policies and EU external relations instruments have to be brought to bear [...], with a mix of positive and negative incentives and the use of all leverages and tools"' (Akkerman, 2018: 16), and a focus on border and migration management, biometric identification tools, and civil registries. This funding focus is reflected in programmes such as MIDA, which have utilised biometric data to train border agents in Somalia. It also includes the MPF, which has Somalia as one of various priority African countries. According to Moreno-Lax (2021), the MPF seeks to: 1) increase return rates, though 'not necessarily [through] formal readmission agreements', 2) improve legislative and institutional capacity for border control and migration management, and 3) 'save lives in the Mediterranean', which has been led by Frontex, though with a heavy emphasis on mitigating sea-based smuggling. These policies co-exist with the MRP and other policies promoting humanitarian assistance, reintegration and development cooperation in Somalia, following a trend that has deepened throughout the last decade: building tools to limit emigration from African countries such as Somalia to the EU.

Trends

As noted above, the primary trend of the last decade related to the externalisation of EU policies in Somalia has been the use of such policies to limit emigration from Somalia to the EU. The EU has achieved these goals primarily through funding mechanisms, direct training and training-of-trainers, as well as technical assistance and interventions focused on capacity- building and security for Somalia's government institutions, police and border management actors. These funding mechanisms have included the EUTF, discussed above and launched at the Valletta Summit, and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (with IGAD countries). The EUTF is particularly notable in Somalia's case, as the funding structure includes contributions from the European Development Fund and the countries themselves. Somalia has, in the last decade, invested heavily in its complementary funding amount to the EUTF, hence it increasingly becoming a priority and focus area for the funding instrument (Zardo, 2020). Increased focus on Somalia as a recipient of funding also comes from its status as a country of transit, origin and, in some cases, destination along the central and continuously unstable Eastern Route. Investment in border management has been the primary trend within EUTF funding (ibid.).

Other trends also suggest that policy-makers in the EU have embraced 'tackling the root causes of migration through development aid cooperation' as a key tool in broader migration management in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa (Dennison et al., 2019). This aid largely has focused on poverty

reduction and human rights. It has focused less on development cooperation for peacebuilding and climate-related emergencies, which continue to be two of the primary drivers of Somali emigration (ibid.). Further, as Dennison et al. (2019) note, EUTF funding of border security and border management through development assistance may exacerbate migrants' vulnerabilities due to the unstable and fragmented nature of Somalia's border control and port of entry system, as discussed in the section on Immigration.

Impacts on immigration, emigration, return migration and transit migration

Research suggests that the 'EU's overriding concern for the securitization of migration and borders has also reduced the political and economic benefits of intra-regional migration' (Dennison et al., 2019, p. 9). This includes, according to some researchers, complicating efforts toward an African Union Passport, which would allow for greater labour migration and would possibly open up conversations towards establishing a free trade area (ibid.). Critics of these security-focused policies and their potential impact on open immigration and safer transit migration (i.e., open borders reducing the need for and incidence of smuggling) suggest that securitisation interferes with the necessary coordination needed to catalyse development across Africa (ibid.).

Impacts on development

In addition to potential challenges to development associated with border restrictions and the continued need to obtain visas to travel between most African countries (discussed above), researchers have noted that EU funding has largely driven development decisions in countries such as Somalia, regardless of whether certain EU-supported initiatives are the most immediately necessary for development outcomes. As one researcher notes, 'whether EUTF financing goes toward containment or development policy appears to depend in part on recipient states' function vis-à-vis migration' (Mager, 2018: 4). The same paper notes that Somalia, as a country of origin, receives considerable development cooperation – however, this cooperation does not necessarily prioritise drivers of migration in Somalia, such as drought and insecurity. This disconnect may slow Somalia's development in the long run by diverting attention towards EU-sponsored development issues, rather than those issues deemed most pressing by local communities. The lack of local ownership and localisation in EUTF and other EU-sponsored development funding – including the MRP – continues to pose a challenge for development sustainability. Finally, key informants suggested that while there has been more development assistance in recent years, EU aid continues to be largely humanitarian in nature and supply, rather than demand driven, underscoring the need for more community- and locally based approaches.

Key incoherence across policies

To some extent, EUTF funding helps to drive policy development and priorities in Somalia, as noted above. But this can also contribute to incoherence across EU-supported migration policies and Somalia's

development and migration goals. For example, as of 2020, the EUTF had invested €40 million in security-sector improvements, police reform and judicial governance in Somalia (Raty and Shilhay, 2020). As Raty and Shilhay (2020: 16) note, ‘the project aims to increase accountability but, at the same time, EU involvement in Somali affairs’ and enable Somali ‘legislative and other relevant bodies to exercise an increased control over the security forces...’ while also strengthening ‘the EU’s ability to understand and engage with senior Somali government officials’. However, the project is EU-owned not locally owned – suggesting incoherence with Somali policies and goals stated in NDP-9 to foster better governance and to strengthen capacity in state institutions.

Additional incoherence lies in the EU’s focus on informal (as well as AVR-led) returns to Somalia, which promotes return but does not necessarily adequately fund or protect Somalis seeking to reintegrate into their places of origin. The EU’s emphasis on promoting high rates of return contrasts with the FGoS’ ability to keep pace with reintegration that adheres to the standards and responsibilities it has set out in the NPRRI and other 2019 IDP and refugee-returnee legislation and policy frameworks.

Interaction with development policies

The primary interaction between the externalisation of EU policies and Somalia’s development policies lies in the language of NDP-9 (FGoS, 2020a). In NDP-9 (in addition to making commitments related to poverty alleviation, food security, agriculture and humanitarian issues), Somalia prioritises and commits to policies in lockstep with EU and EUTF goals. This is, namely, through NDP-9 Pillar 2 (Security and Rule of Law) and a focus on the ‘cross-cutting’ theme of improved governance (p. 272) and macroeconomic and fiscal reforms (Chapter 9, Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework), which focuses on debt management (ibid.). While these are not the sole topics of concern in NDP-9, they each receive significant consideration in the document, eclipsing the catch-all category of ‘economic development’ enshrined in Pillar 3 (ibid.). Though it is not possible to determine the extent to which EU policies directly impacted NDP-9 (and a thorough review of the NDP drafting process and sentiment analysis is outside the scope of this profile), it would appear that EUTF funding priorities and development aid goals influenced the weight given to the different sections of NDP-9.

Main development policies

As this country profile notes, Somalia has developed a wide range of development and migration policies, especially since 2019. This section focuses on: 1) the main development policies and plans in Somalia, identifying any relevant trends over time, and 2) relevant interactions with migration policies across the seven areas of migration policy detailed above. It concludes with a brief discussion of relevant impacts of the global COVID-19 pandemic on development and migration policies.

The selected policies

The guiding development policies in Somalia are NDP-9 2020–2024 (FGoS, 2020a); the NDSS 2020–2024 (FGoS, 2020b); the SSPP (MOLSA, 2019); and additional smaller-scale social and disaster management policies, the National Disaster Management Policy 2018, the Draft National Gender Policy 2015, and the National Youth Policy 2020. This section primarily discusses NDP-9 and the NDSS, while briefly describing the other policies listed.

President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed released NDP-9 in 2019, which ‘serves as the key overarching planning framework for the Government and international partners’ (OCHA, 2021, p. 19). Humanitarian monitoring sources note that ‘the Government-led aid coordination architecture was revised in 2020 to make it more streamlined and fit for purpose for the implementation of the NDP-9’ (ibid, p. 19). NDP-9 was followed by a renewed commitment by the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework to support the development policy. Further, one key informant interviewed for this policy review noted that state authorities in the FGoS have demonstrated a strong willingness to incorporate durable solutions into their development planning, such as through NDP-9.

NDP-9 is based on three key pillars: Inclusive and Accessible Politics, Improved Security and the Rule of Law, and Inclusive Economic Growth, which includes employment goals (FGoS, 2020a). It also deals with disaster risk reduction and risk management, as well as social development, with six cross-cutting policy priorities: 1) strengthening gender, human rights, and social equity, 2) building household and community resilience, 3) environmental and natural resource management, 4) focusing on durable solutions, 5) coordinating planning at the humanitarian–development nexus and 6) improving good governance (ibid.). NDP-9 highlights food security needs, building employment opportunities, and reiterates the importance of ‘traditional economies’ of livestock and agriculture in Somalia, linking these to climate-resilient techniques and improved crop, animal and value-chain productivity (ibid.).

NDP-9 also recognises the importance of immigration border management, in noting that ‘tax and other government revenue are dependent on access, presence, and control of ports of entry’, and of the link between ‘climate disaster’ and conflict contributing to increased displacement and pressures on IDPs and host communities (ibid: 28). Key informants suggest that NDP-9 does not mainstream IDP challenges as successfully as previous NDPs have, and that NDP-9 still leaves a gap in policies related to developing government safety nets and formalising informal legal and policy institutions to strengthen the rule of law (i.e., clan courts, Shabaab courts, etc.)

The NDSS serves as a companion to NDP-9. This policy recognises the role that FMS have to play in coordination and ‘government ownership’ of Somalia’s displacement challenges (FGoS, 2020b). While durable solutions form part of local development plans and NDP-9, the NDSS highlights displacement as an ‘immediate strategic priority for the Government’s commitment to reduce poverty and successfully complete the process conducted in the framework of the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative’ (ibid: 16). It also underscores the FGoS’ 2019 Durable Solutions Secretariat as a key actor in promoting reform and technical cooperation between

different federal and regional (state-led) institutions for oversight purposes (ibid.). The NDSS also draws on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, thus interacting with global commitments, and the BRA’s Durable Solutions Strategy (2020–2024) (BRA, 2019), as well as policies related to climate change, integration (in Puntland), and the Kampala Declaration on Jobs, Livelihoods, and Self-Reliance for Refugees, Returnees, and Host Communities (not discussed in this profile) (FGoS, 2020b).

The NDSS states its vision as ‘achieving durable solutions for displacement affected communities in Somalia through evidence-based analyses, a bottom up and inclusive consensus building approaches, and integrated and systemic programming’ (ibid: 17). It has four key strategic objectives, which together motivate its theory of change: 1) tenure security, 2) participation in public affairs for displaced people ‘as full citizens’, 3) access to sustainable livelihoods and employment, and 4) access to justice. It also highlights the importance of access to public services, access to legal identity, local participation in peacebuilding processes, government accountability, self-reliance, rule of law, formal and informal justice structures, and reducing the impacts of drought and floods (ibid.).




Figure 3: The humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus in the NDSS

Source: FGoS (2020b: 41).

Somalia has also established various smaller-scale development policies and draft policies in the last decade. Table 1, adapted from content of the 2019 SSPP, summarises these initiatives.

Table 1. Policies overviewMIGNEX
Background
Paper

Policy	Description and purpose
Somalia Social Protection Policy (MOLSA, 2019)	Seeks to 'set a long-term vision for more predictable, institutionalized, nationally owned social protection for Somalia' (p.24). This policy will 'provide the basis for a system which supports the needs of all people (especially the poorest and most vulnerable groups) throughout the lifecycle, based initially on predictable cash transfers' (p.24). It also establishes the 2040 Vision, to have 'progressively established a functional social protection system which delivers predictable assistance across the lifecycle' that 'reduce(s) the current reliance on unpredictable humanitarian financing to address cyclical crises' (p.26).
National Disaster Management Policy (2017) and Framework for Disaster Management (2016–2018)	According to its citation in the SSPP (MOLSA, 2019: 20), the NDMP (2017) 'provides a legislative framework for embedding disaster management within appropriate government structures and for strengthening capacities for effective disaster preparedness, response, mitigation, prevention, and recovery at the federal, member state, and waax and tabeela (section and village) levels to protect lives and livelihoods, property, the environment, and the economy', especially in building resilience to acute shocks and improving early warning systems, disaster risk reduction, data collection, and information-sharing on disaster management and coordination. The Framework for Disaster Management (2016–2018) seeks to 'build capacity of communities and local/regional authorities to manage disasters in their areas, protect lives and livelihoods of the vulnerable and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to [hazards]' via the Somalia Disaster Management Agency (SODMA) and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (ibid: 21).
Draft National Gender Policy (2018)	In draft form, this policy establishes a 'framework to guide the process of developing legislations, policy formulations, implementation and programmes that will promote equal rights and opportunities for women and men in all spheres of life' with a focus on economic empowerment, health, education, and political participation (ibid: 21).
National Youth Policy (2017)	This policy seeks to 'empower the young people of Somalia and ensure participation and collaborative interventions on youth issues, including specific focus on a) education and skills development, b) employment creation and economic development, c) healthy lifestyles for boys and girls, d) protection-related issues, and e) inclusion of marginalized youth and promotion of non-discriminatory principles and attitudes' (ibid: 21).

Source: Adapted from MOLSA (2019).

Interactions with migration-related policies

The above development policies interact with migration policy primarily in their collective focus on displacement as a pressing development issue in Somalia, and their joint focus on durable solutions, reintegration, and employment, livelihoods, security and public services for migrants as key to growth. This MIGNEX Background Paper identifies interactions between migration and development policies at the end of each policy section. To avoid repetition, this brief discussion does not develop these interactions further, but it expands on frameworks not yet discussed in this policy review and potential gaps in policies.

Along with NDP-9, the NDSS and the NDMP (all of which highlight the importance of discussing root causes of displacement), the Recovery and Resilience Framework – while not strictly a policy – 'reinforces government efforts to accelerate the path to resilience' and push forward with implementation of durable solutions and self-reliance initiatives for returnees and IDPs (ReDSS, 2019a). The SSPP also underscores the importance of durable solutions planning on a larger, longer scale, and links to NDP-9 as well as the migration plans (i.e., the National Eviction Guidelines and the NPRRI) that emerged from the extensive policy developments of 2019 (ibid.). These efforts demonstrate the extent to which the FGoS and

various FMS have designed development policies in step with migration-focused policies, intending to foster coordination and collaboration between relevant federal and regional/state/local agencies.

Key informants also highlighted possible gaps in interactions between development and migration policies in Somalia, however. For example, experts noted that there remains a lack of government ownership of large-scale development projects, with large UN agencies and INGOs taking the lead and sometimes effectively shutting out local communities. One key informant observed that government actors often do not show up to donor-led working groups to plan development initiatives. Others underscored that disunity and a lack of coordination between development and migration actors continues to undermine policy implementation and cohesive policy development. For instance, while a Working Group in Baidoa is led by the Ministry of Planning, the same durable solutions working group is led by the Ministry of Interior in another state, and there is a need to establish central leadership when developing policy and initiatives. There is also a gap between those who develop programmes and policy and their beneficiaries – this gap may overlook vital needs. Clan dynamics also impact the efficacy and equity of government programming, and there is a need to better understand how clan dynamics inform reintegration and targeting.

The BMM programme also poses opportunities and challenges for more effective interactions between migration and development policies in Somalia. As one expert noted, BMM is currently providing support to the Somali government to draft an MPF and was issued a decree to set up an inter-ministerial committee. While this was supposed to include a National Coordination Mechanism, talks about such a mechanism are now paused due to understaffing and a lack of funds. However, the MMTF is acting as a substitute to liaise with government actors, NGOs and INGOs on migration issues to work towards an MPF. Developing an MPF is a lengthy process and could take up to six years, and it will include a new immigration law to replace the existing legislation that has been in place for decades. This new law will better adhere to international standards; however, the current political atmosphere may hinder its development and implementation, highlighting the political challenges for effective migration–development coordination across key stakeholders in Somalia.

Any additional information related to COVID-19

COVID-19 has impacted the lives, livelihoods, protection risks and security threats to displaced communities and returnees in Somalia. It has also left a mark on Somali migration and development policies, and it has contributed to land border closures, the temporary closure of the critical Kenya–Somalia border and state-level COVID-19 restrictions that may have impacted internal migration and internal state-border crossings, to a limited extent (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020). It has also potentially contributed to increased transit migration through Somalia – the MRP found that near the start of the pandemic and subsequent lockdowns and restrictions, ‘with Djibouti’s border closures being the most effective, many

migrants tried to cross through Somalia instead. Soon enough, pockets of stranded migrants were reported in different parts of the Horn, unable to proceed or return to their places or origin' (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2021: 9).

In Somalia specifically, migrants themselves have noted more difficult border crossings, reduced employment opportunities while in transit, reduced family support upon migrating, loss of access to basic goods and services, reduced livelihoods and income-generating opportunities, food insecurity, and 'decreased reliance on the wider network of migrants and community for basic needs' (ibid: 36). Experts suggested that COVID-19 has created 'tipping points' for IDPs, where so many people leave from one area that others are forced to leave due to a lack of resources. This expert added that corruption and lower remittance levels due to COVID-19 have added to internal migration push factors.

The MRP also notes that emigration to Yemen has increased as a result of COVID-19, but arrivals in Yemen have declined, leaving many migrants 'stranded' en route. AVR programmes also paused during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, and when they resumed they began to require quarantine and isolation before allowing returnees to travel to their places of origin (ibid.). It remains unclear what impact the COVID-19 pandemic has had on refugees or labour migrants, such as Ethiopians settling in Somaliland or Puntland, though it is likely that pandemic policy restrictions similarly impacted these migrants and refugees, especially in crowded camp (including IDP camp) settings. Indeed, the FGoS and various FMS expressed concern over the conditions of COVID-19 in IDP camps, namely regarding threats to host communities should a COVID-19 infection spread rapidly in a camp setting. However, the FGoS and FMS took little to no actions to mitigate the threat of an IDP camp infection, and evictions remained the same or increased during this trying time.

Experts suggested that especially during COVID-19 there is a need to fund development and migration projects for longer time periods to generate meaningful outcomes for migrants and refugees. Further, it is important to recognize that security policies and IDP policies can complement each other. To do so will require additional political will on the part of donors, the FGoS and FMS in Somalia.

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