



**MIGNEX**

**MIGNEX Background Paper**

# **Links between migration management, development and integration**

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**MIGNEX**

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**MIGNEX Background Papers**

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# Links between migration management, development and integration

Migration management, development processes in countries of origin, and integration in societies of settlement are intertwined components of social change. To understand the links between them, a holistic approach to migration as integral to social change across nation-state borders is needed. But what does such an approach mean, and what is lost without it?

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There are links between migration management, development and integration – but also disconnects. Separation of policy fields exacerbates such disconnects.

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Different legitimate but competing interests need to be recognised and balanced to boost positive migration effects. This is a challenging yet necessary task for policy-makers.

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The temporal frames applied to understanding links between migration management, development and integration are important: from colonial ties through to electoral cycles.

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## Introduction

### MIGNEX Background Paper

The purpose of this MIGNEX Background Paper is to clarify the links between migration management, development processes in migrants' countries of origin, and migrant integration in European countries of settlement. This triangle offers many possible links and interactions, but also disconnects and conflicts of interest. This paper offers a bird's eye view, rather than an exhaustive engagement with all possible relationships. We draw on, and explore further, select empirical cases and policy instruments.

A note should be made on the geographic point of departure for this MIGNEX Background Paper. We recognise the need for critical engagement with what often remains a Eurocentric approach to migration management, migrant integration (implicitly assumed often to be in European contexts) and to development (as something that happens 'elsewhere'). Indeed, the relationship between migration and social change, where we also recognise that migration is endogenous to social change (de Haas, 2010), suggests that the processes of migrant integration in any society are a dimension of social change in that society – whereby both migrants and the society in question, including all its inhabitants, are exposed to and part of social change in different ways.

It is relevant to reflect on integration in relation to whether countries are described as 'of destination' or 'of settlement'. As descriptors, the former says something about direction and goal; the latter says something about temporality, as long-term or permanent. Meanwhile, in policy and academic literature, the terms are used often without further definition, though increasingly it is being questioned whether 'of destination' can refer to more than 'where migrants arrived' (i.e., perhaps less, 'destination of choice' and more as 'de facto destination'). Furthermore, migration is of course often not an A-to-B movement, neither in a one-off sense, nor in that there is a linear, planned, desired move. Circulation, return mobilities, onward migration, transit and temporary stays, and fractured journeys, all in different ways challenge a simplistic and linear understanding of migration (Collyer and de Haas, 2012; Schapendonk and Steel, 2014). This noted, we define our use of the three key terms within this paper below and in a later section elaborate on our Conceptual and methodological approaches.

The 'triple-win' scenario on migration gains – for migrants, countries of origin, and countries of settlement – and the much critiqued 'migration-development mantra' are indeed often too good to be true (Bakewell, 2008; Sinatti, 2015; Gardiner and Bryan, 2018; Wise, 2018; Withers, 2019). However, our point of departure is that there remains significant potential for boosting positive impacts of migration for societies globally – including in both origin and settlement contexts, for migrants, their families and communities – and that a step towards realising this potential lies in a more explicit acknowledgement of the empirical links between migration management, development in countries of origin and integration in countries of settlement.

Acknowledgment of empirical links is also essential if, at closer examination, there are clear dilemmas and conflicts of interest (Boswell, 2007). In relation to European Union (EU) policy, there is much attention to policy coherence –

and incoherence. Here, achieving as much policy coherence as possible is reliant on the ability to identify when policy incoherence is *not* necessary, so is not a result of deliberate and conflicting priorities. Thus, it is arguably important to name dilemmas and flag conflicts of interest, as this makes it simpler to recognise them, and to deal with them in transparent ways – even when there may not be a win-win-win solution. Conversely, awareness of both links and disconnects certainly can also aid in facilitating gains and in minimising undesired human or other costs.

In this MIGNEX Background Paper we cover both empirical relationships (e.g., between migrants' integration and their contributions to development in countries of origin) and how these relationships are reflected (or not) in policy. What might some links between migration management, development and integration look like? Using the example of remittances is illustrative. There are many other mechanisms that underlie links and connects between migration management, development and integration, and remittances are also embedded within broader transnational ties and networks, but nevertheless they serve the purpose of illustration well here:

- The volume and frequency of remittances that a migrant sends is affected by their job situation, and thus linked to *integration processes* in countries of settlement.
- The volume and frequency of remittances affects the types of impacts on *development* that might be possible, e.g., for long-term investments, emergency assistance, or business establishments.
- *Migration management* matters for how migration is envisaged to last over time, with implications for investments in *integration* – and for the effects on *development* contributions that migrants can make, and on the choices non-migrant relatives in countries of origin make.

At the micro level, with an individual or family focus we can imagine a trajectory over time, where first, there are links between migration management and integration; second, there are links between integration and development in countries of origin; and third, there are also links between migration management and development in countries of origin – which for an individual migrant might both precede migration and can be salient in their post-migration life in the country of settlement.

At the macro level, we might also consider how migration management efforts nationally and supranationally impact on policies and practices of integration and development, both nationally and internationally. These first illustrations are meant to set the scene for the types of empirical relationships – and the extent to which they are reflected in policy – that we explore in the remainder of this paper. We now turn to defining the key terms, before presenting some reasons why these links merit further attention.



## Defining key terms

### Migration management

Put simply, we understand **migration management** to involve the actions (laws, policies and policy implementation) undertaken by states to govern the ways in which migrants may enter the state's territory, achieve a legal residence there, and are able to extend (or not) their legal residence in the country of settlement, up to a permanent status (Boswell, 2007; Adamson and Tsourapas, 2020; Pécoud, 2021).

Debates on 'migration policy' dominate the public sphere in many countries, while immigration often becomes a heated topic in election campaign periods. In the realm of research, 'migration policy' is also a contested area, perhaps mainly in foundational terms, for, what is migration policy? We follow Christina Boswell, who more than 20 years ago proposed 'a theory focusing on the functional imperatives of the state in the area of migration, which shape its responses to societal interests and institutional structures' (2007: 75) for engaging with 'migration policy'.

Thus, migration management is about controlling borders, yet we include a broader view, where border control is understood as an instrument in an overarching policy of seeking to influence and shape migration in a way that is desirable from the perspective of a given state. Our emphasis is on *immigration* management, and only selectively on *emigration* management, though we recognise that migration management entails both *emigration* and *immigration* dimensions. Both policy and research in the European context tends to emphasise immigration to Europe and emigration from elsewhere, whereas intra-European emigration and immigration is subsumed under the 'mobility' category, and thus falls outside the scope of 'migration management' policies.

An area that appears particularly revealing of links – but more so of disconnects – is the space where migration management *as deterrence* meets migration management *as the first step towards naturalisation and citizenship*, as a possible end of a migrant 'integration trajectory' in a country of settlement. Arguably, it is perhaps at this intersection of migration management as border control and *exclusion*, and of migration management as entry and (potential) *inclusion*, where policy goals and implementation, and the empirical realities as experienced by migrants, best illustrate the dilemmas that conflicting yet legitimate interests raise. This intersection has ramifications for integration, and also for migrants' contributions to development in countries of origin, actual and potential.

### Development

When referring to **development** in this paper, we seek to balance a broad consideration of development as processes of social change that all societies undergo, with a more specific focus on development understood as 'human development' with measures of improvement – for instance, as measured in the Human Development Index (HDI) (Andersson and Siegel, 2019; UNDP, 2020). Given our focus on migration to European contexts from outside of



Europe, we are referring to development processes in countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, as well as the Americas, which migrants leave.

We acknowledge that development is multidimensional, involves human development, and is best approached in terms of expansion of capabilities in populations (Andersson and Siegel, 2019). It remains a challenge to pin down the impacts of migration – or migrants – specifically, as isolated from other co-constitutive parts of social change (de Haas, 2010; 2021).

As mentioned, we are cognisant of emigration and immigration, as well as internal mobility, affecting all societies globally. Nevertheless, our focus in this MIGNEX Background Paper is on development *in relation to migration to Europe*, while fully recognising that this is but one – and usually a relatively minor – way in which ‘migration’ may impact local development in different countries around the world. As we discuss in Box 1, when referring to migration in this paper, we focus on international migration not internal migration, which is an explicit limitation in the scope of our work (but see, for example, Skeldon, 2006 and 2017; King and Skeldon, 2010).

Approaching the possible interactions of development processes and emigration at the micro-level, there are factors that can be identified and that merit attention. We seek to focus on development in relation to material and immaterial forms of social change. This might include roofs on houses being repaired via remittances, or freedom-constraining cultural norms that might be challenged or upheld, and that are all somehow connected to the reality of international migration.

### Box 1. Migration – internal and international

In this MIGNEX Background Paper our focus is on international migration, hence we use migration management to refer to the regulation of entry of people across borders. However, we recognise that internal migration constitutes the most significant form of geographic mobility that is impacting social change in most societies, whether in Europe or around the world. While some of the links between migration management, development and integration that we discuss are of relevance also in the context of internal mobility, many will be less so.

Similarities may be found in contexts with a high degree of regulation of internal mobility within a state, or in relation to integration, where there are linguistic differences which mean that integration dynamics within the same state may resemble those of international migration (for example, in China or in Belgium). The clearest similarity in dynamics may be found in relation to regions within a country with significant wealth disparities, where internal mobility and its developmental impacts may have clear parallels to those found in the context of international migration. Differences would include, in most cases, remaining within the country you are a citizen of, with a smaller distance geographically from the place left, and often more salient obstacles in terms of linguistic and other differences to overcome.

Our attention to migration management, and our focus on European countries of settlement, provides for a particular view. On the one hand, border control necessarily takes on a central place; but on the other hand, the substantial migration of third-country nationals with various temporary permits constitutes an important backdrop.

### Integration


The term **integration** is weighed down by heavy baggage, conceptually placed somewhere between the hotly contested multiculturalism and assimilation, and in relation to policy in Europe, much critiqued for failing to really espouse its two-way street ideals (Scholten et al., 2017; Rytter, 2019). In this paper, however, we use the term ‘integration’, because it has been a significant policy term in European contexts, and also because we understand integration to relate to the very basic empirical processes of matter-of-fact adaptation which migrants engage in to make life somehow work in a new place, inevitably also putting a mark on societies of settlement (Kivisto, 2003; Erdal, 2013).

In exploring the links between migration management, development processes in countries of origin and integration, we seek to include in our analysis both the dimension of experienced, everyday integration, and the dimension of stated policy goals in the integration field. However, our emphasis in relation to integration is mainly on the empirical realities of migrants’ lives in countries of settlement, or what we refer to as **integration processes**. By including such processes, we want to signal that integration is of course relational, and it is a process, involving material and immaterial dimensions, where necessarily not only migrants but also the societies they relate to undergo social change (Erdal and Ezzati, 2015).

In this MIGNEX Background Paper we refer to countries of settlement, rather than destination, as our focus is more on processes of integration that require some duration of stay. This is a choice that also reflects a recognition that migrants may over time have several countries of ‘destination’ – but usually one place of residence, where they are settled, at any one point in time. However, this does not conflict with an acknowledgment that many migrants are engaged in transnational social fields which connect them with people in places of origin simultaneously to processes of integration in places of settlement (Erdal and Oeppen, 2013).

## Remittances as a linking mechanism

Migrant remittances are a key mechanisms by which migration impacts development in countries of origin (Carling, 2008; de Haas, 2009). The effects of remittances on development are debated, such as in relation to questions about exacerbating inequalities, risks of dependency, or inflating the status of migration in competition with local options for the future (Jones, 1998; Clemens and Ogden, 2014; Azizi, 2021). However, the fact that remittances are equivalent to more than three times the volume of annual official development assistance (ODA), and that more than 800 million relatives of migrants around the world depend on international remittances, underscores their salience in both quantitative and qualitative terms (Rahman and Fee, 2012; Erdal, 2014; Shrestha et al., 2019). Figure 1 illustrates a basic micro-level – individual – approach to these links.



**Figure 1. A micro-level, individual approach to links between migration management, integration and development**

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The unit of analysis considered in Figure 1 is the migrant, for instance a young woman leaving the Philippines for a job in health care abroad. For her, migration management relates to regulations in the country of origin, as well as in prospective countries of destination (and possible settlement), differently enabling her to enter, which is often linked to her qualifications and how her credentials are evaluated (see also Thompson and Walton-Roberts, 2019; Vaughn et al., 2020; Korzeniewska and Erdal, 2021; Ortega and Macabasag, 2021; Walton-Roberts, 2021).

Once in her country of destination (and possible settlement), where entry will usually be tied to the young woman's work, processes of integration will


be linked with the length of her planned stay, where language learning may be a work requirement or, by contrast, may appear a poor and unrequired investment if the timeframe is short. The integration policies and programmes that will meet her in the country of settlement will vary depending on, among other factors, timeframe, type of permit and type of job.

Similarly, less tangible aspects of integration processes – where a sense of attachment may develop – will change over time and with the young woman's evaluation of her future prospects. Meanwhile, family ties and remittance responsibilities could remain stable from the time of arrival and for many years to come. These might run parallel to integration processes, and at the same time may not operate in isolation from them. Thus, such ties and responsibilities are not insulated against shocks that may arise from job loss or struggles to have education certified, for example, both of which are closely related with integration processes (Erdal and Oeppen, 2013; Erdal, 2020).

Figure 1 illustrates a temporal view of these links, from the point of departure of an individual migrant, though using a particular form of migration as an example. The same model could be applied to a young man leaving a West African country to pursue work or education, heading to a neighbouring country, or to Europe, for example.

The temporal dimensions of migration become salient as the ways in which the links between migration management, development and integration manifest. These are associated with whether migration is temporary, seasonal and circulatory, longer-term, or considered as permanent. Such temporalities are intertwined with categories employed in migration management (for example, bureaucratic categories used for the purposes of different types of permits). But also with migrants' own reflections, hopes and aspirations for their migration and life projects, and thereby often linked to their engagements 'here' and 'there', investing in processes of integration in countries of settlement and/or in processes of development in countries of origin (considering potential return mobilities, or onward movement, over time).

Figure 2 adds multidirectional links to this picture. In addition to links between migration management and integration in the settlement country and development in the country of origin (illustrated via remittances above), we might consider a number of other ways in which these three phenomena are interconnected.



## Figure 2. Multidirectional links between migration management, integration and development

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Source: Authors' elaboration.

We might consider migration management as the point of departure to explore links identified as 'downstream' from migration management and entry or residence permits etc., and, following on from integration processes, feeding into forms of contributions to development in the origin country. But we might also want to use 'development' as the point of departure to explore these links – as multidirectional. Development here might be considered at the micro-level, in terms of capabilities, or considered at the macro-level, in terms of the HDI, for example. If development, rather than migration management, is taken as the point of departure, this has implications for the types of links with management (in, for example, European countries) which exist and come into view.

However, as Figure 2 illustrates, these may be composite links, which either work in a sequence or constitute links combined with disconnects. For instance, there are both links and disconnects that can be identified at the micro-level between migrant integration in countries of settlement and development in countries of origin. This is illustrated by the case of remittances, where integration matters for remittance-sending capacity, which in turn impacts the volume and frequency of remittances received and spent in the country of origin.

### Why do these links matter?

Usually migration management, development and integration are considered discrete policy fields, even if potentially relevant to one another. And such conceptualisation of separate policy fields has implications for institutional organisation. This separation both builds on the assumption that these are discrete policy fields, but through this also perpetuates such a separation, even if empirical processes in practice are often inextricably linked, with direct and indirect mutual effects.

While migration management, development and integration can be seen as separate policy areas with related empirical processes, there are also areas of overlap, between two nodes and between all three. Our motivation for the exploration of links between migration management, development and integration in this paper is two-fold. First, empirical links exist, even when causal mechanisms may be hard to pin down exactly, and these links merit further scrutiny. Second, clearly there are some diverging interests governing the policy agendas within each of the three areas and we seek to explore the links between. Meanwhile, in light of the generally agreed-upon drive towards policy coherence, it is worth considering how links between migration management, development and integration are (or are not) reflected in policy, and how this may in turn affect policy coherence – as a goal and/or in the types of outcomes seen in practice.

A crude summary, notably glossing over exceptions, would be that: first, while long-standing research efforts on diaspora development engagements have pointed out connections with integration processes, as have diaspora

organisations themselves, this has not received a significant degree of attention from policy-makers tasked with integration in most European countries. Second, and conversely, policy-makers focusing on development often question the value-added of diaspora contributions, and indeed the role of migration overall in development at local levels in countries in the global south, where broadly a sedentary approach to development remains. Third, there are simultaneous assumptions about how transnational ties might hamper integration processes – which while remain unsubstantiated in terms of robust empirical evidence, are nevertheless pervasive and support zero-sum game approaches to thinking about migrants' potential contributions 'here' and 'there' (Erdal, 2020) (see also Box 5).

Better understanding the links between migration management, development and integration matters because, if kept out of sight, such links contribute to unintended – and unplanned for – effects of policy interventions, and in fields beyond those intentionally targeted. An example might be where migration management policies have effects on migrant integration, or on development in migrants' countries of origin. These effects might be both unintended and undesired, but might also at times unintentionally contribute to desired outcomes from one or more policy perspectives (see also Erdal et al., 2020). Furthermore, links that remain out of sight are a missed opportunity because they could offer potential for policy impact – and for boosting positive effects of migration – across contexts, as well as for various actors, including migrants.


Meanwhile, there are also disconnects empirically – where, for example, processes of integration and migrants' contributions to development in places of origin might operate in apparent isolation from one another. And even more saliently, through the separation of policy fields, which in the EU context are divided under the auspices of the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission (DG HOME) versus the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development of the European Commission (DG INTPA). These are further subdivided into respective policy fields under each of the two DGs, with distinct responsibilities, priorities and funding mechanisms. Added to which are various national-level policy considerations, which, again, are often subdivided in different ways under ministries and directorates in different countries.

The reality, however, is that international migration evades such distinctions between policy fields. Policy matters relating to both migration management and integration are often linked. Furthermore, questions of development in migrants' countries of origin are both strongly connected with migrants, via remittances, for example, but also investments, return migration and skills transfers, as well as migration as a macro-level phenomenon in many areas around the world. Thus, development concerns also intersect with questions of migration, internally and internationally, and increasingly with migration management considerations – albeit often framed by the perspective of European countries. It is therefore necessary to reflect on how migration management concerns also frame the terminology used – such as about regular and irregular migration (see later section on Regular and irregular migration).

## Background paper outline

This MIGNEX Background Paper consists of six sections, including this Introduction (see Figure 3).

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**Figure 3. Structure of this paper**

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The section that follows briefly discusses relevant conceptual and methodological approaches that inform our engagement with links between migration management, development and integration (Conceptual and methodological approaches). The core parts of the Background Paper are the sections Empirical links: what do we know?, Reviewing links as seen in policy and Which temporal view? In Empirical links: what do we know? we review existing research and set out to clarify the links between migration management, development and integration. In Reviewing links as seen in policy we turn to current European policy and present insights from a review of four policy instruments, namely: 1) the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; 2) the Asylum and Migration Pact; 3) the Mobility Partnership Facility; and 4) the Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion. Next, we explore how the links between migration management, development and integration are reflected (or not) in policy. The latter section addresses the question of 'Which temporal view?'. This section is a result of our work with the two parallel pillars of this study (i.e., the discussion presented in the previous two sections). Having conducted our review of empirical links and how these are (not) reflected in the four selected policy instruments, we found it striking how the critical question of which temporal frame is applied was largely missing from the literature and relevant studies.

The paper concludes with a summary of what the exercise of seeking to clarify the links between migration management, development and integration teaches us. This leads us to ask whether the reflection of these



empirical links in policy should be understood in terms of a virtuous cycle or as balancing acts – or perhaps as conflicting interests – and to what extent these are then built into explicit (or implicit) policy goals, as intended or unintended outcomes. We offer a systematisation of the migration management–development–integration interface as emerging from our review of empirical and policy links (and disconnects), attempt to clarify the multidirectional links found, and discuss the dilemmas inherent to balancing conflicting concerns.

## Conceptual and methodological approaches

The links that this paper seeks to clarify are on the one hand empirical, and on the other hand affected by policies. This section briefly introduces our conceptual and methodological approach, first to the complexity of these links; second, to the scale of analysis; third, to the power dynamics at play; and fourth, to migration as temporary and/or permanent.

### Approaching complex links

In the context of the migration–development nexus, it has long been acknowledged that migration is endogenous to social change, which poses serious challenges to isolating the impacts of ‘migration’ on ‘development’ (de Haas, 2010; 2021). Instead, migration is – and therefore should also be approached as – co-constitutive of social change. Conceptually, this suggests that it is necessary to be more specific: which aspects of migration, or the transnational practices which migration enables, is it that are being rereferred to? And which particular aspects of development are being referred to, for whom, where and when? (Raghuram, 2009).

Migration studies, as an inherently interdisciplinary field of knowledge-production, have contributed insight on economic, political, social, cultural, religious, psychological and health-related dimensions of the migration–development nexus. Most significantly, however, the so-called ‘transnational turn’ (Faist, 2004; Waldinger, 2021) has offered a view of migration which reflects its spatial multiplicity, over time. **Migrant transnationalism** refers to ‘a process by which immigrants forge and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995: 48).

With a ‘transnational lens’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004) – which encompasses the ‘transnational social field’ as the geographic scope of relevance – links between migration management, development and integration come into view. A transnational lens is therefore necessary, albeit it is important to acknowledge that migrants’ transnational practices also have limits, whereby not every migrant engages transnationally, nor does transnational engagement look the same, or remain the same over time (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Waldinger, 2008).

In the context of our discussion of the links between migration management, development and integration, it is worth noting that as much as

‘development’ may be approached as a question of freedom and of capabilities (Sen, 1998), ‘integration’ can be approached in a similar vein, if referring to processes leading to social cohesion in societies and what is referred to as two-way processes of integration. However, in the same way that ‘development’ in practice does not always evoke ideas of freedom and human capabilities, so ‘integration’ also more often evokes ideas around the expectations of states with regard to migrants and the requirement for particular forms of behaviour (Rytter, 2019). Meanwhile, ‘migration management’ refers to a goal that is defined by states, not individuals who relate to particular forms of regulation that enable or constrain their international migration.

As we turn to now, there is a considerable leap between individual micro-level considerations – where both development and integration in a ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (UN, 2015) inspired sense refer to an individual’s degree of access to ‘choice, capability, freedom, justice and democracy’ (Hamilton, 2020) – and macro-level considerations (see also Box 2). In this paper we strive to address aspects of both, while being cognizant of debates around structure and agency. We also deal with many of these issues in an overarching and, at times, perhaps superficial way – given our aim of providing a bird’s eye view (but see Bakewell, 2010; Bakewell et al., 2012, for example, for further discussion).

## Scale of analysis

At which scale is it the most relevant to explore the links between migration management, development and integration? The individual, family or household micro-level, or at the national, aggregate, macro-level? Or at an intermediary meso-level, relating to migrant associations and sending regions, for instance?

As referred to above, our geographic gaze is a transnational one – spanning and transcending nation-state boundaries (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; 2003). In our review of existing research, we have included micro- as well as macro-level perspectives. However, it is at the micro-level where the links between migration management, development and integration become visible in the most concrete ways.

Our scale of analysis includes nation states, as well as the transnational social fields spanning countries of origin and settlement, and ‘here’ and ‘there’, which also includes multiple destinations and transits over time. Yet there nevertheless remains a ‘where’, for links between migration management, development and integration manifest ‘somewhere’ after all. For the most part, our attention is on either one or both of the countries of settlement and the places of origin in this context (but see also Shams (2020) on why ‘elsewhere’ is often a relevant spatial scope to consider).

In terms of policy domains, as defined above, our attention to migration management falls primarily on *immigration*, though we recognise the salience of migration management also for *emigration*.

The scale of analysis selected has implications for the sources of empirical knowledge available. At the macro-level of nation states, clarifying the links between migration management, development and integration would rely

on having appropriate units or activities to count. For instance, records of migrants entering via different forms of regulated migration can be combined with records of particular measures of integration (e.g., defined in terms of income, housing, language acquisition), and with macro-level data from countries of origin (e.g., volumes of remittances from migrants in a given settlement country being transferred annually). These forms of data, however, appear quite poorly equipped to grapple in depth with the nature of the links at hand. Therefore, the micro-level becomes all the more salient – both including the dimensions that may be counted (whether in national registry data or in surveys) and those that require a qualitative and often more interpretative approach.

The differing nature of quantitative and qualitative insights, however, is not the most salient in terms of methodological approach to the links we are scrutinizing. Instead, *time and temporal perspectives* are. As we elaborate on the section Which temporal view?, the timeframe selected defines the links that are allowed to be seen and those that remain out of sight. The increasing focus on time and temporalities in research on migration has also brought to light what may be referred to as ‘**methodological presentism**’. This has been defined as ‘the scholarly and societal tendency to understand social phenomena within a limited contemporary framework, thus neglecting possible effects and similarities embedded in and established through human history’ (Schmidt, 2017: 41).

Methodological presentism is a profound obstacle to understanding the links between migration management, integration and development, whether at the micro- or macro-levels, and whether a quantitative or qualitative methodological approach is preferred. Despite the ‘temporal turn’ in migration research and also the social sciences more generally (see, for example, Griffiths, 2014; Baas and Yeoh, 2019), we argue that too little critical attention is being paid to the blind spots which current presentism leads to, with severe impacts on the ability to both understand and potentially learn from past experience in both research and policy-making.

## Power dynamics

This MIGNEX Background Paper uses the term ‘**migration management**’ in referring to the ways in which nation states approach the regulation of migration across their borders. And more specifically, how European states seek to regulate the mobility of people without EU (or European Economic Area – EEA) citizenship into their territories.

As Oliver Bakewell (2008) pointedly states, the connections made between migration and development, while continuing to ignore the agency of migrants from poor countries, will primarily remain focused on one goal: ‘keeping them in their place’. This is connected with entrenched ideas about what development looks like, where it happens, and how – where mobility continues to have an ambivalent role. While recognised in the context of urbanisation processes and increasingly complex patterns of internal as well as international mobility, population movements often remain a challenge for governance efforts.

Questions of migration management in Europe, which commonly involve a range of third countries, may take into consideration the interests of various actors who are located in different places. Yet such considerations are arguably marked by strong Eurocentrism. When coming from the EU, as a political entity, it would be surprising if this were not the case, in a similar way to which the African Union would prioritise the interests of African states.

Nevertheless, given the historical backdrop of imperialism, colonial ties, and asymmetrical economic and political positions in the global order of things, critical scrutiny of different ways of describing the world – and of defining and then finding solutions to problems – is necessary. The repeated calls for decolonisation of knowledge production, not least in the fields of development but also increasingly in migration studies, underscore this point (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010; Raghuram, 2021). As we also discuss in the section *Which temporal view?*, the temporal view chosen matters – and a longer perspective means pre-colonial, colonial, as well as post-colonial eras may valuably be better understood if seen together. More holistic approaches to migration – as well as development, understood as societal improvements in any society across the world – are reflected in policy, such as in the SDGs or the Global Compact for Migration, as we discuss in Box 2 (see also Newland and Salant, 2018; Wise, 2018).

### Box 2. The SDGs and the Global Compact for Migration

The SDGs include specific reference to migration as not only relevant to – but often an integral part of – development processes. The Goals also stress that all human societies have the capacity to ‘develop’ and thus include societies across wealth and inequality ranges globally. Migration is central to the SDGs in several ways, not least in relation to how migrant workers are treated and with regard to remittance-sending and more specifically the need to reduce transaction costs so as to boost remittance flows. The Global Compact for Migration also mentions these aspects, and it stresses the need for legal pathways of migration as an alternative to irregular routes. It clearly reflects trade-offs and potential conflicts of interest, but seeks to do so while recognising that acceptable compromises, respecting the human dignity of migrants and also a state’s right to control their borders should be possible.

Source: UN (2015; 2018).

## Regular and irregular migration

Although not necessarily without risk or vulnerability, most international migrants globally migrate in a regular fashion. In addition, many migrants migrate without having legal pre-approval for crossing borders, such as in the European context, and particularly in the case of migration across the Mediterranean (Fargues, 2017). Here, a key distinction should be made between those who reach Europe to apply for asylum – which is their right according to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (UN, 1951;

1967), and those who do not seek to apply for asylum, but who pursue regularisation over time via other channels (such as via amnesty schemes or entering the work force and being granted temporary work permits over time).

In Europe, which is our focus destination context, three facts are worth highlighting in relation to discussions on migration management: 1) most migration from third countries to Europe is regular and is integral to the labour market needs of European countries; 2) migration from third countries to Europe includes significant proportions of students and family migrants, in addition to labour migrants and those seeking asylum (Czaika et al., 2021); and 3) the bureaucratic categories that migrants are placed within neither fully reflect their motivations or reasons for migration, nor should they be seen as static and permanent. Instead, as data show, migration management categories operate in a dynamic, if not intended, dialectic relationship with actual migration flows (ibid.).

In the context of a discussion on the links between migration management, development and integration, it is also necessary to discuss conflict-related migration and asylum. Our approach is to see refugees as migrants who have particular rights under international law and the 1951 Refugee Convention specifically (in states that have ratified it) (UN, 1951). Refugees are also migrants, therefore. However, many migrants leaving conflict-settings will effectively not meet the criteria set out in the Refugee Convention. Thus, migration in the context of war, does not equate refugee status.

Yet the institute of asylum remains significant in many European countries, despite many challenges to it – both from those questioning its narrowness and those attacking its breadth. In the context of clarifying the links between migration management, development and integration, it is important to stress that these links – and disconnects – matter also for migrants from conflict settings. Depending on the type of conflict setting, humanitarian assistance or more long-term development aid is often a critical lifeline for populations remaining (Lindley, 2010). Therefore, actively including the perspective of migration in the context of war is necessary also and supports the case for a holistic perspective on the migration process – sensitive to conflict/asylum specifics but recognising that often these are differences of degree not nature necessarily, because what may be termed survival migration or not (for example) may vary, along with how that squares with the 1951 Refugee at an individual level (Lubkemann, 2000; Betts, 2013). Indeed, diaspora development engagements are certainly no less prevalent among diasporas from war-torn areas, often quite the contrary – which also illustrates the very political question of what development is, for whom, and involving whom. Such questions are relevant in all settings, but more easily inflammable in conflict settings (Horst, 2013).

## Temporary vs permanent migration

How do the relationships between migration management, development and integration relate to the long-explored question of temporariness versus permanence in a migratory context (Vasko et. al., 2014)? The choice between temporary and permanent migration is always central to the design of immigration policies (Amin and Mattoo, 2005). It also has a variety of

implications for both integration and development. Furthermore, in addition to long-established historical legacies that affect states' positions towards these two types of migration, economic and social costs and benefits are determining factors that affect states' choices for permanent or temporary settlement.

Analytically, migrants who leave one country and establish themselves permanently in another face the issue of integration in the country of settlement to a considerable extent. But it is also the case that migration may in fact be temporary: people move, find employment, and then return home or might move on, often multiple times. Regardless of state policies and migrant intentions, however, one might argue that in most migration flows, there is both some long-term and some short-term (temporary) migration – if seen in retrospect. Temporary movements and permanent migration constitute part of the same continuum of population mobility in time and space: indeed, it is this continuum that creates a set of challenges for the relationships between migration management, development and integration.

As we elaborate in the section *Which temporal view?*, over the decades the policy choice between temporary migration and (long-term or) permanent settlement has been central to immigration policies in Europe (Castles, 2006a; 2006b). Consequently, this choice – explicitly or implicitly – has had an enormous impact on the formulation of policy across different areas. In this context and referring to migration–development links, whether migration has a temporary, or a long-term and de facto if not planned permanent timeline matters hugely.

While countries of settlement aim to solve their question of labour shortages, countries of origin intend to tackle unemployment, benefit from remittances while workers are abroad and gain from enhanced human capital when they return. However, when migration takes place in a temporary context, integration of migrants does not become an explicit concern (Samuk, 2020), and the contribution of emigrants to the development of their countries of origin remains a major interest (İçduygu, 2008).

Simultaneously, policy focus and choices also depend on how integration is viewed. Where some aspects, e.g., worker rights, matter for short-term labour migrants just as much as for long-term migrants, language learning or citizenship acquisition, for example, would be seen in contrasting ways. In general, however, if explicit temporary migration becomes long-term and/or permanent settlement, integration issues become more pressing.

Considering the question of temporary labour migration specifically, Bauböck and Ruhs (2021) propose a stronger effort to secure a 'triple-win' outcome. This entails more adequate and even consideration of the goals and agency of labour migrants, countries of origin and countries of settlement, perhaps via arbitrated negotiations through international organisations like the International Labour Organization (ILO) or the International Office for Migration (IOM). While the framework proposed seeks to deal with national and global justice issues comprehensively and jointly, according to the authors it 'can help to address, but never fully resolve the inescapable ethical dilemma that such programmes raise under real world conditions' (ibid: 3). Thus, in the case of temporary labour migration programmes, there are clear



challenges when a triple-win outcome is sought. This is perhaps an example where issues of necessary incoherence might at least be resolved, however, and as such the scope for policy coherence might be increased.

Given the centrality of questions of temporariness versus permanence in relation to international migration, this MIGNEX Background Paper endeavours to situate this within the wider context of the relationships between migration management, development and integration. We seek to explore some conceptual links and substantive concerns in policy-making over these linkages, emphasising the implications of the two forms of mobility and identifying distinctive features that present a methodological challenge. We recognise that often the distinction between temporary and permanent migration is neither clear in advance, nor necessarily later, and that the nature of mobility may change from one to the other over time, whatever the initial aims might have been.

## Empirical links: what do we know?

In this section we explore what is known about the empirical links between migration management, development and integration. Despite the exponential growth in academic publications in the field of migration studies (Levy et al., 2020; Pisarevskaya et al., 2020), the triangle of migration management, development and integration is rarely studied together. There are, however, different aspects of this nexus that are focused on in academic publications and research reports published by the likes of IOM, the World Bank, and other international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and think tanks. We discuss relevant links in pairs, between migration management and development, between integration and development, and between migration management and integration.

The geographic scope of attention in these discussions is significant (see also our discussion on scale in the section Conceptual and methodological approaches). Often, the geographic scope is implicit yet narrow, such as when migration management is de facto about controlling immigration to – or making the most of immigration to – a particular nation state. Development is often implicitly focused on national-level development processes, as reflected in changes in HDI ranking, gross domestic product (GDP) or Gini coefficient. In turn, integration studies often focus either on migrants more than the societies they integrate within, or on national-level aggregate trends despite increasing attention to city-level processes. Thus, while the critique of ‘methodological nationalism’ in the social sciences has become a cliché, it nevertheless remains relevant here – what does an implicit nation-state framing do to our ability to understand the links (and disconnects) between migration management efforts and outcomes, and similarly integration (policies, experiences and outcomes) and development (policies, experiences and outcomes)?

Examining the empirical links between migration management, development and integration from different angles makes awareness of ‘blind spots’ essential. This goes for *methodological nationalism* and *methodological presentism* (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; 2003; Schmidt, 2017), as well as for *methodological individualism* (Arrow, 1994). The latter



sensitizes us to the need to balance considerations of the individual within the collective they are part of – the household, community or village, for instance – and has been emphasised within economics in particular. In relation to studying the interplay between migration management, development and integration, we propose that awareness of these intersecting blind spots offers an opportunity for a broader perspective.

Sometimes the unit of analysis might be a mechanism that links these – such as remittances. Other times, the unit of analysis might be at the nation-state, regional, city or village level, whether in terms of empirical patterns of behaviour, policies or people's subjective experiences. In the following subsections we seek to address the hurdles that different scales of analyses or approaches present.

The section draws on systematic literature searches conducted using both Web of Science and Google Scholar advanced searches, as well as a review of the references within the identified literature or within relevant articles that were already known to the authors. The methodology is not presented in further detail because the systematic searches for the terms 'migration management', 'development' and 'integration' in titles, abstracts or papers in select journals or time periods yielded relatively little useful information. This was largely due to the nature of the words 'development' and 'integration', which can of course be used in multiple ways in different contexts. Thus, after an initial systematic effort was made to identify literature relevant to pairs of our three terms, we used a more qualitative approach to review the literature.

The subsections that follow map the empirical links between migration management, development and integration as these emerged in selected literature, but the review is not exhaustive.

## Links between migration management and development

The literature on migration and development does *not* primarily react to policy on migration management goals. Rather, Wise et al. (2013: 430) present a case for 'reframing the debate on migration, development, and human rights with particular emphasis on the promotion of a comprehensive, inclusive, and human-centred alternative agenda'. This approach closely mirrors the logic of the SDGs, as well as the Global Compact for Migration, in taking a holistic perspective on migration – where countries of origin and settlement alike have goals to reach when it comes to human development and welfare, and where migrants' rights are first and foremost human rights.

These are debates drawing on long-standing interest in the migration–development nexus (Sørensen et al., 2002; de Haas, 2010). Simultaneously, there is recognition of the role of migration management concerns in EU policy, which is also reflected in research. This is summarised well by Sørensen (2016: 67), who writes: 'much migration-development policy in reality has served migration management functions rather than development goals'. Further, Crane (2020: 29) refers to the 'carrot and stick conditionality that EU development policies use towards implementing externalization policies like migrant readmission'. Crane (ibid: 34) also

places migration management concerns in the context of different policy fields and claims that ‘development and humanitarianism are central to implementing and justifying the EU’s security centric externalization of migration management’ (see also Cuttitta, 2018). Thus, the links between migration management and development are also discussed in research in direct response to policy-making in these fields, with particular constellations of assumptions about links between forms of development and forms of migration management.

Academic work, especially based on empirical contexts in Europe, focuses on the impacts of the implementation of European policies on migrants *in Europe* – such as the effects of illegality, of temporariness and precarity, and the liminality that implementation of migration management creates in people’s lives (Andersson, 2014; Sahraoui, 2020). However, in this literature, there is little, if any, connection to questions of development in countries of origin, other than in relation to the question of return (Collyer, 2012; Leerkes et al., 2017).

Return (and readmission) and in particular assisted return – which in this context is usually understood singularly as a migration management tool, focused on removing aliens without legal right to stay – has been much focused on by governments in Europe. Policy-oriented analyses and evaluation has ensued, often raising quite critical questions about both alleged connections with ‘development’ and other aspects of ‘return’ (Koser and Kuschminder, 2015; DRC et al., 2019; IOM, 2020).

Below we expand on four areas of both empirical links – and research about them. This is telling of the links and disconnects seen at the interface of migration management and development, namely: migration control and geopolitics; migration management and development aid; return and development (aid); and how trade-offs between migration management and development interests are being sought and balanced.

### Migration control and geopolitics

Migration management goals as seen from the perspective of European states are clearly often intertwined with broader geopolitical agendas, whether linked to trade interests, concerns over terrorism or in other ways. This is visible in relations between the EU, as well as in specific EU Member States, and countries on the southern side of the Mediterranean Sea (see, for example, Collyer, 2016). In practical terms, this manifests from the level of the operations of Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) (Reid-Henry, 2013), to the various agreements and partnerships that have been developed in the past two decades especially (see also the sections Reviewing links as seen in policy and Which temporal view?). The academic literature on migration control and geopolitics explicitly focuses on questions of migration management, where matters of both integration and of development remain largely out of scope.

## Migration management and development aid

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Analysis of the relationships between tying development aid to particular migration management programming goals identifies the changing perspectives, moving from a preventive to a more repressive approach (Knoll and Sheriff, 2017; Collyer, 2020). This is in the context of research increasingly providing evidence at an aggregate level that relationships between migration and development appear quite clear, in that increasing GDP per capita levels run parallel to increasing emigration levels, whereas emigration levels fall after countries reach a stable and high level of GDP per capita (Clemens, 2020). Drawing on this evidence, Clemens and Postel (2018) argue against the effectiveness of development aid as a tool of deterrence, and instead urge more creative approaches to policy engagement with migration and development broadly.

Largely, engagements on the topic of migration management and development aid remain at the aggregate, national level. Meanwhile, at the individual or community level, the implications of the links between migration management as implemented – and the outcomes of particular development aid interventions – appear less researched. Exceptions include Gamso and Yuldashev's 2018 study combining national-level data with Arabarometer survey data on migration aspirations, which suggests differences in the relationship between rural and urban development interventions in terms of shaping emigration from different areas (Gamso and Yuldashev, 2018). Here, however, the focus is not on migration management, but rather on understanding the mechanisms underlying migration decision-making and how development interventions may play a role. Overall, the evidence on the role of development aid in shaping the outcomes of migration management interventions is both mixed and highly uncertain, as it is hard to isolate effects with any degree of certainty (Coggio, 2021).

## Return migration and development

Return migration is, alongside remittances, one of the key ways in which migration might influence development in migrants' areas of origin. In the context of migration management, however, the return migration most frequently referred to is voluntary assisted return (Koser and Kuschminder, 2015; Horst and Nur, 2016; Bonin, 2017; DRC et al., 2019; IOM, 2020), or the return to the country of origin of persons without legal right to stay in the country they find themselves in (for instance in Europe). This is a particular subset of return migration, which is closely tied into migration management conceptualisation in the EU (see also the section Reviewing links as seen in policy) (Knoll et al., 2021).

While return migration can yield salient impacts on local development, including through economic investments leading to job creation or other forms of development and growth, research has shown that preparation for return (both in practical terms, but also in relation to assets which are accessible) is crucial (Kuschminder, 2017; Lietaert et al., 2017; Vandevoordt, 2017). So too are the conditions that returning migrants face back home, in terms of the business and investment climate. As has been pointed out repeatedly in the migration–development nexus literature, migrants'

contributions to development generally can boost virtuous cycles, but rarely change the context as a whole on their own, for obvious reasons (de Haas, 2010).

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### Balancing trade-offs

A wealth of evaluations, reports and other policy-related analyses have been produced since the 2000s that grapple in different ways with the links between migration management and development. In the European context, this is reflected in policy interventions – which we return to in the section Reviewing links as seen in policy. In particular since the European migration crisis (2015–2016), balancing the trade-offs between controlling immigration to European countries (especially reducing irregular migration into Europe), and contributing to development (with *assumptions* around decreasing prospective migrants' urge to leave) has been on the policy agenda (see, for example, Koch et al., 2015).

Trade-offs between migration management and development interests also have different contextual backdrops, depending on where in the world such links are explored. Examples of country-level studies include Moldova (Ratzmann, 2012), Mozambique (Raimundo, 2009) and the Philippines (Oh, 2016), where migration management is discussed in conjunction with development in both a regional (e.g., the EU neighbourhood) or national context, but also connecting these discussions with securitisation.

Because the geographic focus between migration management and development is often quite divided, exploring their links offers an opportunity to reflect on the people of interest, concern and priority. As discussed in Box 3 on 'Sustainable migration – *for whom?*', scrutiny of the links between migration management and development underscores the reality of both links and disconnects: how these are understood, and the implications, depends very much on the eye of the beholder. As a policy-maker, what is your mandate? Controlling nation-state borders, contributing in specific ways to national development, including through selective migration policies, or contributing to human development in places and countries elsewhere in the world?

**Box 3. Sustainable migration – for whom?**

In the paper ‘Defining sustainable migration’ (Erdal et al., 2018), sustainable migration is defined as: ‘migration that ensures a well-balanced distribution of costs and benefits for the individuals, societies and states affected, today and in the future’. A key question is thus: sustainable migration – for whom?

Three insights are worth highlighting: ‘First, migration from poorer to richer countries – and the sustainability thereof – cannot be understood in isolation from other mobilities, whether internal or to other international destinations. Second, the temporal perspective applied, having an eye to the future, but also historical perspective, makes a difference both to what is considered, and to how the costs and benefits of migration are understood. Third, there are inherent dilemmas and conflicts of interest, where the answer to what “well-balanced distribution of costs and benefits” of migration means, is always going to be a political question. As such, the term “sustainable migration” is also inherently vulnerable to politicization’ (ibid: 36).

Given the multiple and at times contradictory impacts of different kinds of mobilities on development processes, there are unresolvable dilemmas, trade-offs and challenges to achieving ‘triple-win’ promises, where migration can benefit migrants, as well as societies of origin and settlement simultaneously.

**Links between integration and development**

In this section we explore empirical links between integration and development, as these emerge from the academic literature and from reviews and evaluations of policy and practice. We start with broad empirical links – and disconnects – before turning to some specific mechanisms that connect integration and development. We then explore the area of diaspora development engagements in particular.

Migrants’ contributions to development in countries of origin, including but not restricted to remittance-sending, are discussed in the research literature in conjunction with integration processes and the circumstances which migrants find themselves in, whilst living in countries of settlement (Carling et al., 2012; Carling and Hoelscher, 2013; Erdal, 2013; Bilgili, 2015; Sturge et al., 2016). However, in the vast academic literature on migrant integration, issues that link to development in places of origin are arguably not a main concern, and relatively frequently these completely fall off the radar (Erdal et al., 2020).<sup>1</sup>

When questions about migrants’ circumstances abroad – broadly speaking relating to integration – are raised, this is often in the context of migrant-worker protection in key labour migration destinations such as the Gulf States. Discussions in the Global Forum on Migration and Development reflect these very legitimate concerns and interests among many states

<sup>1</sup> This section reproduces relevant content from Erdal et al. 2020: 7.

whose citizens migrate to work abroad. Meanwhile, equally important questions remain under-explored about how the foundations for successful contributions to development in countries of origin may hinge on predictable and equitable processes of integration and gaining rights in all countries of settlement. In Box 4 we explore three reasons why this may be the case – despite the intuitive and easily observable empirical links that exist.

#### **Box 4. Three reasons why further attention is yet to come to the links between integration and development**

1. While the field of migration research has grown dramatically in recent decades, and despite the so-called ‘transnational turn’ since the 1990s, much research about international migration remains heavily tilted towards questions of integration in countries of settlement and in particular in countries of settlement in Europe and North America. This ‘integration bias’ means that much research, not least that funded by public agencies or governments directly, focuses on mapping, understanding and ultimately identifying solutions to problems within the broadly defined integration landscape, and not on migrants’ engagements in countries of origin.
2. Research that investigates development in countries around the world is primarily concerned with development performance, changes and obstacles in a given local or national context, wherein migration invariably plays only a partial role, if any, in overall outcomes. At the same time, much of the development sector continues to hold a sedentary and nation-focused bias, which largely fails to acknowledge the transnational contributions of diaspora and has particular understandings of development aid as a hierarchical geographical relationship that makes the role of diaspora invisible (Sinatti and Horst, 2015).
3. Where links between migrants’ transnational engagements in countries of origin and integration processes in countries of settlement are made, attention has been on specific practices, for example how levels of integration in particular domains affect remittance-sending. Here, the interest has not stretched to the question of what impact these remittances have in tangible terms in the places they are sent to (Erdal et al., 2020: 7).

Empirical links between integration and development are very real, and merit further scrutiny – which is what we turn to below. Subsequently, we discuss some of the insights gained by civil society actors and INGOs on the links between diaspora development engagements in countries of origin and integration in countries of settlement.




## Mechanisms connecting integration and development

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There are many ways in which the activities of diaspora populations can affect development processes in countries of origin (Erdal et al., 2020).<sup>2</sup> We focus on development processes with a relatively broad understanding. Meanwhile, most of the specific mechanisms that we discuss are also relevant when considering diaspora contributions in terms of ‘diaspora philanthropy’ (see, for example, Brinkerhoff, 2008) or ‘diaspora humanitarianism’ (see, for example, Horst et al., 2015).

Our discussion of mechanisms – and activities therein – does not distinguish online or virtual engagement as distinct from non-virtual forms. Rather, we include both modes as and where relevant. In some cases, for example where physical travel is referred to, virtual options are less relevant; while for other case, for example remittance-sending or civil society-led initiatives, virtual modes of engagement are integral to the ways in which such diaspora activities are conducted today.

We differentiate between eight types of activities, as illustrated in Figure 4.



**Figure 4. Connections between integration in countries of settlement and development in countries of origin**

Source: Erdal et al. (2020).

Each of these eight mechanisms can contribute significantly to development in countries of origin, although if and how they do varies, and there are pitfalls to be aware of. Policy measures can affect – positively or negatively – whether diaspora populations engage in these activities as well as the consequences for development.

Often, integration in countries of settlement will facilitate engagement in these activities. For instance, some require material resources that, in turn,

<sup>2</sup> For a full discussion on how each of these mechanisms might operate, please see Erdal et al. (2020).



presuppose a good position in the labour market. Diaspora members' contribution to development in countries of origin can also have consequences for their integration in countries of settlement. At the overall level, making a difference in this way can positively affect the image of diaspora populations. And aside from the more general impact of contributing to development, the specific activities that diaspora populations engage in could affect their integration, positively or negatively.

### 'Bolster inclusion to foster development'

Since the height of debates on remittances as 'the new development mantra' (Kapur, 2003; de Haas, 2005; Hansen, 2012), the pendulum of optimism vs pessimism about whether migration (including remittances) may or may not contribute to, or even drive, development in poor societies has swung back and forth, and has been scrutinized from many angles (see, for example, de Haas, 2012; Gamlen, 2014).

However, both governments and civil society have in the interim acted upon and implemented a range of programmes and activities which in different ways have sought to boost the effect of migrants' engagements in development processes in countries of origin. A recent report from IOM (2019: 58) based on experiences in Italy, for instance, states that: 'the migration–development–integration nexus is shaped by a variety of sectoral policies in specific contexts. Therefore, it is important to adopt policy approaches not exclusively focused on migration, but focused on understanding how migration both affects and is affected by different sectoral policies.' Such policy approaches do not just consider sectoral policies, but they also consider how the relationships between different governance actors function.

Based on much work seeking to support diaspora development engagements, Knoll et al. (2013) review the experiences of 11 European countries. While the main attention is on migration and development links more specifically, 'integration is perceived as a way to enhance migrants' capacity to contribute to the development of their country of origin, notably in countries where local authorities have been involved in migration and development activities' (ibid: 34). The authors conclude that 'generally, the mapped countries have found it easier to integrate migration issues into development policies – mainly via the standard issues of remittances, skilled migration, and diaspora engagement – than vice versa. Discussions on integrating development into migration policies have mainly revolved around return, reintegration, and circular, in practice temporary, migration, ambiguously cast as vehicles for development' (ibid: 36). Furthermore, on how the insights garnered on local levels do not necessarily make their way up to higher levels of governance: 'local authorities have become increasingly active as players in development cooperation, including migration and development initiatives, and they often address and acknowledge the linkages between the integration of migrants and their development activities. At the same time, an exchange of practices and experiences between the central and local level is lacking, which hampers the promotion of policy coherence on migration and development' (ibid: 51-52).

Lessons learned from these policy intervention efforts in the field of diaspora development engagements include a broad-based agreement that policy and institutional coherence are key success criteria (Hong and Knoll, 2016). In their review, Hong and Knoll conclude with three specific recommendations: (1) pursue synergies to advance shared objectives, (2) actively seek to minimise the negative side effects of policies; and (3) prevent policies from undermining each other or the achievement of agreed-upon development goals. These are drawn from a review of how migration policies (narrowly conceived), sectoral policies that are not specific to migration yet that nonetheless affect or are affected by migration (including integration), and migration-related development policies connect and interact in practice. This illustrates the issue of links and disconnects between migration management, integration and development, and the particular roles of institutional and policy (in)coherence therein.

The heading ‘Bolster inclusion to promote development’ (from IOM, 2019) summarises a key insight which both practice and research confirms – namely, that migrants’ inclusion in societies of settlement matters for their capacity to engage in development in places of origin (see also Erdal et al., 2020; Sgro et al., 2021).

#### **Box 5. Migrant integration and transnational ties are not a zero-sum game**

Research challenges assumptions that diaspora engagement in development work in countries of origin runs the risk of ‘dividing loyalties’ – based on an impression of either/or and a view of this engagement being a zero-sum game (Erdal and Oeppen, 2013). Instead, the evidence shows that transnational engagement in a country of origin does not come at the cost of attachment to one’s country of settlement (Lacroix, 2011; Hammond, 2013; Marini, 2014; Mügge, 2016; Baudassé et al., 2018;; Tan et al., 2018 – all cited in Erdal et al, 2020). These are much more complex relationships, where weak *integration*, may well go in hand with weak *transnational engagement*, and strong levels of integration may well go in hand with strong levels of transnational engagement (Carling and Pettersen, 2014 and 2015; Erdal, 2020; Horst, 2017).

Source: Erdal et al. (2020).

## **Links between migration management and integration**

In this section we explore the links between migration management and integration, as found in the literature, usually within specific subfields rather than at an overarching level. While there are thematic groupings, there are also two possible angles that many studies have used to approach this relationship: either as policy analysis or through the prism of experience. Increasingly, studies also focus on potential and actual clashes between policy and lived experience.

This section lists and briefly discusses key links between migration management and integration, exemplifying them, but without providing an exhaustive review.

- **Migration management and ‘externalisation’ of integration.** In the Netherlands there is the requirement to pass language tests to obtain a temporary residence permit or family reunification papers.<sup>3</sup> Here the integration process is expected to start not only prior to arrival, but also prior to knowing whether migration will happen at all. The link between migration management and the state’s integration expectations (including but not limited to language) are very explicit. Migrants’ experiences of ‘externalised’ integration processes, or indeed the effectiveness of such processes if the aim is to achieve successful integration rapidly, are not well documented.
- **Family reunification requirements for income in a settlement country.** In certain European countries a migrant must prove their income (monthly for one or more years) above a certain threshold in order to secure family reunification (Mascia, 2021). Migration management measures – and the intentions of policy-makers that are articulated therein – have tangible implications on the everyday lives of migrants who seek to reunite with their family members. Thus, there is a link to the lived realities of integration – if not to ‘integration policy’ per se. Migrants face income requirements, which direct them to particular types of employment that are available to them on a short-term basis, perhaps at the cost of pursuing language training, further education and the crediting of prior education, etc. In the long run, this may hamper integration processes for migrants (Bonjour and Kraler, 2015; Goodman, 2019). The flipside is that once family members arrive, there is a migrant with a stable income there to welcome them and introduce them to life in their new country of settlement. The integration goals that partly motivate such requirements thus also have their merits, in the event that the policies work as planned and are adequately followed up.
- **Citizenship as the final ‘border post’?** Citizenship (and naturalisation policy) can arguably be said to be the intersection of migration management and integration – both in relation to the inclusive and the exclusionary dimensions of citizenship as a membership-regulating mechanism (Bloemraad and Sheares, 2017). Citizenship is the final ‘border post’ and an end-goal of integration processes in some countries, or a signpost along the way in other countries. With increasing ‘bordering’ trends, the border becomes not just the physical border of a fence that needs to be crossed, but it is also a digitised omnipresent border, such as within the United Kingdom’s ‘hostile environment’ practices where house owners who rent out rooms, employers who hire staff and other citizens become the ‘border control patrol’. The citizenship institution also has the potential to contribute to ‘dis-integration’ – the processes of reversing integration of migrants (Brekke et al., 2021), as much as it has the power to also foster inclusion, membership and the positive outcomes of successful integration. As such, the links between migration management and integration in many

<sup>3</sup> See <https://www.naarnederland.nl/en/brochures-en>

different ways – in policy and lived experience, as well as in political debate and representation – converge around ‘citizenship’. This is reflected in the literature to an extent, but as mentioned above, more often than not focuses on a particular sub-set of issues, rather than the bird’s eye view.

- **Revocation of permits (and citizenship).** In recent years, the revocation of residency permits has risen based on grounds of fraud (e.g. misleading information or, as is often the case, uncertainty regarding identity or identity documents). Citizenship is being revoked also, although few cases are processed and end with this outcome. The very reality of revocation as a possibility is linked to integration in terms of security about knowing where you will, or will not, live your life (Brekke et. al., 2020). How the practices of revoking residency permits affect integration processes is not well documented, but studies show that migrants are concerned – even if they are not at risk directly. Thus, these policy measures as migration management instruments of the state build trust and foster a sense of home – which are both crucial aspects of successful integration. Even if used in a symbolic way, signaling strictness, for instance, they appear to have (albeit unintended) integration effects. Furthermore, such policy measures often affect migrants to a greater degree than the target groups of the specific policy instrument.
- **Cessation (and temporary protection).** This relates specifically to the situation of refugees who receive refugee status, not necessarily permanent status, but perhaps explicitly or implicitly temporary. When states evaluate the situation in the origin country as sufficiently secure, refugee status may be withdrawn and return is required. Nation-state practice in this area has shifted over time – where temporary protection has been tested in several different instances – with varying experiences. Return mobility is often more likely when migrants already have a secure status and can come back to their country of settlement if return to their country of origin does not work out. This is not the case in the event of protection ceasing to be offered, however. Instead, in these cases there is a reliance on reconstruction programmes and support for returnees being in place locally. In relation to integration processes in countries of refuge, clearly temporary protection poses some serious challenges with regard to language skills, effective participation in the labour market, children’s education in local schools etc. These aspects are all central to successful integration, yet they are complicated by an uncertain, open, temporary – yet often quite long-term – timeframe (i.e., not one year, but often many years, perhaps amounting to a decade since a migrant originally left their country of origin). Thus, policy measures that relate to the temporary protection status for refugees specifically are closely intertwined with how integration can or cannot be successful for these particular migrants.
- **Resettlement programmes for refugees.** Such programmes also link to preparation for integration in different ways. Here, the link between migration management and integration does not involve the same type of precarity or uncertainty if integration preparation follows a resettlement decision and if it takes place during the interim waiting

period before actual resettlement takes place (Garnier et. al., 2018). In such cases, instead, integration can be jump-started, thanks to a time-sensitive approach to links between migration management tools and integration policy. This is in many ways the inverse of the dis-integration processes associated with (fear of) revocation of residence permits.

- **Temporary (and circulating) labour migration.** As migration management programmes and as self-initiated patterns of mobility, temporary and circulating labour migration in many ways counters the typical assumptions of integration policy. It requires investment of time, effort and human resources in the process of integration – both on the part of migrants, and in different ways by institutions and individuals in the settlement society. If migration is short-term, the need for and gains from integration – in the sense of learning a new language, fitting into society, being able to influence life in this new society – are all rather redundant. Meanwhile, the boundary between short-term and whatever is deemed longer-term or assumed to be permanent migration is elusive, varies and is often both unplanned and unpredictable (Bauböck and Ruhs, 2021).
- **Transnational living?** The regulation of migration applies to all non-citizens crossing a border, although within the EU the free mobility and entitlement – for example to health care in other EU countries – for EU citizens means that border crossings and living as a non-citizen in another EU country are experienced differently compared with a third-country national. Some people chose to lead transnational lives, spending a substantial amount of time split between two countries. While for a minority of mobile people or migrants internationally, this is still an empirical reality and one that challenges the logic of both migration management and integration – if seen in a singular way only (Carling et. al., 2021). The links between migration management and integration here might be different, however – and how would we consider integration into two societies, one of which might be a person's country of origin and both might be countries of citizenship?
- **Deskilling and reskilling?** Migrants can experience downward professional mobility in early phases of migration to a substantial degree. This is often labelled 'deskilling', although it is not always clear how this is measured or defined. Closely linked to migration management and types of entry and residence permits, the question of how labour migrants enter a country and can remain there working points to another intersection of migration management and integration. Migrants who cannot obtain an entry permit based on their professional qualifications might seek entry via other entry routes, for example as a student, au pair or through family reunification in order to take up work in their profession. Depending on integration policies and programmes, migration management requirements and integration processes can align or clash, and subsequently can contribute to deskilling or potentially reskilling of migrants. While work is a central focus of much integration policy, migration management instruments do not always facilitate or even accommodate initiatives that could

secure successful integration outcomes at a quicker pace for migrants with specific types of skills and professional training.

As we turn to in the section Which temporal view?, arguably, the logic of maximising the effects of migration for development in countries of origin and the logic of maximising effects of migration in the country of settlement (i.e., through integration) could be seen to be at odds. Yet in cases of temporary labour migration there is a need for some form of integration, and in cases of longer-term migration there are also contributions made to development processes in origin contexts. While the ‘triple-win’ mantra (Bauböck and Ruhs, 2021) of migration and development succeeds for the migrant as well origin and settlement contexts, it is not the focus of much policy attention at present – despite its basic premise and recognition that there are inextricable links remaining valid and important. In this specific context, migration management through various programmes of temporary work permits, for example, often is not in direct dialogue with integration policy and realities in any systematic way. For instance, language courses for temporary labour migrants are far less common than for migrants with long-term residency, and especially those with refugee status for whom many European countries have quite detailed integration programmes.

Potentially, there are multiple links between migration management and integration, as shown above. These links typically vary depending on migration pathways, as we also point to in Box 1 where we discuss the different implications of entry in a regular and irregular fashion, and how this also shapes links (and disconnects) between migration management, integration and development. More specifically, the particular legal or bureaucratic categories that migrants are placed within by states are often decisive for their possibility of integration, their mode of integration, and also the impacts on migrants’ capacity for engagement in development in countries of origin. It should be noted that migrants’ desire and capacity to engage in development in places of origin is not dictated by integration circumstances in linear ways, as transnational networks and priorities play different roles (see also Carling et al., 2012; Carling and Hoelscher, 2013; Erdal and Oeppen, 2013; Erdal, 2020).

Meanwhile, as mentioned in the Introduction, migration management as *deterrence* and migration management as *the first step towards naturalisation and citizenship* as the end of a migrant integration journey in a country of settlement are two very different approaches and sets of goals. One is about border control and *exclusion*, the other is about entry and (potential) *inclusion*. Hence, it is only reasonable that policy goals and implementation, and the empirical realities as experienced by migrants at the receiving end of one of these, will differ from those at the receiving end of the other kind of migration management. Migration management that transitions into processes of inclusion indeed *becomes integration processes*, illustrated by many of the links above. By contrast, where migration management remains exclusionary, the disconnects between migration management and integration – both at the policy and the experienced levels – illustrate the dilemmas raised by conflicting yet legitimate interests. Many of the examples above of disconnects fall into this bracket – and these arguably have ramifications not only for integration, but also for migrants’ contributions to development in countries of origin.



## Empirical links and disconnects

In this section we briefly list what existing knowledge tells us about the empirical links – and disconnects – between migration management, development and integration. We return to a fuller discussion in the section Conclusion: a virtuous cycle, conscious balancing act or conflicting interests?, where we also include the links and disconnects as these emerge from the review of four policy instruments (see section Reviewing links as seen in policy), and from an explicit engagement with temporal perspectives (see section Which temporal view?).

- *The scale at which links between migration management, integration and development are explored matters.* At the individual and family level, migration management directly impacts positioning in relation to integration processes, which in turn has a bearing on migrants' capacity to engage in development in places of origin. At the national level, both in contexts of settlement (integration) and in contexts of origin (development), these links will always remain less important than individual considerations about migration management, integration or development as such.
- *Particular migration management policies, instruments and their intended and unintended effects* have different and specific links with aspects of migrants' integration processes. The result may have repercussions for migrants' development engagements in places of origin. These are non-linear relationships, where multiple factors play a role, not necessarily in predictable ways.
- *Development processes in societies in the global south* are neither highly affected by European migration management efforts, nor by contributions from migrants in Europe, as compared to other and more significant societal forces. This is largely because migration to Europe is insignificant in numerical terms in each national context of origin.
- *Integration processes in European societies clearly have a bearing at some level on the capacity of migrants to engage in development processes.* At a basic level, this is about security and predictability in their situation as migrants and in their lives in the country of settlement. However, not all migrants who have security and predictability in the country of settlement will choose to engage in development in their place of origin. Thus, integration matters in non-linear ways and acts as a precondition, where the pathways into integration – dictated by migration management – contribute to shaping much of migrants' lives and engagements in both countries of settlement and origin.
- *Diaspora development engagements* are, together with remittances, the mechanisms that are most explored in the literature. These links point clearly to how aspects of integration are for many migrants critical for their development engagements in places of origin.
- *While return and reintegration* of migrants without legal right to stay in European countries often features as part of development agendas, tangible links between such returns and development in places of origin



remain poorly documented. Instead, such returns appear to squarely function as instruments of migration management.

- The *timeframe under consideration* clearly plays a role when exploring links between migration management, development and integration. Both integration and development processes are slow and require high time investments. Such timeframes are often incompatible with the short-term political interests of European states and the EU.

## Reviewing links as seen in policy

In this section we review links between migration management, development and integration as seen in policy. We do this selectively only, and thus our discussion and claims are based on a narrow review, with the limitations that this naturally entails. In order to be able to engage in-depth with the ways in which links do (or do not) emerge, we have chosen four EU policy instruments for further investigation:

1. Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)
2. Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF)
3. New Pact on Asylum and Migration
4. Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion.

Following adoption of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) (European Council, 2005) and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) (European Commission, 2011), both of which take account of the many different forms of migration to the EU and the related challenges posed to all Member States, migration issues continued to be one of the high-level controversial agenda items both for EU institutions and for Member States. Moreover, the so-called migration/refugee ‘crisis’ of 2015 added to the political tension over migration across the EU geography. Consequently, over the last few years, there have been a number of newly created EU policy documents and instruments to tackle emerging migration-related questions in Europe and to bring a type of harmonisation effort to the agendas of the Member States to seek to solve these problems collectively. It is within this context that we have chosen the above four policy instruments and a selection of their key documents to analyse the links between migration management, development and integration issues as seen in policy.

## The AMIF

## MIGNEX Background Paper

**Table 1. AMIF documents reviewed**

Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, 2014 (hereafter 'Founding document') (European Parliament and Council, 2014)	Interim Evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, 2018 (hereafter 'Interim evaluation') (European Commission, 2018)
Follow the money: assessing the use of EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) funding at the national level, 2018 (hereafter 'Follow I') (UNHCR and ECRE, 2018)	EU funds for migration, asylum and integration policies: budgetary affairs, 2018 (hereafter 'Budgetary review') (Darvas et al., 2018)
Follow the money: assessing the use of EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) funding at the national level 2014-2018, 2019 (hereafter 'Follow II') (UNHCR and ECRE, 2019)	More snapshots from the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, 2020 (hereafter 'Snapshots') (European Commission, 2020a)

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF) was established by the EU and ran from 2014 to 2020, with a budget total of €3.137 billion. It was designed to 'promote the efficient management of migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration' (European Commission, n.d.). Funding recipients included state and federal authorities, local public bodies, NGOs, humanitarian organisations, and educational and research organisations, among others.

We selected AMIF as one of our case studies because it is a representative iteration of the EU's attempts at a holistic approach to asylum, migration and integration, and the links between them. It is also both recent and limited in time, thereby allowing us to review the whole duration of the initiative.

The three policy fields of migration management, integration and development are only mentioned together on two occasions, specifically in the Budgetary review when listing European funding instruments and their allocation (Darvas et al., 2018: 11), as well as in the Founding document when stating how the EU should use the Mobility Partnerships to support activities and 'pursue Union priorities' both in third countries and within the EU (European Parliament and Council, 2014: 170). This is telling, considering that the Founding document itself states that 'measures on and in relation to third countries supported through the Fund should be adopted in synergy and in coherence with other actions outside the Union supported through Union *external assistance instruments*, both geographic and thematic' (ibid: 171, our emphasis added).

If we understand 'external assistance instruments' as development aid or other development collaboration, the fact that this is seemingly not weighted equally with other policy fields in the quest for coherence suggests that other elements of migration policy might take precedence and carry more weight.

Our review of the AMIF policy documents indicates a dialectic relationship, where successful integration of migrants who are allowed to stay in Europe is only seen as possible if there are restrictive asylum measures in place for those who are not allowed to remain (and integrate). In addition, a vigilant return policy acts as a strong disincentive to those who seek to migrate without the legal right to do so.

The MPF

Table 2. MPF documents reviewed

Assessing the EU’s External Migration Policy, 2019 (hereafter ‘Assessing’) (Tamas, 2019)	Breaking gridlocks and moving forward: recommendations for the five years of EU migration policy, 2019 (hereafter ‘Breaking’) (ICMPD, 2019)
MPF Policy Brief: Enhancing cross-border police cooperation through existing political frameworks (hereafter ‘MPF Brief’) (MPF, 2019)	Partnerships for mobility at the crossroads: lessons learnt from 18 months of implementation of EU pilot projects on legal migration, 2020 (hereafter ‘Partnerships’) (MPF, 2020)

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

We conducted an investigation and coding of a small selection of documents related to the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF), an EU initiative seeking to operationalise the EU’s external migration policy framework, the GAMM. The initiative seeks ‘to strengthen the cooperation between the European Union and partner countries that signed a Mobility Partnership’ and started in 2016 (MPF, n.d.). The MPF is funded by the AMIF together with the Internal Security Fund for Police Cooperation (ISF-Police) and the Internal Security Fund for Borders and Visa (ISF-Borders), and it is managed by DG HOME.

Overall, the three fields of migration management, development and integration are only mentioned together on three occasions. Zooming in on one of these instances, it speaks volumes about where the EU’s focus seems to be, as well as about the ways partnering countries find the MPF lacking: ‘much progress has been made in this evolving cooperation e.g. visa liberalisation linked to readmission agreements, implementation of the IBM concept and closer engagement of Frontex, improved document security through biometrics, and overall improved data exchange. But still, some partner countries would like to see more emphasis on their own specific interests and needs, such as access to more legal migration opportunities or more initiatives in the area of migration and development’ (Tamas, 2019: 2).

Breaking down the numbers, development and integration are mentioned roughly the same number of times, while migration management is mentioned significantly more. Migration management and development are linked in the documents three times as often, however, which perhaps speaks to the existence of a sort of migration management–development nexus at the heart of the EU’s MPF.

In summation, the key takeaways after looking at the MPF documents, are:

- Migration management is most frequently mentioned, which is perhaps indicative of the MPF's focus.
- There are few mentions of different combinations of the three fields of migration management, development and integration.
- Development and migration management are most often mentioned together, which plays into the migration–development nexus of interwoven policies that have coloured the EU's stance on both fields over the past two decades at least (Bakewell, 2008).

There was a comparatively stronger inclusion of and interaction between these terms within the MPF documents than in the AMIF documents, although neither had combinations of all three terms.

## The EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum

On September 23 2020 the European Commission announced its New Pact on Migration and Asylum, aimed at setting up an agenda for a 'common European framework for migration and asylum Management' during the 9th EU legislature (Carrera, 2021). It appeared this new agenda was very much affected by the experiences of the European migration crisis in 2015 and of the EU–Turkey Statement of 2016 (European Council, 2016a). In fact, the Pact reveals the failure and unsustainability of the European asylum policy, and repeatedly emphasises the importance of the management of 'crisis situations', together with the 'situations of migration pressures' (Commission to the European Parliament, 2020: 1).

Although the Pact claims to cover all elements needed for a comprehensive European approach to migration, its main arguments are on the movements of irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, alongside a focus on strengthening returns and border security. The Pact proposes three main dimensions for 'building confidence through more effective procedures and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity', which basically aim at managing the flows of irregular migrants and refugees to address a core concern namely: reducing the pressures on Member States' own national systems for asylum, integration or return, with the view that they will not be able to cope in the event of large flows (Commission to the European Parliament, 2020: 2).

The first dimension proposed in the Pact refers to the need for comprehensive partnership agreements with the countries of origin to keep potential (irregular) migrants and refugees in their countries. The second dimension considers the investments in increased border security and deterrence, while the third dimension proposes a system of shared responsibility among EU Member States for the protection of asylum seekers.

The New Pact thus places a strong emphasis on further strengthening the security dimension, which is a long-standing approach to migration management. It seems that, by suggesting a 'principle of integrated policymaking', the Pact tends to mix international protection and migration management. It gives priority to the notion of migration management by reducing its focus to the irregular flow of migrants, with a wide range of concerns around securitisation and externalisation, and consequently

undermines refugee protection. And it is within this context that the Pact promotes the institutionalisation of ‘Migration Partnerships’: non-legally binding arrangements or ‘deals’ with non-EU countries, such as the EU–Turkey Statement in 2016 (European Council, 2016a; Carrera, 2021).

One of the important and critical points is that the New Pact seems to view the instruments of resettlement, integration and return as migration management tools, rather than as tools to provide protection and a durable solution to refugees. While the return of refugees is directly linked in the Pact to the development of countries of origin – which is highly encouraged through the value placed on return, economic aid and co-operation, and re-integration in countries of origin – the choices of resettlement (from other countries) and integration in Europe are not fully encouraged. Furthermore, there is a tendency to shift the responsibilities of the refugee issue to the countries of origin and transit. As far as cooperation with third and/or partner countries is concerned, however, the New Pact underlines the importance of return, but it also suggests a partnership beyond this. It proposes a more comprehensive and systematic approach, in which migration and asylum are related to all areas of the EU’s external policy, such as in development aid (and more precisely, in economic cooperation), science and education, digitisation and energy.

The New Pact mentions the ‘development of legal migration pathways to Europe’ and to the ‘integration of those migrants arriving with legal pathways’, but for detailed elaboration of integration-related issues the Pact refers to the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (discussed below).

In conclusion, the New Pact remains rather limited in developing a comprehensive approach for common governance of migration and asylum because of its preoccupation with irregular migration and asylum issues, which is very much integrated with securitisation and externalisation perspectives. There is a clear need for a more detailed and comprehensive elaboration of the various types of migratory movements that affect Europe that goes beyond irregular flows and asylum issues, in order to achieve an effective common governance framework for migration and asylum.

## Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027

Building on the experiences of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (European Commission, 2016), the European Commission issued an Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion on 24 November 2020 (European Commission, 2020b). The New Pact on Migration and Asylum described above also provided a background for this new 2020 Action Plan.

While the 2016 Action Plan targeted only third-country nationals, the new Plan covers all migrants including EU citizens with a migrant background. The new Plan also aims to contribute to making Europe a more prosperous, cohesive and inclusive society in the long run, and to achieve all of these aims it refers to four main areas of integration: education, employment, access to health services and housing. More specifically, it first puts forward actions for inclusive education and training from early childhood to higher education, focusing on faster recognition of qualifications and language

learning, with support from EU funds. Second, it aims to improve employment opportunities and skills recognition to fully value the contribution of migrant communities and women in particular, and to ensure that they are supported to reach their full potential. Hence, it promotes working with social and economic partners and employers to promote labour market integration, support entrepreneurship, and make it easier for employers to recognise and assess skills. Third, the 2020 Action Plan suggests a dedicated funding system to promote access to health services for people born outside the EU and opportunities for Member States to exchange best practice. And fourth, it refers to the question of access to adequate and affordable housing funded through the European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund Plus, the AMF and Invest EU, as well as funding platforms to exchange experience at local and regional level on fighting discrimination and segregation in the housing market.

As emphasised in the New Pact (Commission to the European Parliament, 2020), successful integration and inclusion is seen as an essential part of a well-managed and effective migration and asylum policy. It is also argued that this is essential for social cohesion and for a dynamic economy that works for all. Hence, the Action Plan proposes targeted and tailored support that takes into account individual characteristics that may present specific challenges to people with a migrant background, such as gender or religious background. It is also argued that successful integration and inclusion depends both on early action and on long-term commitment.

In the new 2020 Action Plan, the European Commission presents a framework for action and concrete initiatives to support Member States in the integration of migrants residing legally in the EU. Whilst the competence for integration policy lies primarily with Member States, the EU tends to play an important role in supporting, developing and coordinating Member States' actions and policies on integration. The Plan states that the EU intends to achieve this by establishing more stable partnerships with all parties involved: migrants, host communities, social and economic partners, civil society and the private sector.

Overall, while the 2020 Action Plan is seen as a new commitment and investment towards integration and inclusion for migrants in Europe, its successful implementation widely depends on the cooperation between EU agencies and Member States. Since national governments are primarily responsible for creating and implementing social policies, the EU's main role in supporting Member States is through funding, developing guidance and fostering relevant partnerships – which is seen as crucial to the success of the Plan. In this context, various civil society actors in the field consider the Plan's recommendations on EU funding for the recovery plan to be 'limited and vague' (Manca, 2020). The same actors also have serious concerns about the position on irregular migrants in Europe, questioning the Action Plan's stance towards these migrants, and specifically whether EU funding covers them or not.

Regarding application of the Action Plan, while this will depend solely on decisions made at the national level, it appears that some Member States have already covered the principle of including all (which includes irregular migrants) far earlier than the new Action Plan in order to achieve a more



prosperous, cohesive and inclusive society. This has been done also through the use of inclusive policies that contribute to integration of irregular migrants, especially in response to Covid-19.

Given the worsening conditions that irregular migrant workers face – and the fact that national economies are suffering in light of an absent labour supply due to Covid-19 – there have been various governmental attempts to ease their difficulties (İçduygu, 2020). The concrete initiatives set up by the Italian and Portuguese governments provide two good examples here. The Italian Government passed a law on 13 May 2020 paving the way for around 200,000 irregular migrant workers to apply for six-month legal residency permits (D'Ignoti, 2020). Portugal's decision in March 2020 to treat people with pending immigration or asylum applications as residents for the duration of the covid-19 crisis has been regarded as an effort to guarantee that irregular migrants have access to health care and social services during the pandemic (Da Silva, 2020).

## Links and disconnects

In our review we find few examples of policy instruments that fully engage with all three concerns – migration management, development and integration. Rather, we see many instances where policy overlaps between two out of three fields. Examples include the much-referred to migration–development nexus (via a migration management–development link) or links between integration and development (via the diaspora–development link).

A more holistic policy approach is seemingly lacking. Instead, what is apparent in the examples discussed in this section, is the subordination of development policy, and to a certain extent integration, to European migration management goals and concerns. In addition, we see intimations of an imagined binary relationship between 'successful integration' and active returns and restricted asylum opportunities, where one cannot exist without the other.

Integration in European migration policy widely refers to the essential importance of comprehensive and targeted integration measures for a successful migration policy. In this context, it explores key principles and values regarding integration and inclusion and also focuses on actions within sectoral areas like education, employment and skills, health and housing. However, neither those key principles and values, nor the needs in these sectoral areas, seem to be incorporated fully into the mechanisms of migration management: this shortcoming is often seen as an outcome of the divergence between the EU's lack of legislative competence and the essential importance of comprehensive and targeted integration measures for a successful migration policy (Brandl, 2021).

European migration policy is very much preoccupied with a fear of arrivals of irregular migrants and refugees, with policy-makers more concerned about addressing this challenge than any other issue. Consequently, the core actions in migration management tend to focus on preventative measures to reduce new arrivals and secure their return rather than on integration and inclusion.

Attention towards irregular migration and finding ways to (at least in principle) live up to Europe's commitments to protect refugees entirely overshadows much needed debates on regular and orderly migration. And this focus in EU policy documents is in stark contrast to empirical realities on the ground in the EU, where a significant number of third-country nationals receive temporary and usually work-related residency permits each year. This curious disconnect between policy focus (especially if considering the period 2017–2021, and not 2015–2016) and empirical reality appears noteworthy.

To be more specific, and as mentioned previously, in our selective and qualitative review we see intimations of an imagined binary relationship between 'successful integration' and active returns and restricted asylum opportunities, where one cannot exist without the other. This is a problematic simplification that has real-world consequences for many, and where migration management goals trump all other considerations. Granted, we have not gone through all documentation that exists within each policy instrument, however. Rather, we have selected those policies that seem to represent the most important milestones and that better illustrate the possible evolution of policy.

In academic literature, it is widely argued that the integration of immigrants in EU Member States is a complex process that involves actors across multiple policy areas at national, local and supranational levels. There is no doubt that migrant communities are key actors here, not least through the engagement of diaspora communities. Both of these communities and their origin countries have moved away from the rhetoric that stigmatises integration in the receiving society and have instead started to move towards the idea of integration (Desiderio and Weinar, 2014). Furthermore, it is expected that European policies can be active in tackling the challenges and maximising the opportunities for cooperation between origin and destination countries on integration issues.

As far as the link between migration management and development is concerned, it appears that the experience of the so-called European migration crisis of 2015 has informed European policy-makers on the root causes of migration, and on the potential use of development aid to tackle perceived drivers of migration to Europe. Consequently, the main aim of European policy seems to be to reduce the incentive to migrate rather than to provide an environment for poverty alleviation in countries of origin. Meanwhile the records of success are incredibly mixed – and evidence is further confounded because it is close to impossible to isolate the effects of development aid as a causal mechanism. Instead, what seems well-substantiated is that development gains can also encourage migration by increasing people's skills and aspiration, at least from a short- to medium-term perspective (Fine et al., 2019; see also the section Empirical links: what do we know?).

Migration management, development and integration are too often viewed and written about in an unreflective way, without acknowledging that our viewpoints are shaped by historical trajectories. This is also true for policy documents. And it is contrary to the reality, where when speaking of all three nodes, former colonial relationships are relevant and the question of

temporariness versus permanence can be seen as central to. We turn to such temporal perspectives in the following section.

## Which temporal view?

While exploring the relationship between migration management, integration and development, we frame our discussion around the interconnected *temporal* and *spatial* dimensions that are inevitably embedded in any migratory context. Many immigrant-receiving countries, including those in Europe, consider not only *who* is needed or preferred as migrants and *where* they might come from, but also for *how long* they might – or should – stay. Historically, permanent settlement has always been central to migration policies (management) for the traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, the United States and those in South America. For Europe, however, particularly after World War II, temporary migration schemes such as guestworker programmes, circular (seasonal) migration arrangements, and temporary movements of asylum seekers and refugees have often become the main elements of migration management questions (Hammar, 1989; Appleyard, 2001; Triandafyllidou, 2008).

There is a wide range of literature which, in an historical context, examines the recruitment of temporary foreign workers from former colonies or neighbouring countries by Western European countries after 1945, the reasons for cessation of recruitment in 1973/1974, and long-term ‘integration-related’ consequences for Western European societies (Castles, 2006a; 2006b; 2017). Most European countries abandoned policies of temporary migrant labour recruitment around 1974, moved towards increasingly restrictive entry rules and paid attention to the integration question of immigrant workers and their families. Later, in the early 2000s, there were various attempts to re-introduce temporary and seasonal (circular) migrant worker programmes in a number of countries in Europe. While the unintended settlement and integration of temporary workers of the earlier periods became a persistent agenda item in the 1990s and 2000s in Europe, the increasing numbers of migrants arriving irregularly (whether to seek asylum or not) also contributed to this agenda. Concern over long-term settlement and integration, and conversely return of those who do not receive legal right to stay, has become a major concern for European policy-makers.

Analytically speaking, the question of whether given migration flows will lead to temporary settlement or to relatively long-term or permanent settlement has several implications both for countries of origin and countries of destination (which quickly become countries of settlement). While this question relates to integration in the settlement countries, it mostly refers to development-related matters for countries of origin. Hence, the temporal dimension of migration and (possible) settlement becomes central.

The long-term or permanent settlement prospect of migrants becomes a matter of concern for integration in the countries of settlement; however, it also raises doubts about the long-term contribution of migrants to their countries of origin, with the claim that emigrants might invest less and less in their former homeland as they become more attached to their new

homeland. At the same time, we also experience that the contemporary nature of international migration with its transnational character is heterogeneous, circular and varied in terms of stages and durations, and that the boundaries between permanent and temporary mobility are becoming increasingly porous and conditional (Robertson, 2014).

While facing the changing temporal dimension of international migration, both countries of origin and countries of destination (and possible settlement) encounter another set of challenges brought by the dynamic relationship between migration management, integration and development. This section aims to bring the temporal dimension of international migration to the fore and develops a temporally sensitive approach to further understand the links between migration management, integration and development. We engage with debates on: (a) colonial ties, (b) the legacy of guestworker schemes of the 1960s/1970s, (c) circular migration of the 2000s, and (d) the geopolitics of the present. These debates reveal historically and structurally embedded temporal dimensions that often play an implicit yet major role not only in migration management, but also in both the production and interpretation of the links between migration management, integration and development.

### **Linking colonial ties: implications for migration management, development and integration**

As mentioned previously, migration management, development and integration are too often viewed and written about in an unreflective way, without acknowledging that our viewpoints are shaped by historical trajectories. In fact, when speaking of these three fields and their links, former colonial relationships are central. This quickly becomes apparent in the example of the Mediterranean Basin and specifically the migratory regime between Africa and Europe. Historically speaking, particularly after World War II, former colonies and many other neighbouring countries had become source countries for labour migrants who were needed in Western European countries. Over the decades, migratory flows from these former colonies have continued through the legacy of colonial ties. Currently, what have come to be known as the ‘Western Mediterranean’ and ‘Central Mediterranean’ migratory routes to Europe could be seen as the outcome of post-colonial history between Africa and Europe.

Although in the early periods after World War II there was a relatively liberal approach towards migrants from these former colonies in Africa – even offering long-term settlements and citizenship opportunities (Messina, 1996; Paparusso, 2019) – the EU and Member States have over the course of several decades built up a regime that relies on externalised border and migration control (Boswell, 2003; Wolff, 2008; Lavenex and Stucky, 2011). Behind the somewhat anonymous labels of ‘Western’ and ‘Central’ lies a web of international and bilateral relationships between European countries (some themselves former colonial metropolises) and the previous colonies and present autonomous states of Libya and Morocco. Taking a longer view, we see a history of European interests in these two countries, which have shown a mutability over time, ranging from colonialism before World War II, petroleum extraction and easy access to labour migrants in the post-war era, to present-day Mediterranean migration management.

A widely held assumption about the EU is that it represents a rupture with previous colonial and imperial agendas. In foundational works by authors like Zielonka (2006) there is often little if any mention of colonialism; instead, increased European integration is represented as a post-colonial clean slate constructed in the aftermath of World War II. Far too often, this view also encompasses writing on the EU's approaches to migration management, development and integration. There are many counter arguments to this understanding, however. Besides the obvious connections, such as previous colonial powers often having large and multigenerational populations of former migrants from their ex-colonies who can facilitate integration, or that European bilateral development aid overwhelmingly goes to former colonial territories, there are also authors who work to connect past colonial history and present political realities.

In the case of Libya, authors such as Hom (2019) and Lemberg-Pedersen (2019) have done important work. The former draws on repressed parallels and couples prior colonial concentration camps and mobility restrictions with migrant detention centres of today; the latter writes about the historical linkages between displacement practices of the past slave trade and the logics of present humanitarianised border control. As for Spain–Morocco, there are articles that attempt to bridge the gap between past and present, focusing, for instance, on the microhistories of individual migrants moving through contested categories of social and political inclusion at the Spanish–Moroccan border, and how migrant imaginings of Europe relate to inherited colonial connections (Alexander, 2019). Beyond work like this mentioned above, which primarily connects the past with migration management practices, the relationships between colonial history and the intersecting fields of integration, development and migration are in our view under-researched.

In this post-colonial context, focusing on the two country cases of Libya and Morocco (the former representing the Central Mediterranean route to Europe and the latter representing the Western Mediterranean route) could help evaluate the interrelation between migration management, integration and development in the contemporary Euro-Mediterranean migratory context. Seen from the perspective of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1953), the present European migration regime in the Mediterranean is contested. A prime example is the refoulement of refugees at sea, forcibly returning them to North African coasts. The European Court of Human Rights condemned refoulement in 2012 at the judgment in the *Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy* case. Nonetheless, Italy entered into bilateral agreements to return migrants to Libya – a nation not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention (UN, 1951) and currently torn between several factions in a civil war raging since the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Refoulement is therefore not something confined to instances happening about a decade or more ago: indeed, according to InfoMigrants (2021), 12,000 migrants were pushed back to the Libyan coastline last year alone.

While present concerns are about limiting outward migrants moving through and from Libya, Italian colonial pursuits in Libya in the early 20th century were about creating a settler colony to serve as a destination for what was considered excess unemployed populations in Italy (Ballinger,



2016). Nor was this idea limited to Italian pre-World War II colonial thinking, but instead it survived well into the post-war era and informed both national and indeed supranational European agendas. As Hansen and Jonsson (2011: 263) write, ‘...from the interwar period up until the late 1950s nearly all of the visions and institutions working towards European integration placed colonial Africa’s incorporation into the European enterprise as a central objective, and linked to this enterprise were plans for managing intercontinental migration’. The visions and institutions mentioned here include the predecessor organisation to the IOM, the Council of Europe and the Treaty of Rome, all speaking of the importance of maintaining both control over North African colonies and control over movement both to and from them (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014). The direction of migrant movement, level of sovereignty and policy language used may all have changed, but this is nonetheless indicative of a long-standing and mutable European need to govern mobility in the area.

This does not imply a purely neo-colonial relationship, however. Alongside the above continuity there has been great change, most importantly the rise of Libyan agency after independence in 1951 and the country’s growing economic clout as a petroleum exporter. Regarding the latter, it must be noted that the former colonial metropole of Italy became an indispensable partner in Libyan petroleum extraction, in part based on search work done before colonialism ended, and Italy remains one of the key markets for Libyan oil and gas to this day (Tjønn, 2019). This status as indispensable partner and key market has allowed a range of Italian governments – of all political stripes and irrespective of who their Libyan counterparts were and what kind of state Libya was in – to construct a framework of agreements enlisting their former colony in the work of policing Europe’s external border, through the 1990s up until the present. Over the past three decades, the migrant management relationship between the two countries has been marked by three significant agreements, namely: the Joint Communiqué of 1998 with the first appearance of migration as a topic of Italo-Libyan bilateral discussions; the linkage between colonialism, petroleum and migration made in the 2008 Friendship Treaty between the two countries; and the 2017 Valletta Memorandum of Understanding (renewed in 2019 for an additional two years), where the EU is implicated in funding the memorandum’s goals.

Migratory flows from the Western Mediterranean route in general, and those from Morocco specifically, represent another area of major concern for the migration management policies of Europe. While many Moroccan migrants have left their country for Europe, numerous numbers of migrants from various African countries have also used Morocco as a transit zone towards Europe. Morocco is the only African country sharing a land border with a European country, where Moroccan territory meets the Spanish autonomous enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, themselves a legacy of Spanish colonialism. Spain and Morocco negotiated a readmission treaty in 1992, allowing Spain ‘exceptional repatriation’ of migrants to Morocco, irrespective of whether these migrants are Moroccan or not (Fargues, 2017). Ceuta and Melilla became important flash points for European migration control and border policing, with the storming of the border fences in 2005 by hundreds of African migrants being the catalyst for The Rabat Process the following year. Here, the rhetoric of an equal partnership abounded, but an



underlying asymmetry in power was evident in the emphasis put on European desires for seasonal labour and ‘circular migration’, rather than a full commitment to addressing the mobility divide that exists between African and European citizens (Vezzoli and Flahaux, 2017).

Although France was the primary colonial protectorate power in Morocco and is presently the country’s biggest development aid donor, trading partner and host for the largest population of Moroccans abroad, as we have seen it is Spanish–Moroccan migration management at their joint land and sea border that constitutes the Western Route. Looking beyond migration management, post-war labour migration and a colonial past have helped to create large Moroccan diasporas, not only in France, but also in Spain, Italy and other European countries. These populations also have importance for development and integration, as the Moroccan Government has been drawing on diaspora networks to help with the economic development of Morocco through increased remittances and skills transfer, and also to a lesser extent in order to strengthen the diaspora population’s societal status and equal access to social rights within Europe (Mahieu, 2020).

Returning to migration management, Moroccan agency and collaboration has been vital here as well. Morocco stopped 65,000 irregular migrant departures from its shores in 2017, and 25,000 the following year. This was not sufficient for Spain, however, as the two countries signed their latest agreement in February 2019 to allow the Spanish coast guard to directly return certain categories of rescued migrants to Moroccan ports. How this will square with the 1951 Refugee Convention is unclear.

With the examples of Libya and Morocco and their respective former colonial relationships with several central EU member states, we see how colonial histories matter for integration, migration management and development. Regarding integration, migrants from former colonies have a specific set of circumstances, challenges and opportunities in their former colonial metropolises, for instance due to linguistic ties and substantial migrant communities already present. Similarly, the often deeply entrenched economic relationships between former colony and colonial metropole can facilitate European migration management initiatives and the interweaving of economic and political concerns. Third, development is often directed in a substantial way to former colonies of previous European colonial metropolises, tying together the past and present, although without one being fully contingent on the other.

### **Guestworker schemes of the 1960s/1970s: implications for contemporary debates**

The guestworker schemes of the 1960s and 1970s reflect the dynamic interaction between the migration policies of countries of origin and countries of destination. For countries of destination, the main assumption was that setting the time limit of a guestworker permit provides low-cost labour for its employers, while reducing the risk of irregular immigration. For the countries of origin, it was considered beneficial through remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees.

The main philosophy behind the guestworker programme lay in the concept of the ‘migration chain’ in the 1970s. This had been set out by policy-makers for both analytical and operational purposes, and it had become the central element in their thinking on migration matters. The **migration chain** referred to ‘the various stages of the physical process of migration itself, the links which join all these, and the cumulative social and economic effect of the process’ (OECD, 1978, 5). It was said that to organise the migratory chain meant to try to arrange both the various stages and the total process of migration, such as the selection of workers, transit arrangements, their work and their return. Consequently, the intention was to increase the range of choices open to the workers involved, and in turn it implied adequate cooperation between countries of emigration and immigration.

In discussions of the migration chain in the 1970s, the emphasis was on the lack of government policies and normative actions over the possibility of return of migrants to their home countries. The argument was that, in the context of a properly organised migratory chain, ‘the possible return home of the migrant worker’ was an essential stage if migration was to be conceived as cooperation between the countries of origin and countries of destination. While one of the main instincts behind this concern was directly associated with the idea of linking migration with the development of the countries of origin, the other point undoubtedly related to unwillingness of the countries of destination with regard to the permanent settlement of migrants. This self-centred concern of the countries of destination was noticeably reflected in the following statement from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which was ambiguously advocating the idea of the migratory chain and return:

Such an omission (of return of migrants) was a natural enough in the economic situation of the 1960s when returns were few and represented in most cases a personal intention on the part of those concerned. This is not true in present circumstances where the demand for manpower has dropped and where, without necessarily being expelled from host country, migrant workers are liable to be encouraged to return home as the result either of deliberate policies or of the pressure of circumstances (OECD, 1978: 6).

Some parts of the guestworker programme indeed functioned as it had been intended; other parts were not a total success. In this context, particularly referring to linkages between migration management, integration and development, one could give the example of the German guestworker programme as experienced by Turkish migrant workers.

From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, nearly three-fifths of Turkish migrants worked for a limited time and then had a chance to repeatedly renew their work permits before finally returning home. However, the remaining two-fifths did not return: instead, they moved their families to them, settled and then became immigrants, often facing a serious integration challenge. While the Turkish Government considered its emigrant guestworkers as agents for the development and modernisation of the country, questions remained around the extent to which this programme contributed to the development of the country.

What was clear was that the operation of the guestworker programme had enabled Turkey to temporarily ease its unemployment problem. In the late 1960s, the total number of Turkish guestworkers in Europe was over half a million, and there were around 900,000 Turkish workers who were in search of employment abroad through the Turkish Employment Service (İçduygu, 1991). With the remittances sent, the country had managed to reduce the deficit in its balance of payments by nearly 20%. What was not clear, however, was the efficiency of the guestworker programme. For instance, it has been argued that emigration through guestworker programmes was one of the most powerful vehicles of social and economic changes in Turkey, but lack of foresight and adequate governance caused a partial waste of human and financial resources (Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz, 1986; İçduygu, 2008).

In this context, attention has been drawn to regulatory measures or incentive schemes which are necessary to ensure safety and efficiency of remittance transfers, to lower the unduly high transaction costs and to encourage or facilitate productive investment of remittances. While attention has also been drawn to the fact that remittances are private money, and there are limits for public authorities to interfere, to argue that remittances should be completely 'left alone' seems unrealistic. Accordingly, there are certain concrete historical examples that indicate some unique development programmes of the 1970s that were initiated by the Turkish Government in the context of guestworker schemes and that aimed to channel remittance savings into employment-generating activities in the country. This includes the establishment of Workers' Joint Stock Companies, Village Development Cooperatives, and the State Industry and Workers' Investment Bank, which were initiated as a part of official policies to reintegrate the savings of migrants and return migrants into the local economies, generating job opportunities for returning migrants and serving as a tool for the economical use of their savings. Earlier research on these government initiatives in Turkey reveals that although these interventions were not fully successful – mainly due to administrative problems – they were nevertheless significant in channeling remittance flows to development projects under the guestworker scheme (Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz, 1986; İçduygu, 2008).

It is widely argued that immigration through guestworker schemes became an important ingredient in post-war economic recovery and success in Europe, as the countries of destination reaped the benefits of lower labour costs and higher rates of economic growth. In theory, these schemes were also viewed as politically less risky, as they were built on the notion of 'temporariness' by limiting the length of stay of workers and restricting the entry of dependents. However, the schemes ultimately led to a larger and more permanent immigration: this was partly due to a continuing and severe need for migrant labour in European countries, and partly due to the repeated entry of migrant workers together with new family formation and family reunification processes.

Looking at this experience, it has been argued that, in the long run, there is no such thing as a temporary worker programme – because emigration might turn into a one-way ticket. Similarly, one could also argue that there is an intrinsic link between temporariness and integration, albeit contradictory at times, where the former seems to prevent the latter. In fact, in mainstream

migration studies, integration is generally regarded as a laborious process that takes many years to achieve, and therefore, temporariness is seen as an obstacle to the nature of integration. Of course, these arguments are questionable too, particularly because of the new forms of migratory settings in transnational spaces, where temporariness prevails.

## Circular migration debates of the 2000s

Beyond the historical importance of guestworker schemes, temporary labour migration – or ‘circular migration’ – has also been widely debated in Europe in recent decades. For instance, there was a call from the European Council in December 2006 ‘to propose ways to integrate legal migration opportunities into the Union’s external policies in order to develop a balanced partnership with third countries adapted to specific EU Member States’ labour market needs; to suggest ways and means to facilitate circular and temporary migration; and to present detailed proposals on how to better organize and inform about the various forms of legal movement between the EU and third countries’ (European Council, 2006b: 9). Consequently, on 16 May 2007, the European Commission released a communication entitled ‘Circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries’ calling on EU States to work more closely both to combat illegal migration and to control legal migration, especially by fostering circular migration. While the main idea is that circular migration may make a contribution to the management of migration flows, the communication can also be associated with efforts to control and limit migration into the EU, and to reduce the tendencies of immigrants to permanently settle in the countries of destination.

The past experiences of various types of temporary and circular migration in Europe and elsewhere beg the question: what is new in the notion of circular migration today? Furthermore, what is the new rationale behind the promotion of circular migration as a remedy for migratory flows today?

Before answering these questions, it is imperative to have a definition and typology of circular migration. Although the term **circular migration** is used to refer to many different patterns, today it specifically relates to temporary worker programmes that allow some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries. In this sense, circular migration resembles guestworker programmes; however, it often refers to circulation of the *same* persons between countries. There are also sharp differences between the international climate of guestworker programmes of the past and that of circular migration of today: as noted by Agunias and Newland (2007: 2), ‘circular migration today ... is based on a continuing, long-term, and fluid relationship among countries that occupy what is now increasingly recognized as single economic space’, which is basically associated with the formation of transnational spaces in the age of globalisation.

Guestworker programmes of the past were the product of a rigid system of the international world that was strictly divided and defined by nation states. It is partly within this context that the question of whether circular (temporary) migration could become a prelude to permanent settlement, as it had before, needs to be answered (Hugo, 2003). There seem to be several reasons associated with the characteristics of the new global setting which

reduce the likelihood of permanent settlement: this includes the development of transportation and communication technologies which reduce the cost of travelling and increase connectivity between origin and destination countries; the increasing possibilities of longer and more flexible employment contracts; options of re-entry; and flexible residency rights.

In order to create a typology of circular migration to aid understanding of the concept, Agunias and Newland (2007: 4) suggest four main types: (1) movement of permanent migrants who return permanently (e.g., return of the Irish Diaspora in the late 1990s), (2) movement of permanent migrants who return temporarily (e.g., Taiwanese ‘astronauts’ from Canada and Silicon Valley, California), (3) movement of temporary migrants who return permanently (e.g., Korean turn-key project managers in the Middle East), and (4) movement of temporary migrants who return temporarily (e.g., contract workers from the Philippines). While the last category signifies a more genuine type of circular migration in which temporary migrants have a degree of legal mobility back and forth between their home country and host country, the first three categories indicate some sort of circularity in migratory movement. In short, the notion of circular migration can be interpreted in different ways, analytically and empirically.

Based on the core premise of circular migration, several EU regulations<sup>4</sup> have been introduced over the last decade. These have a particular focus on labour migrants with varying status to remain and work in the countries of destinations for a prescribed period of time. The workers include: highly qualified workers (Blue Card Holders), salaried workers, independent workers, intercorporate transferees (ICTs), researchers, posted workers and seasonal workers (Verschuere, 2016). And within these regulations, the temporal dimension of residence seems to be one of the main determining factors in worker status.

Most recently, in the face of COVID-19, however, this temporal dimension has been widely questioned. Closed borders have had an enormous impact on the circulation of migrants, affecting legal migration into EU member states from four perspectives: first, the mobility of those third-country nationals who were granted a temporary stay in EU Member States; second, the entry of third-country nationals to do seasonal work; third, legal migrants entering and staying; and fourth, the status of third-country nationals already residing in EU Member States, especially those experiencing a loss of income

<sup>4</sup> The EU Blue Card Directive (Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25th May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment); the Single Permit Directive (Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13th December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State); the ICT Directive (Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer); the Directive on students and researchers (Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11th May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing); and the Directive on Seasonal Workers (Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers).



(Sommarribas and Ninaber, 2021). Consequently, not only have the lives of migrants been affected enormously, but the economies of the countries of destination have been impacted negatively too due to shortcomings of EU migration regulations that are based on conventional, temporal arrangements.

## Geopolitics and present-day ties

As elaborated in the section Reviewing links as seen in policy, collaboration between countries of origin and transit is incredibly important for the success of EU policies, in relation to the links between migration management, development and integration. It is within this context that we refer to two country cases here: Turkey and Pakistan.

Over recent decades, a particular understanding of migration has been upheld by many in Europe: that migration ‘is the epitome of globalisation, the triumph of global economic drive over territorial order’ (Parkes, 2015). Europeans have become more conscious, not only of the economic competition between local populations and newly arriving migrants (including refugees), but also of culturally and ideologically loaded forms of border crossings. Rising trends in the arrivals of asylum seekers and irregular migrants from fragile states in Africa, Asia and the Middle East have resulted in an environment of insecurity in many European countries. Consequently, migration has become an object of geopolitics. With both migration management and border management rising to the top of the political agenda, scholarly evidence suggests that the relationship between the two becomes more complicated (Taylor, 2005; Carrera and Hernanz, 2015; Tantardini and Tolay, 2020).

In fact, migration management policies and practices in many countries of destination around the world have been increasingly reduced to border management policies and practices over the last two decades (Taylor, 2005). And European countries are no exception (Carrera and Hernanz, 2015). One of the main reasons behind this tendency is increasing trends of irregular border crossings, which have legitimised the focus on border management among countries of destination. However, one can argue that effective migration and border management systems must recognise the twin nature of facilitation and control, and that two equally important objectives must be addressed at the same time. This has been one of the challenges experienced, for instance, in the context of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe in 2015 and in the EU–Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, which aims to control the crossing of refugees and migrants from Turkey to the Greek islands, primarily with regard to Syrian refugees (European Council, 2016a; Tantardini and Tolay, 2020).

In its initial parts – while also referring to the return question of irregular migrants and Syrian refugees to Turkey, the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other nationalities in the country, security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police, and enhanced information sharing – the EU–Turkey Statement first and foremost stresses the various dimensions of border control issues. Consequently, all of these issues emerge as part and parcel of the larger externalisation policies of the EU that target border control.



What are also important in the EU–Turkey Statement – but relatively secondary and complementary to the main aim of border control – are elements of migration management policies and practices that are applicable both in Europe and Turkey. Accordingly, the Statement also refers to migration management practices such as resettlement arrangements for Syrian refugees in Europe (e.g., the One-to-One Programme and the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme), Turkey's opening of its labour market to Syrians under temporary protection, and the EU's funding programme of €3 billion for the Facility for Refugees.

While we observe some elements of migration management policies and practices in the EU-Turkey Statement which are applicable both in Europe and its migratory counterpart Turkey, we also note some migration–development linkages. Firstly, although migration has been mainly a positive force for development in both countries of origin and destination (and even for transit countries), irregular migration has financial, social and political costs for individuals, societies and governments – what happened with irregular migratory flows from Turkey to Europe in the Summer and Autumn of 2015 is a good example of this. Secondly, only comprehensive and coherent policies that address both border management and migration management issues at the same time, and that involve all countries in the migration continuum, can provide a mechanism to minimise the negative impact of migration and preserve its connection with development. Thirdly, migration–development linkages must not only be viewed within the context of country- or community-based development that relies on a cause-and-effect relationship. Such a view centres on the question of factors driving migration from developing countries to developed ones, or the impact of international migration on the economic and human development of migrants' source countries. Rather, concerns over individual-based human development, including human rights, must be central to these debates also.

Consequently, an important perspective that one could draw from the experiences in 2015-2016 could be to look at the linkages between migration management, development and integration with regards to human rights, particularly when it involves the irregular mixed flows of refugees. Indeed, debates around the experiences of 2015-2016 implicitly ask in what ways respect for social and economic human rights enhances migrants' and refugees' capacity to contribute to the development of their own and their families' lives – which is essential for management of border crossings and migratory movements (Ferreira, 2019).

It is within this context, and as formulated in the EU–Turkey Statement of 2016 (European Council, 2016), that any concrete effort to improve the humanitarian conditions for Syrian refugees could be evaluated as an effort of migration management that allows them to contribute to their own human development and to their integration into the host society. Conversely, however, a lack of respect of these rights reduces that contribution: and consequently, the dominant externalisation perspective of the 2016 Statement, which undermines the rights of asylum in Europe, represents a counter-productive approach.

Turning to a second example, over the last two decades Pakistan has become one of the EU's target countries for combatting irregular migration, due to

increased migration flows from or through Pakistan to EU territories. Consequently, in 2010, a readmission agreement was concluded between the EU and Pakistan, which aims to facilitate the return of illegal immigrants from the country as well as other nationals who have transited through Pakistan before arriving in the EU (Yavuz, 2017). While various practical difficulties are persistently experienced in the operation of this agreement, based on a Strategic Engagement Plan signed in June 2019 (EEAS, 2019), both sides have agreed to work towards a comprehensive dialogue on migration and mobility. For instance, in 2020, the EU informed Pakistan about its New Pact on Migration and Asylum; and in 2021 the EU, after emphasising its appreciation for Pakistan's hosting of millions of Afghan refugees for the past two decades, assured Pakistan of its cooperation and ongoing work towards a durable solution, including through assisting and promoting the safe and dignified return of Afghan refugees to their homeland. In their cooperation efforts, the EU and Pakistan have emphasised the need for a well-resourced and time-bound roadmap for migration- and refugee-related issues.

### **Time and links between migration management, development and integration**

The discussion above reveals that integration of migrants and development (of origin countries) have often become a matter of some concern for the migration management policies in Europe. However, this concern is not a constant one, it often happens selectively, and it changes as a contextual matter.

What becomes clear is that time is central to the contextual understanding of migratory processes. Time is seen not only as an engine of, but also a metaphor, for many processes that lead to development and integration in a migratory context. Indeed, a variety of literature in the field that links migration studies with modernisation refers to the economic, social and political changes emerging over time, which are directly associated with how mainstream policy positions often perceive the integration of migrants and development (of origin countries).

Having discussed the linkages between migration management, integration and development issues with debates on (a) colonial ties, (b) the legacy of guestworker schemes, (c) circular migration, and (d) geopolitics today, it is possible to draw two lines of conclusions, which ultimately demonstrates the puzzle of migration management policies in Europe.

*Firstly*, migration management policies often assume a linear relationship between the development of origin countries and the reduction of immigration flows. However, what we know from scholarly research is that there is a complex interaction between migration and development, which is far from a simple one-way causality. There is a body of scholarship arguing that, based on a long-term perspective, rising development in a country causes declining emigration flows over time. Poverty alleviation at a certain level, which could result from remittance flows through emigration, can discourage aspirations to migrate over time by increasing household incomes. However, at the same time, a certain level of development – and with this, increased household incomes – might also enhance rather than

deter the aspiration to migrate in the short and medium term. As argued by de Haas (2010), take-off development in the least developed countries is likely to lead to take-off emigration. Since development is a continuous and partly open-ended process, the span of time over which development and migration occur must be measured.

*Secondly*, as far as the linkages between migration management and integration are concerned, complexities exist regarding the question of temporariness versus permanence, which could be seen as a factor in the realisation of integration. Our elaboration on the circular migration debate and then on geopolitics, which covers concerns about flows and prolonged settlement of irregular migrants and asylum seekers in recent years, clearly indicates the puzzling European policy position on how to tackle the temporal dimension of integration. Whether they are permanent or temporary, migrants typically do not cut ties with their country of origin. Their interaction with their household and home community is the main channel through which migration could benefit development in the country of origin, therefore. However, if migrants are living with a temporary status (recognised formally or not), neither their intention nor the policies and practices of the country of destination will be compatible with the notion of integration. As before, the span of time seems to be central to integration: the longer migrants stay in a destination country, the more integrated they become. Although several empirical puzzles remain, particularly on the direct impact of the span of time on development and integration, the debate here exemplifies the need to conceptualise time as integral to broader processes of development and integration.

## Conclusion: a virtuous cycle, conscious balancing act or conflicting interests?

This MIGNEX Background Paper sets out to clarify the links between migration management, development and integration. We define key terms and point to remittances as one among several key mechanisms through which these three policy goals and areas of experience connect – albeit in different ways and to different degrees. Through our review of the evidence on the migration management–development–integration nexus it is clear that both links and disconnects exist. And furthermore, that these links and disconnects present dilemmas, not only in policy, but also for individual migrants and their families, as well as at the societal level.

Our analysis of four policy instruments implemented by the EU at the intersection of migration management, development and integration underscore these dilemmas. Our review of empirical studies and of policy interventions both point to *the salience of time*. It matters whether the temporal perspective considered is an electoral cycle of four years, the time it takes for the child of a migrant to become an adult, or a generation or more during which a society can work towards increasing the quality of life of its inhabitants.

In this conclusion, we centre our discussion on the question of whether the links and disconnects between migration management, development and

integration – as empirical realities and in different policy fields – might best be described in terms of a virtuous cycle, a conscious balancing act, or conflicting interests. Arguably, all three of these may be correct, according to the case in question. However, there is little evidence that there is any inevitability here: migration management, development and integration concerns can, arguably, be balanced and negotiated, mutually. The important question, therefore, is: *under which circumstances might policy foster or support migration management, development and integration to interact in ways that balance different considerations in mutually beneficial ways?* Conceivably, both the SDGs (UN, 2015) and the Global Compact for Migration (UN, 2018) point to areas where such productive interaction ought to be attainable – and indeed is already being strived for.

The remainder of this conclusion consists of three parts. First, we put forward a systematisation of the migration management–development–integration interface. Second, we clarify the multidirectional and relational nature of links between the three nodes. Finally, we offer some reflections on whether conflicting interests can be balanced.

### Systematising the interface of migration management, development and integration

Based on our review of the empirical evidence and selected policy instruments, Figure 5 illustrates a systematisation of the migration management–development–integration nexus.

Point of departure →	Migration management	Development	Integration
Migration management	as exclusion vs. as inclusion	as instrumental vs. intrinsic goals	exclusionary goals undermine inclusionary
Development	geographic scope and scale diverge	temporal and geopolitical divergence	diaspora engagement circumstances
Integration	inclusion supported by boundary-making	dual ties acceptance boosts recognition	conflicting conceptions of social cohesion

**Figure 5. Systematising the migration management–development–integration nexus**

Source: Authors' elaboration.

The above systematisation comprises nine parts. Three of these reflect internal variation – at times inconsistencies, diverging or even conflicting perspectives. The remaining six focus on the interface between the three. The nine parts can be expanded upon as follows:

- **Migration management/migration management:** *as exclusion vs as inclusion*, reflecting the inherent tension within migration management

goals. Maintaining boundaries enables inclusion but it relies on simultaneous exclusion.

- **Migration management/development:** *as instrumental vs. intrinsic goals*, reflecting that migration management goals may intersect with, but ultimately are not primarily aimed at reaching, development goals.
- **Migration management/integration:** *exclusionary goals undermine inclusion*, reflecting the risks and challenges of exclusionary boundary-making that result from border processes that aim to foster inclusion.
- **Development/migration management:** *geographic scope and scale diverge*, reflecting that for goals to develop whole societies, international migration management is a minor and sometimes insignificant factor elsewhere.
- **Development/development:** *temporal and geopolitical divergence*, reflecting the tensions within development goals, depending on timeframe and how geopolitical considerations affect the situation past, present and future.
- **Development/integration:** *diaspora engagement circumstances*, reflecting that while integration context does not predetermine diaspora engagement and remittance-sending, integration contexts nevertheless matter significantly.
- **Integration/migration management:** *inclusion supported by boundary-making*, reflecting that on the inside of a border, inclusion for those who are or become members of a society may benefit from clarity and predictability.
- **Integration/development:** *dual-ties acceptance boosts recognition*, reflecting that since there is no zero-sum to belonging 'here' or 'there', acceptance of ties and contribution 'there' boosts recognition 'here' in the settlement context.
- **Integration/integration:** *conflicting conceptions of social cohesion*, reflecting that internal inconsistency exists about what 'integration' ought to entail and the extent to which 'complete' integration of migrants within a society is possible.

At the abstract level, such a systematisation exercise can provide a conceptual and analytical tool that might be used in approaching the possible goals, considerations or prospective links (or disconnects) in concrete policy and empirical contexts of interest. Systematising the interface of migration management, development and integration in this way underscores the existence of contradictions and disconnects, but arguably also points to links that may be fostered and actively capitalised on.


## Clarifying multidirectional links

As the preceding sections of this paper have shown, migration management, development and integration are connected, both as empirical realities and as policy fields. Such interconnections mean that in specific cases there may be links, disconnects, or both in how policies affect a given situation, or how

the empirical realities as experienced by actors come together or remain fragmented. For policy-makers and all other involved stakeholders – from individuals, through to families, communities and civil society actors – the fact that there are particular ways in which migration management, development and integration interact, in given circumstances, often brings to the foreground very real dilemmas.

These dilemmas are not always easily resolved. Sometimes there is scope for promoting ‘a virtuous cycle’ – a triple-win scenario, where migrants (and their families), as well as societies of origin and societies of settlement, may all benefit. However, it is rather uncommon that benefits are equally spread, without cost to any of the involved actors. Therefore, more often than not, the reality may be one of conscious balancing acts. Arguably, such conscious balancing acts are possible, and it is with this perspective that the SDGs largely relate to international migration, and similarly that the Global Compact for Migration relates to the opportunities offered by safe, orderly and regular migration.

In Figure 6 we use three countries to illustrate the more abstract points on the migration management–development–integration interface.



**Figure 6. Mapping migration management, development and integration links relationally**

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Figure 6 maps the interactions between migration management, development and integration as these emerge relationally – taking into account migrants' societies of origin and of settlement, processes of integration and development, and efforts to manage migration. Here, we take the examples of Italy, Turkey and Pakistan. We consider migration management (1 in the figure), development (2) (understood as in this paper, which also reflects the use in EU policy, namely as development of another society, typically a society in the global south), and integration (3) (as most often understood, as integration of migrants in own society). Figure 6 also




shows the main circle representing each country as development of own society (4), which we could take to mean development as understood in the SDGs.

Meanwhile, it is worth noting that migration management (indicated as the centrally placed rectangle) spans the boundaries of Italy, Turkey and Pakistan. Migration management policies have both internal and external dimensions, as well as modes of implementation. Furthermore, these can intersect with (2) development in another society (indicated as the oval sitting at the boundary of the Turkey and Pakistan circles), through efforts such as Italian development engagements in other countries. Although this need not be the case, present-day development priorities in EU countries suggest they overlap.

If we were to take as a point of departure the interests not of Italy, but of Turkey or of Pakistan in Figure 6, this might look somewhat different, though migration management, integration of migrants in own society, and development of own society would remain policy concerns. Development of other societies would also be relevant, but not with Italy at the receiving end of such concerns. This underscores the specific relationalities that underpin the links and disconnects we have discussed in this paper, and in particular the historical backdrop that shapes such relationships over time.

Figure 6 also refers to *social cohesion* (5) and *geopolitics* (6), which we now turn to. Arguably, development – whether pertaining to integration of migrants, reduction of social inequalities between inhabitants, or the regulation of migration in accordance with labour market needs, international obligation to respond to protection and humanitarian needs, or other societal considerations – all relate to an overarching goal of social cohesion. Taking external dimensions into consideration, geopolitics also comes into play, encompassing both migration management, but also a country's broader economic, political, security and other interests, regionally and globally.

In Figure 7 we show how social cohesion and geopolitics can be seen as overarching policy considerations of nation-states, broadly understood in terms of internal and external foci, but both with the same aim – promoting the interests of the given nation state.



**Figure 7. Social cohesion and geopolitics as overarching policy considerations**

Source: Authors' elaboration.

We propose that the links between migration management, integration (of migrants in the countries of settlement) and development (in migrants' countries of origin) should be seen as mediated by overarching concerns about social cohesion and geopolitics. All three are relevant to social cohesion – i.e. internal dimensions – in some way; but also, to different degrees, to geopolitics – i.e. external dimensions. This might be via migrant populations (diasporas) present in the country, or through particular geopolitical ties or interests that are reflected in development or migration management priorities. Conversely, the internal dimensions of migrant management, integration and development affect the external dimensions and are also shaped by them.

A particular country, like Italy, Turkey or Pakistan for example, will have its own unique set of countries with which it seeks collaboration in order to manage migration – including emigration, immigration, transit migration, questions of protection, as well as return. Similarly, the set of considerations regarding integration, own society development, and involvement in another society's development will also vary. Such a picture would likely change rapidly over time, but could also be firmly rooted in historical realities, such as previous colonial ties leading to strong economic interaction.

Mapping the relational interactions of migration management, development and integration can serve the purpose of clarifying policy goals and priorities – or at least uncovering where there are key dilemmas, about which there should be informed political debate before choices and decisions are made. Often, such debates will centre around fundamental questions of paths towards social cohesion, but also geopolitical positioning and alliances.

## Can conflicting interests be balanced?

MIGNEX  
Background  
Paper

A holistic approach to the dynamic relationship between migration management, development and integration offers more satisfactory answers to the question of how new policies may be designed and utilised for the maximum benefit of all actors involved.

Whether conflicting interests can be balanced equally remains an empirical question. This paper offers five insights of relevance for the development of policy – and practice – which considers the links and disconnects between migration management, development and integration concerns:

- Attention should be paid to the competing concerns of actors involved. Efforts should be made to develop deliberative mechanisms for cooperation and better governance of migration management, development and integration, multilaterally and bilaterally, between stakeholders.
- Careful assessments and reassessments should be made of what targeted and effective migration management, development and integration policies might look like, recognising that they (often) interact with each other. A holistic and multidimensional perspective should be considered to accommodate the dynamic interactions among the three nodes.
- The benefits of purposeful, balanced and adequately implemented migration management, integration and development policies should be recognised by and communicated with all key actors involved.
- Migration management issues should be considered as associated with integration and development, rather than just emphasising the goals of reducing migration and asylum flows into Europe.
- The main reasons for migration are mixed and change over time. Therefore, migration management policies based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach risk being harmful for goals associated with both integration and development.

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