Migration-relevant policies in Cabo Verde
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MIGNEX (Aligning Migration Management and the Migration-Development Nexus) is a five-year research project (2018–2023) with the core ambition of creating new knowledge on migration, development and policy. It is carried out by a consortium of nine partners in Europe, Africa and Asia: the Peace Research Institute Oslo (coordinator), Danube University Krems, University of Ghana, Koç University, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Maastricht University, the Overseas Development Institute, the University of Oxford and Samuel Hall.

See www.mignex.org.

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MIGNEX Background Papers

The MIGNEX Background Papers are scientific papers containing the documentation and analyses that underpin the project results. Selected insights from background papers are also presented in non-technical form in other formats, including MIGNEX Policy Briefs and MIGNEX Reports.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Contents

**About the MIGNEX policy reviews** 1  
Methodological note 2  
**Summary of main results** 2  
### Emigration 3  
Main policies 3  
Trends 4  
Impacts on emigration 4  
Impacts on development 5  
Key incoherence across policies 6  
Interaction with development policies 6  
### Diaspora 6  
Main policies 6  
Trends 8  
Impacts on development 9  
Key incoherence across policies 10  
Interaction with development policies 10  
### Transit migration 11  
Main policies 11  
Trends 11  
Impacts on immigration and transit migration 11  
Impacts on development 12  
Key incoherence across policies 12  
Interaction with development policies 12  
### Return migration 13  
Main policies 13  
Trends 13  
Impacts on return migration 14  
Impacts on development 14  
Key incoherence across policies 15  
Interaction with development policies 15  
### Immigration 15  
Main policies 15  
Trends 17  
Impacts on immigration 18  
Impacts on development 18  
Key incoherence across policies 19  
Interaction with development policies 20  
### Internal migration 20  
Main policies 20  
Trends 20  
Impacts on internal migration 20  
Impacts on development 21  
Key incoherence across policies 21  
Interaction with development policies 21  
### Externalisation of EU migration policies 22  
Main policies 22  
Trends 22  
Impacts on immigration, emigration, return migration and transit migration 23
Migration-relevant policies in Cabo Verde

Impacts on development 24
Key incoherence across policies 24
Interaction with development policies 25

Main development policies 25
The selected policies 25
Interactions with migration-related policies 27
Examples of impact on migration 28

Any additional information related to COVID-19 28
References 28

Figures
Figure 1 Diaspora Engagement Initiative 7
Figure 2. ‘For a Cabo Verde for everyone’ (Por um Cabo Verde de Todos) campaign 17
Figure 3. Cabo Verde tourism logo 27
## List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAI</td>
<td>High Authority for Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPO</td>
<td>Centre for the Support of Migrants from the Country of Origin</td>
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<td>CNI</td>
<td>National Immigration Council</td>
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<td>CNPS</td>
<td>Centre for National Social Pensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONED</td>
<td>(Former) National Committee on Emigration and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Language Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>EU Common Visa Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEF</td>
<td>Foreign and Borders Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEI</td>
<td>Diaspora Engagement Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>Emigrant Investor Statute</td>
</tr>
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<td>ENED</td>
<td>National Strategy on Emigration and Development</td>
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<td>ENI</td>
<td>National Immigration Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMP</td>
<td>Mobility Partnership with the EU</td>
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<td>EUTF</td>
<td>European Union Trust Fund</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>INE</td>
<td>National Institute for Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPS</td>
<td>National Institute of Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEV</td>
<td>Multiple Entry Visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFIS</td>
<td>Ministry of Family and Social Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIEUX</td>
<td>Migration EU Expertise Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communities</td>
</tr>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRRD</td>
<td>Definitely Returned Non-Resident Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDO</td>
<td>Pre-departure orientation</td>
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<td>PEDS</td>
<td>Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>Repatriates Integration Project</td>
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<td>PNI</td>
<td>National Immigration Policy</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Readmission Agreement with the EU</td>
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<td>REJ</td>
<td>Legal Regime of Entry, Stay, Exit and Expulsion of Foreigners from Cabo Verdean Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNIAC</td>
<td>National System of Identification and Civil Authentication</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRQN</td>
<td>Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals project</td>
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<td>VFA</td>
<td>Visa Facilitation Agreement with the EU</td>
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</table>
Migration-relevant policies in Cabo Verde

This paper presents the results of the policy review of the MIGNEX project in Cabo Verde. The purpose of the review is to provide an overview of the key migration policies in Cabo Verde and its interaction with development and development policies.

There are several initiatives to engage the diaspora, including the Emigrant Investor Statute in 2020.

Immigration is a key policy issue since the launch of the National Immigration Strategy in 2012.

Cabo Verde cooperates on mobility issues with the EU under the framework of the Mobility Partnership, signed in 2008.

About the MIGNEX policy reviews

This is one of ten MIGNEX Background Papers devoted to a review of policies in the ten countries of origin and transit covered by the project. The term ‘policy’ can refer to many different phenomena. MIGNEX adopts a broad perspective and regards policy to include the existence and effectiveness of particular laws, common practices, development initiatives, policy interventions and the broader policy environment or framework. This inclusive definition encompasses the needs of the project’s overall research.

Much of the analysis in the review involves policies that relate directly to migration and its link to development. The concept of ‘migration-related policies’ includes both the migration policy environment and interventions that seek to affect the development impacts of migration. It also includes policy and projects that might have large effects on migration dynamics, even if not presented under a migration heading.
Methodological note

During February and March 2020, a systematic desk-based review as well as 25 semi-structured interviews with 34 policy-makers and other experts were undertaken in Cabo Verde’s capital Praia. Gemma Hennessey conducted all interviews, with 23 conducted in person and two over the phone. Interviews were conducted in either Portuguese, Cabo Verdean Kriolu, French, or English with interpretation provided by Eileen Barbosa. Access to interviewees was facilitated by Andira Lopes from PD Consult, the sub-contracting firm that conducted the MIGNEX survey, due to their established connections to relevant policy-makers and experts on migration issues in Cabo Verde.

The time unit of analysis for the paper is 12 years from 2008-2020. This period was selected because 2008 was a significant year for migration and development policy. Cabo Verde graduated from ‘Least-Developed Country’ to ‘Middle-Income Country’ status, and, in the same year, entered into a Mobility Partnership with the European Union, with aims of facilitating movement of persons, managing irregular migration and cooperating on migration and development.

This is one of three pilot studies that were carried out at an early stage to test the methodological approach to policy reviews developed in MIGNEX Handbook Chapter 9 (Godin and Carlos Vargas-Silva, 2020).

Summary of main results

Engaging the vast Cabo Verdean diaspora, and in particular harnessing diaspora contributions for development, has long been a policy focus in Cabo Verde. The diaspora enjoys several rights, including dual nationality and the right to vote in presidential elections. A recent key policy to encourage diaspora contributions is the Emigrant Investor Statute launched in 2020, which provides additional tax exemptions for diaspora members, above and beyond the incentives available to foreign investors.

Immigration is an area of considerable recent policy development in Cabo Verde since the launch of the National Immigration Strategy in 2012. The National Immigration Strategy was formulated to respond to the reality of Cabo Verde increasingly becoming a country of destination. It laid the groundwork for overhauling the legislative framework regulating the entry, stay and exit of foreigners as well as policies for the social inclusion and integration of immigrants. At a national level, the second Action Plan for the Social Inclusion of Immigrants (2018-2020) was approved in 2019, and additionally in 2020, two municipal level Action Plans were created. The reception and integration of immigrants is overseen by the High Authority for Immigration, with three broad types of initiatives: immigrant integration, promotion of tolerance and diversity, and supported return for immigrants at risk. Additionally, protections for victims and penalties for perpetrators of human trafficking are relatively new policy developments, with the first ever National Plan to Combat Human Trafficking approved in 2018.
Cabo Verde’s relationship with the EU is a driving force in several areas of migration policy. In 2008, Cabo Verde became one of the first countries to enter a Mobility Partnership with the EU. Under the framework of the partnership, the EU and Cabo Verde have signed two legally binding mobility agreements, which came into force in 2014. Firstly, the Visa Facilitation Agreement allows certain categories of individuals short-stay multiple entry visas to some EU countries. The second agreement is the Readmission Agreement, which obliges Cabo Verde to readmit citizens and third-country nationals (who entered the EU via Cabo Verde) irregularly residing in the EU. Other key areas of cooperation include border management and document security.

**Emigration**

**Main policies**

The freedom to emigrate is enshrined as a constitutional right in Cabo Verde (Article 58). The institutional framework for emigration (and diaspora) issues is overseen by the Directorate General for Consular Affairs, Communities and Migration, which sits under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communities (MNEC). Meanwhile at the local level, there is the National Network of Municipal Focal Points made up of 22 focal points responsible for emigration issues within each municipality.

There are two main aspects to emigration policy. The first is driven by Cabo Verde’s relationship with the EU. In 2008, Cabo Verde entered a Mobility Partnership with the EU (EUMP), see section on Externalisation of EU migration policies. Under the framework of the EUMP, Cabo Verde signed a Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA), which came into force at the end of 2014. The VFA allows for Multiple Entry Visas (MEV) to the Schengen area for short-stays of up to 90 days (per 180 days), and some visa exemptions for delegates, children, students and researchers (Art 5). The MEVs are limited to certain professions and categories of people. For diplomats, delegates from international organisations, business people, and relatives (spouses, dependent children, and parents) visas can be valid for up to five years (Art 4.1). Meanwhile, for researchers, artists, athletes, journalists, NGO workers, teachers, students, religious workers or those travelling for medical reasons, visas can be valid for between one and five years, dependent on previous visa history (Art 4.2). In 2020 a new amendment was approved which will broaden the eligibility of MEVs to all categories of people (European Commission, 2020a). In 2010 the EU Common Visa Centre (CVC) opened in Praia. Operated by Portugal, the CVC receives MEV applications for 19 European countries.¹ MEVs can additionally be acquired at the Spanish Embassy in Praia.

Cabo Verde has also signed bilateral labour mobility agreements with four EU Member States: Portugal (1997; 2013), Spain (2007), France (2008), and

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 Luxembourg (2017). The latter two agreements offer limited temporary or circular emigration opportunities, including internships and professional experience opportunities for Cabo Verdean graduates and young professionals in France and Luxembourg.

The second aspect of emigration policy relates to Cabo Verde’s membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional political and economic community established in 1975 to foster economic integration in West Africa. Cabo Verde is party to the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment (Protocol A/P.1/5/79), ratified in 1982. Under this protocol, ECOWAS citizens have visa-free entry to all 14 ECOWAS countries for up to 90 days as well as the right of residence and establishment, dependent on national immigration policies. Cabo Verdean citizens enjoy these free movement rights as ECOWAS citizens.

**Trends**

There are two main trends in emigration policy over the past 12 years. The first relates to the EUMP. In addition to the VFA and bilateral agreements discussed above, the EUMP’s flagship project, the Centre for the Support of Migrants from the Country of Origin (CAMPO) (2009-2011). CAMPO sought to promote legal migration channels to the EU by giving potential migrants information on emigration opportunities and pre-departure orientation (PDO) training. It created a migrant information centre in Praia and delivered services on other islands through employment and training centres. Since the end of CAMPO, national policies have been drafted to provide PDO to would-be emigrants, most recently in the second National Action Plan for Human Rights and Citizenship (2017-2022); however, none have been implemented.

The second trend relates to recent impetus to expand emigration opportunities through membership of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), an international community established in 1996 for cooperation between nine Portuguese-speaking countries. Cabo Verde has held the CPLP presidency since 2019 and has used its position to place the issue of free mobility high on the agenda. Their dossier on mobility was approved in December 2020 and is expected to be ratified by heads of state at the Luanda summit in 2021 (Expresso das Ilhas, 2020). The dossier proposes a flexible system of mobility, with various levels available to each state – the minimum is free movement for diplomats and the maximum is free mobility for all CPLP citizens (Reis, 2019).

**Impacts on emigration**

The impact of the VFA and various bilateral agreements with EU Member States on emigration flows is minimal, despite Cabo Verde’s high hopes for

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2 The other members are Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Togo, Mali, Benin, Senegal, Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana.

3 Other CPLP countries are Angola, Brazil, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Portugal and São Tome and Principe.

4 Extended by one year due to COVID.
increased mobility opportunities through the EUMP (Langley and Alborola, 2018). This is in part due to the limited scope of agreements. The current VFA, for instance, offers only limited opportunities for short-term labour mobility for certain professions, and tourism for relatives. The categories of people included in the VFA are those which already found it easier to get visas (van Stokkum, 2015). Although the recently approved amendment to the VFA is wider in scope, it still offers only short-term emigration opportunities. The temporary circular migration opportunities for young professionals in France and Luxembourg are too small in scale to make a significant impact on emigration flows, with between 50 and 100 places per year.

The opening of the CVC has facilitated travel to several EU Member States which do not have an embassy in Cabo Verde. However, experts noted that obtaining a visa remains difficult. The refusal rate increases year by year, with 36% of 22,000 applications refused in 2019 (European Commission, 2020b). Experts indicated refusals are linked to CVC staff doubting the credibility of applicants’ stated purposes for travel.

The impact of other policies on emigration is restricted. CAMPO was too short-term to have a lasting impact (Langley and Alborola, 2018), and in total it supported just three legal migration projects to the EU (Åkesson and Alpes, 2019). Although Cabo Verde is an ECOWAS member, in practice relatively few Cabo Verdeans exercise their ECOWAS rights and migrate within the region. In Cabo Verde, the ECOWAS Free Movement protocols are more relevant in terms of immigration (see section on Immigration).

Experts consider the lack of emigration opportunities to be linked to increased internal migration flows, see Internal migration.

### Impacts on development

Remittances are vital to Cabo Verde’s economy, making up 12% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2019 (World Bank, 2020a). Remittances are also important to local development due to the country’s long history of emigration and large diaspora population. A large proportion of households receive remittances, at least occasionally, including the very poorest households (Åkesson, 2013).

The development potential of the VFA and bilateral agreements is restricted, given that they allow for only limited temporary mobility for certain categories of people. Emigration is facilitated for only those who have social and economic capital and thus already have greater access to opportunities within Cabo Verde. With emigration reserved only for the most privileged, it may be the case that only those privileged households receive remittances rather than those who need it most, contributing towards socio-economic inequality (Åkesson, 2013).

ECOWAS membership has a limited impact on development. In 2018, just 1.4% of Cabo Verde’s remittances originated from the ECOWAS region (World Bank, 2019a). The EU, CPLP, and US are more relevant to Cabo Verde in terms of remittances. With 50% already from CPLP countries, predominantly from Portugal and Angola, the ongoing CPLP negotiations could have an important impact.
Lastly, experts highlighted that the lack of PDO for would-be migrants may have a knock-on effect for development. If migrants are, as a result, less successful in countries of destination, this could impact remittance levels, as well as success on return.

**Key incoherence across policies**

There are two main sources of incoherence across policies regarding emigration. One source is inconsistency between national and international political will. Internal efforts to increase emigration opportunities are frustrated, as emigration depends simultaneously on the policy of the country of destination (Delgado, 2013). Emigration continues to be at much lower levels than in the 20th century (INE, 2015; Carling, 2004), largely a result of increasingly restrictive immigration policies in countries of destination. Cabo Verde entered the EUMP in part as a means for extended labour mobility opportunities for its citizens (van Stokkum, 2015). However, even in the recent VFA re-negotiations, only short-stay visas were on the table (European Commission, 2020a), see also Externalisation of EU migration policies.

The second source of incoherence is a lack of resources for implementation. Projects such as CAMPO were intended to be transferred to the government, but this was not possible due to a lack of financial and administrative capacity (Langley and Alborola, 2018).

**Interaction with development policies**

Cabo Verde has invested significantly in document security, starting in 2013 with the launch of the biometric National System of Identification and Civil Authentication (SNIAC). SNIAC was instrumental in reaching EU standards required to implement the VFA in 2014 (Langley and Alborola, 2018). Cabo Verde has continued to invest in document security, most recently with GESTDOC (2019-2022). This 5-million-euro EU Trust Fund (EUTF) project seeks to build capacity to verify and prevent fraudulent documents in Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau.\(^5\) GESTDOC coincides with the recent VFA renegotiations with the EU.

**Diaspora**

**Main policies**

There are three broad categories of diaspora policies in Cabo Verde. First, there are policies to harness diaspora contributions. An early policy was the creation of special bank accounts for emigrants first, established in 1984 (Decree nº 51/84 of 9th June). The most utilised of these accounts – emigrant savings deposits – offer special exemptions and above-market subsidised

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interest rates to incentivise members of the diaspora to open bank accounts (Rodrigues, 2017).

Recently, diaspora investments have been encouraged through the introduction of the Emigrant Investor Statute (EIS) (Law nº 73/IX/2020 of 2nd March) in 2020. The EIS provides for special tax incentives for ‘emigrant investors’ beyond those already available to foreign investors. Under the statute, ‘emigrant’ is broadly defined to include retired returnees who receive a pension from abroad. EIS sits under the Ministry of Finance, implemented together with the state agency for foreign investment promotion, Cabo Verde Trade Invest. Diaspora investments are also encouraged through international business events and one-off schemes, such as the selling of Cabo Verde Airlines shares in 2019, when 5% was reserved for the diaspora (Macau Hub, 2019).

Alongside monetary contributions, there is a focus on facilitating knowledge transfers from the diaspora. A new mechanism to facilitate this is the Diaspora Engagement Initiative (DEI) under the Ministry of Finance in cooperation with the World Bank and the IOM, see Figure 1. The DEI aims to build capacity and attract investment from the diaspora through an online database of diaspora members’ profiles alongside job, consultancy and volunteering opportunities in Cabo Verde. These profiles will be visualised online in a ‘Diaspora Capabilities Map’. Originally due to launch in 2020, the project is currently suspended, in part due to COVID-19.

![Diaspora Engagement Initiative](https://dei.gov.cv)

**Figure 1 Diaspora Engagement Initiative**

Source: Diaspora Engagement Initiative: https://dei.gov.cv

The second category of policies extends nationality, political and other rights to the diaspora. The right to dual nationality is enshrined in the Constitution (Art 5(3)). The Nationality Law allows second and third generation diaspora members born abroad to acquire Cabo Verdean nationality. The diaspora

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6 Foreign Investment Law nº 13/VIII/2012 of 11th July.
7 Law nº 80/III/90, of 29th June, Law nº 41/IV/92, of 6th April, Law nº 64/IV/92, of 30th December.
has the right to vote in national presidential elections (Constitution, Art 108), and is represented in the National Assembly, electing six out of 72 seats. Political parties have delegates abroad in diaspora associations, and it is commonplace for politicians to go abroad to campaign ahead of elections.

There is special support through the Pension for Emigrant Communities in Vulnerable Situations for diaspora members living in precarious situations in African countries, mainly in São Tomé and Príncipe but also Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. The non-contributory pension is provided by the Centre for National Social Pensions (CNPS), an autonomous body under the Ministry of Family and Social Inclusion (MFIS), and is distributed quarterly via consulates. The pension amount doubled in 2019 to around 40 euros per month, with 1,400 beneficiaries in 2019 (CNPS, 2019). The diaspora can also access the public administrative service Casa do Cidadão, which sits under the Ministry of Justice, through the online platform Porton di Nos Ilha\(^8\) and offices in consulates abroad. The third category of policies seeks to maintain cultural ties with the diaspora (Constitution, Art 7(g) and 79(3e)), largely through events organised by consulates abroad. Most recently, the Ministry of Culture oversaw the opening of a Cabo Verdean Cultural Centre in Lisbon in 2019 (DW, 2019).

**Trends**

Since 2008 there have been two main trends in diaspora policy. The first is a shift in the national institutional framework governing diaspora issues. In 2011 a specialised ministry for diaspora affairs was created, the Ministry of Communities. In 2013, the Ministry oversaw the creation an emigration and development advisory committee – the National Committee on Emigration and Development (CONED)– which included 19 representatives from various government ministries, academics, NGOs, the private sector, and the immigration advisory body.\(^9\) Under this framework, the National Emigration and Development Strategy (ENED) was published in 2013. ENED was Cabo Verde’s first comprehensive strategy on diaspora engagement, with extensive proposals to harness diaspora contributions and support emigrants (Ministry of Communities, 2014).

In 2016, there was an institutional restructure following a change in government. Specialised diaspora agencies were subsumed by non-specialised government bodies; for instance, the Ministry of Communities by MNEC in 2016 and the autonomous Community Solidarity Fund were brought under the CNPS in 2019. The year 2016 also marked a shift in national policy. Notably CONED disbanded, meaning there is no longer a specialised advisory body for emigration and development, and ENED is no longer referred to. The main policy emphasis of the government since 2016 is encouraging diaspora investments, culminating in the new EIS (2020) discussed in the section on Main policies.

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\(^9\) As part of AMEDIP Project Strengthening Diaspora Policies in African and Middle Eastern Countries through South-South Cooperation, in cooperation with the IOM and funded by France, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland.
The second trend involves Cabo Verde’s partnership with the EU under the EUMP framework. Between 2008 and 2016, there were several projects which sought to harness diaspora contributions, implemented in collaboration with EU Member States, see section on Externalisation of EU migration policies. These projects fall under three groups. Firstly, there are initiatives to harness the developmental impact of remittances, such the ACP-EU study on remittance dynamics with the IOM in 2016 (Isaacs, 2017). The Remittances and Emigrants as Resources for Development (2009-2011) and the Solidarity Development Program (2010-2015) also sought to channel remittances into productive investments (United Nations, 2018). Secondly, some projects focus on information dissemination on migration and development issues, like the Luxembourg-funded InforDiáspora project. Thirdly, there are projects for knowledge transfers from the diaspora through temporary return visits and training missions by diaspora members, see also section on Return migration.

**Impacts on development**

The importance of diaspora contributions to Cabo Verde’s development is well-recognised (Varela, 2016a), with an estimated 50% of Cabo Verdeans living abroad. A clear example of the impact of diaspora policy on development is the emigrant savings deposits accounts. These are widely used and continue to make a substantial contribution to the country’s finances, representing 35% of GDP in 2018 (IMF, 2019). It is more difficult to quantify the scale of diaspora investment policy, as there is little data available. Experts note that diaspora investments, particularly in construction, are clearly visible across Cabo Verde, particularly in the peripheral islands with high levels of out-migration. It is too early to assess the impact of the EIS, but there are high hopes for it as a tool to increase diaspora investment and create more jobs (Inforpress, 2019). As detailed in the section on Emigration, remittances continue to make up a substantial proportion of Cabo Verde’s economy, but it is difficult to attribute this to any direct policy-making.

Policies around diaspora rights and culture are thought to have direct and indirect impacts on development. Directly, dual nationality and the right to vote mean that the diaspora holds political weight and can communicate their concerns to the government (Rodrigues, 2017). Indirectly, diaspora rights and cultural outreach have an impact on development by enhancing the diaspora’s ‘unusually strong bond’ to their country of origin (Resende-Santos, 2015). Indeed, there was sentiment among some experts that the diaspora’s commitment to their homeland – even among second and third generations – makes up for the lack of effective policies to harness diaspora contributions.

Lastly, the development impact of various diaspora engagement projects under the EUMP between 2008 and 2016 was limited (Langley and Alborola, 2018). The lack of tangible results is in part because projects were too short-term, had overlapping aims, and lacked sustainability (Rodrigues, 2017).
Key incoherence across policies

One source of potential incoherence is institutional. Experts noted that the institutional restructure in 2016 was coupled with high levels of staff turnover due to high levels of partisanship in public administration in Cabo Verde. As a result, substantial institutional memory was lost. Further, the disbanding of the special advisory body CONED in 2016 means there is no longer a body to coordinate the many institutions involved in the design and implementation of diaspora policy. CONED included a member from the immigration advisory body to ensure coherency across migration policies – no other policy coherence mechanism has taken its place.

Another source of incoherence is due to large data deficits on the diaspora, including how large the diaspora is, who invests and in what sectors, and who remits and how. A migration observatory was created in 2014\textsuperscript{10} to improve migration data within Cabo Verde; however, this is no longer in operation. Lack of knowledge about the diaspora may undermine effective policy design.

Another source of incoherence is the lack of organisation among the diaspora. Frequent attempts to organise the diaspora have failed, for instance through the Council of Communities, a formalised policy advisory body provided for in the Constitution (Art 258). Experts note this is due to a lack of resources, partisan politics (with diaspora organisations often associated with a particular political party), and frequent institutional restructures. An unorganised diaspora undermines the potential influence of the diaspora to lobby and shape policy as well as to promote Cabo Verde interests or contribute to development (Resende-Santos, 2015).

Interaction with development policies

Diaspora policies directly interact with several development policies. Attracting FDI has been a government priority since it graduated to MIC status in 2008 (AfDB, 2012). The diaspora is a key part of this strategy, as seen with the recent EIS law. In late 2018, the government held an international conference ‘Building new partnerships for the sustainable development of Cabo Verde’ in Paris as part of the current development plan – the Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development (PEDS). One outcome of the conference was the introduction of the annual Cabo Verde Investment Forum in 2019, which aims to drive FDI in part by encouraging diaspora investments.

In PEDS, tourism is recognised as a key sector of growth for the economy (see Main development policies). The diaspora is part of the government’s vision for the sector, with measures for promoting what it refers to as ‘ethnic tourism’ – in other words tourism from the diaspora (Government of Cabo Verde, 2018).

\textsuperscript{10} Resolution nº 22/2014 of 14th March.
Transit migration

Main policies

Transit migration policy in Cabo Verde refers to border management, namely the patrolling of the waters surrounding the archipelago for cases of irregular migration or smuggling via boat. There are two national bodies that deal with border management. The Foreign and Borders Directorate (DEF) of the National Police sits under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is responsible for controlling the entry and exit of persons at borders as well as issuing visas and ‘Resident Permits for Foreigners’. Meanwhile the Coast Guard, under the Ministry of Defence, has responsibility for the protection of borders and patrolling waters (United Nations, 2018).

Border management and the movement of irregular migrants through Cabo Verde and its territorial waters is an area of substantial international cooperation with several neighbouring and destination countries. Since 2011 the Cabo Verde National Police has a working agreement with EU border agency FRONTEX. The agreement allows for cooperation in controlling the external borders of the EU and is aimed at preventing third-country nationals, including Cabo Verdeans, entering the EU. The agreement provides for cooperation in operations, returns, training and information exchange, as well as technical assistance. Labour mobility agreements with France (2007) and Spain (2008) include cooperation against irregular migration, including technical and financial assistance in policing and document security. In the case of Spain, this also includes joint surveillance. There is particularly close cooperation with Spain and Portugal, the geographically closest EU countries.

Trends

Border management is an area of significant policy change since 2008, accelerated in part by the signing of the EUMP in 2008, see section on Main development policies. International cooperation on this matter began in 2005 with the Seahorse project (2005-2010), led by Spain together with Portugal, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to create an information sharing network to strengthen border management (Enriquez et al., 2018). Other cooperation projects include the capacity building programme of public security and law enforcement institutions (2007-2012) in which 1,500 members of the Cabo Verde National Police received training from the Portuguese Service of Foreigners and Borders (Langley and Alborola, 2018).

Impacts on immigration and transit migration

There is consensus that increased international cooperation and capacity building in this area have greatly reduced transit migration through Cabo Verde (Rodrigues, 2017). In 2008, there was a phenomenon of undocumented transit migration from West African countries. People mainly travelled from Ghana, Mali and Senegal through Cabo Verde towards the Canary Islands, and some to the Caribbean a trend which had been increasing since 2000 (Carling, 2008). Means for smuggling undocumented migrants were via
small-scale fishing boats from Senegal and some larger vessels from more organised human smuggling. There was limited control of borders and vast territorial waters due to limited surveillance resources and technical capacity (Carling, 2008). Nowadays, this type of irregular transit migration is rare, and experts indicated it is no longer considered to be an issue in Cabo Verde. In 2014, 21 people arrived in Cabo Verde in such vessels, and none were recorded in 2015 (Rodrigues, 2017). However, it should be noted that in late 2020, the IOM reported that the number of departures from West Africa travelling along the West African sea route towards Europe are increasing, with 12,000 West African arrivals in the Canary Islands in October and November 2020 (IOM, 2020). Although not transiting through Cabo Verde, several boats travel through the archipelago’s waters, including a recent shipwreck of a Senegalese vessel intended for Spain, whose 66 passengers were rescued by Cabo Verde authorities off the coast of the island of Sal (Texeira, 2020).

Nowadays, there is the impression that migrants who arrive from West Africa generally stay in Cabo Verde, although there are no studies of immigrants’ migration aspirations (Rodrigues, 2017). Some immigrants from ECOWAS countries are thought to have the intention to firstly obtain residence permits in Cabo Verde with the hope of then securing a visa to Europe, in effect viewing Cabo Verde as a (regular) transit route to other destinations (Varela and Wilson, 2017; Furtado, 2016). Schengen visa statistics are not broken down by the nationality of applicants, however experts indicated that most visa applications to the EU are lodged by Cabo Verdean citizens. Immigration numbers have increased over recent years, but it is difficult to say if this is attributed in part to transit migration policies.

**Impacts on development**

Experts did not identify any evidence on the development impact of increased border management.

**Key incoherence across policies**

Similarly, no incoherencies across transit migration policies were identified.

**Interaction with development policies**

As mentioned in the section on Emigration, Cabo Verde continues to invest in citizen identification and document security, most recently with the GESTDOC project. This is of direct significance to transit migration policy as the government increases capacity to securitise identification for foreign nationals as well as Cabo Verdean citizens.

Cabo Verde continues to invest in maritime security cooperation which reinforces border management efforts. For instance, in 2018 Cabo Verde signed a status of forces agreement with the USA following the opening of an Office of Security Cooperation at the US Embassy in 2017.
Return migration

Main policies

There are two main aspects to return migration policy in Cabo Verde. First, there are policies to facilitate the return migration process. Emigrants who have been abroad for more than four years can apply for ‘Definitely Returned Non-Resident Status’ (NRRD). Upon their return to Cabo Verde, individuals with NRRD can, benefit from exemptions from customs duties and consumption tax on personal goods and equipment, which may include a car and furniture.\(^{11}\)

Cabo Verde has signed bilateral social security agreements with key countries of destination, including Spain (2012), France (1982), the Netherlands (2004, amended 2018), Italy (1980), Luxembourg (1990), and Portugal (2011, approved 2017).\(^{12}\) Such agreements are overseen by the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) and allow Cabo Verdeans enrolled in social security systems of both countries to maintain benefits on return to Cabo Verde, including sickness, maternity, old-age pensions, disability, survivors and family allowances.

Second, there is the involuntary return of Cabo Verdeans and other non-EU nationals to Cabo Verde through the EU Readmission Agreement (RA), which was signed in 2013 and came into force in 2014. A key component of the EUMP (Van Stokkum, 2015), the RA obliges Cabo Verde to accept nationals who entered or stayed in the EU irregularly, and exceptionally, third-country nationals who entered the EU via Cabo Verde.

Trends

There have been three main trends in return migration policy since 2008. Firstly, towards the beginning of the period, there were several initiatives for the reintegration of returnees, including deportees, such as the Repatriates Integration Project (PIR) launched in 2003 (Rodrigues, 2017). The second component of EUMP project CAMPO was to facilitate the social and economic reintegration of returnees from the EU, including the provision of information on training, employment and investment opportunities (Rodrigues, 2017). Reintegration support was also included in the former emigration and development strategy ENED, see also section on Diaspora. Most recently, the National Action Plan for Human Rights outlines a strategic objective to support involuntary returnees and deportees. This includes measures to collect data on deportees' profiles and disseminate information on reintegration to returnees. However, no specific reintegration programmes have been implemented in Cabo Verde since 2016.

The second policy trend relates to the temporary return of skilled Cabo Verdean emigrant professionals to facilitate knowledge transfers. There were several initiatives under the framework of the EUMP between 2008 and

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\(^{11}\) Law nº 26/VIII/2013, of 21st January

\(^{12}\) See https://www.inps.cv/organismos-internacionais/ (Accessed 25/02/2021). There is also an SSA with Sweden (1990) and three more signed but not yet applicable SSAs with Angola (2010), Brazil (2009) and Senegal (1998).

The third return policy trend refers to readmission agreements. Cabo Verde first signed a readmission agreement as a member of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States in the Cotonou agreement with the EU in 2003. Bilateral labour agreements with France and Spain include readmission clauses. These agreements apply to the return and readmission of Cabo Verdean nationals only. Agreeing to additionally readmit third-country nationals in the RA in 2013 was exceptional (Delgado, 2013).

**Impacts on return migration**

There is a lack of data on return flows or profiles of returnees in Cabo Verde (Rodrigues, 2017).

It is unclear whether customs and tax exemptions for NRRDs facilitates the permanent return of emigrants. Whilst the policy does not explicitly encourage return migration, experts perceive the policy to moderately influence the decision to return to Cabo Verde. There is a trend of retirees returning with foreign pensions who make use of the scheme to transport their cars and home furnishings to Cabo Verde for retirement.

The impact of the RA is difficult to quantify. There were initial concerns that the agreement would lead to a sudden large inflow of Cabo Verdean and third-country national deportees from the EU (Van Stokkum, 2015); however, this does not appear to have materialised. According to EUROSTAT (2020) data, over 25 Cabo Verdeans have returned under the RA from 2014-2019 (20 from Luxembourg and five from Italy), with an additional 205 Cabo Verdeans ‘returned to a third-country’ from Portugal to a third-country, 110 from France and five from Belgium. EUROSTAT data does not reveal the number of non-Cabo Verdeans who have been readmitted to Cabo Verde under the RA, although experts noted there have been some cases. The number of Cabo Verdeans who have returned from an EU Member State following an order to leave appears to be declining. From 2010-2014 there was an average of 117 per year, but 2015-2019 it was an average of 76 per year (EUROSTAT, 2020). The majority of these are from Portugal, France and the Netherlands.

**Impacts on development**

There are little data on the development impact of return migration. It is thought that returnees do sometimes open businesses in Cabo Verde and contribute to creation of jobs, but the extent of this phenomenon is unknown (Rodrigues, 2017). Similarly, highly educated returnees who have studied abroad appear to be integrated into the job market, for instance within public administration.

In terms of the impact of the policies discussed above, exemptions to facilitate the return of NRRDs and social security portability may feed into the decision as to whether to return, and this in turn has a snowball development effect, for instance through increased consumption or investments.
Initiatives under the EUMP for the temporary return of qualified professionals, namely Dias, Diaspora Contributo and TRQN, mobilised around 150 professionals from the diaspora, with over 3,000 beneficiaries in Cabo Verde. However, on completion these projects were not transferred to the government and ceased to exist. Experts noted that the lack of effective schemes to facilitate knowledge mobilisation from the diaspora to Cabo Verde is a huge loss for the country’s development. The nascent Diaspora Engagement Initiative (see section on Diaspora) is hoped to facilitate this, yet it is too early to assess its impact.

Reintegration initiatives PIR and CAMPO are also considered to have been limited in impact (IOM, 2012 cited in Rodrigues, 2017). This is in part due to programmes lacking sustainability and resources (Langley and Alborola, 2018). One study found that CAMPO supported just three people with their return to Cabo Verde (Åkesson and Alpes, 2019). The lack of return and reintegration programmes is likely to impact returnees’ contributions to development (Brandão and Zoomers, 2010). Some evidence suggests many returnees experience difficulties readapting to life in Cabo Verde (Åkesson, 2011), particularly for deportees from the US, who have been linked to criminal activity (Varela and Wilson, 2017).

Key incoherence across policies

There is a potential source of incoherence between the readmission agreement and immigration policy, including Cabo Verde’s obligations under ECOWAS (Varela and Wilson, 2017). Third-country nationals from the ECOWAS region who are readmitted to Cabo Verde cannot be repatriated to their countries of origin under ECOWAS. This could be a source of conflict for regional integration with ECOWAS (Varela, 2016b).

Interaction with development policies

Bilateral social security agreements allowing portability of benefits for returnees directly interacts with social protection in Cabo Verde. Experts also highlighted that development policies indirectly influence return migration flows. For instance, a more investor-friendly business environment and improved inter-island transportation could encourage return migration as well as increase returnee’s contributions to development (Brandão and Zoomers, 2010).

Immigration

Main policies


Immigration is governed by the High Authority for Immigration (AAI), which is comprised of two departments. The Department for Supporting the Integration of Immigrants is responsible for social integration projects and
strengthening civil society including migrant associations. Meanwhile, the Department of Studies, Projects, Cooperation and International Relations is responsible for technical aspects. There is also the National Immigration Council, an immigration policy advisory body made up of 30 representatives from government ministries, the private sector, NGOs, academics and migrant associations.

Broadly, there are three main aspects to immigration policy in Cabo Verde. First there is the regulation of immigration flows through the Legal Regime of Entry, Stay, Exit and Expulsion of Foreigners (REJ) (Law nº 66/VIII/2014, of 17th July)\(^\text{13}\) launched in 2014. To enter Cabo Verde, foreigners need a passport, visa and proof of sufficient financial means. There are two types of visa exemptions. Firstly, due to Cabo Verde’s ratification of the ECOWAS treaty on Free Movement of Persons (see also Emigration), ECOWAS citizens arriving in Cabo Verde do not need an entry visa for up to 90 days. However, DEF reserves the right to refuse entry to individuals deemed inadmissible under domestic law (Art 4). The other exemption is for EU, US, Brazilian, and Canadian citizens for up to 30 days, in place since 2019 (Law nº 19/IX/2017, of 13th December).

According to REJ, to acquire a residence permit an individual must prove means of subsistence within in Cabo Verde (e.g., a formal work contract) alongside other documentation. There are specialised residence permits for highly skilled migrants, investors, students and family members (Arts 51-57).

The second key aspect to immigration policy relates to immigrant integration. There are broadly three types of integration policies. Firstly, under the Immigrant Social Integration Project, launched in 2013, there are several initiatives to promote the integration of immigrants, such as disseminating information on regularisation processes. Secondly, under the Promotion of Multiculturality project there are several initiatives to promote tolerance and diversity, such as the information campaign ‘For a Cabo Verde for everyone’, see Figure 2. The Ministry of Education works together with schools and migrant organisations to teach children about multiculturalism, including a programme to celebrate Africa day. Third, there are policies to support immigrants at risk. The Voluntary Return Project was launched in 2016 and became law in 2019 (Decree-Law nº 46/2019). The scheme was an initiative of the umbrella migrant organisation Platform for African Communities and offers support for vulnerable migrants who wish to return to their countries of origin but do not possess the means to do so.

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\(^{13}\) As amended by Law no. 80/VIII/2015, of 6th January and Law no. 19/IX/2017, of 13th December, and regulated by Decree-Laws no. 1 and no.2/2015, of 6th January.
The final main aspect of immigration policy relates to protections for victims of human trafficking, a relatively new area of interest. The REJ introduced protections for victims of human trafficking, including temporary residence permits, and fines for crimes such as smuggling or aiding irregular immigration (Arts 91-100). The Cabo Verde Penal Code criminalised human trafficking for the first time in 2015, and in 2018, the first ever National Plan to Combat Human Trafficking (2018-2021) was approved.

### Trends

Since the 1990s Cabo Verde has increasingly become a destination country, largely from ECOWAS countries (predominantly Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Nigeria), with smaller numbers from China and Portugal (Rodrigues, 2017). In response to increasing numbers and issues relating to irregular status and inclusion, the Government Program of the VII legislature 2006-2011 outlined the need for an immigration policy with two elements: regulation of immigration flows and integration of immigrants (Barros and Furtado, 2014). The resulting National Immigration Policy (PNI) and National Immigration Strategy (ENI) in 2012 were considered a ‘turning point’ for immigration policy in Cabo Verde (Tittel-Mosler, 2018). The ENI laid the groundwork for both the change in policy regulating flows (REJ) in 2014 as well as extensive programming for integration (Barros and Furtado, 2014).

There have been three other trends in immigration policy since 2008. The first is institutional. The institutional framework has transformed alongside policy development. Most recently, an inter-ministerial committee concluded a more strategically focused agency was required to govern immigration, which led to the establishment of the AAI (Decree-Law n° 55/2020) in 2020.

A second trend is around migration status and citizenship. There have been extraordinary regularisation initiatives, such as in 2010 for irregular migrants from Guinea-Bissau, and in 2015 for long-term irregular

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14 Law No. 94/VIII/2015
15 Resolution 40/2018, of 9th May
16 Decree-Law No. 13/2010
Meanwhile, there have been frequent proposals to amend citizenship laws, which would make access to citizenship slightly more difficult for foreign nationals (Tittel-Mosler, 2018). The most recent proposal was in 2019; however, none have been approved (Expresso das Ilhas, 2019).

Another trend is the decentralisation of integration policy to municipalities, deemed important due to the geography of Cabo Verde split over several islands. Two municipal level plans were approved in 2020 for Praia and Boa Vista, with plans in other municipalities expected. The AAI plans to create a network of Local Units for Immigration, with local representation on all islands.

**Impacts on immigration**

ECOWAS has facilitated significant movement in the region, including towards Cabo Verde. The impact of REJ is difficult to ascertain in part due to limited immigration data (CNDHC, 2018). Whilst the REJ is considered to have substantially improved the legal framework governing immigration flows, experts suggest that there has been little impact in terms of the type or scale of immigration since 2014. There has been some increase in demand for residence permits; but, for instance, the special provision for highly-qualified individuals has likely not increased highly skilled immigration flows. According to DEF, from January 2019 to February 2020, 696 residence permits were issued, 20% to immigrants from Guinea-Bissau, 18% from Portugal, 10% from China and Senegal.

It is difficult to ascertain the impact of REJ and other initiatives on regularisation. The irregular population is difficult to quantify, with expert estimates ranging from 400 to 10,000. Significant problems with regularisation persist, see section on Key incoherence across policies. However, efforts for the extraordinary regularisation of irregular migrants from Guinea-Bissau led to thousands regularising (Rodrigues, 2017). The measures in REJ to deport irregular migrants is not being implemented. Individuals will only be deported if they have committed a serious crime. Meanwhile, the VRP assists a small number of individuals to return home each year.

Little is known about the phenomenon of trafficking within Cabo Verde, yet media reports highlight cases of established networks of West African women brought to Cabo Verde to work in the sex industry (CNDHC, 2018; Rodrigues, 2017). In 2020, Cabo Verde prosecuted its first human trafficking case (US Department of State, 2020).

**Impacts on development**

In general, there is a lack of data on the contribution of immigrants to development. For instance, data on tax contributions of individuals and businesses is not disaggregated by migration status. However, the high presence of immigrants in Cabo Verde’s labour market indicate they do contribute to the economic development of the country (Rodrigues, 2017). In 2016, a lower share of immigrants was unemployed (7%) than the proportion

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17 Decree-Law no. 1/2015, of 6th January
of Cabo Verdan nationals (10%) (INE, 2016). This may be because immigrants are more inclined to accept low paid jobs than the domestic population (Rodrigues, 2017).

There is an acknowledgement that well integrated immigrants can better contribute to the economy, particularly because working in low-skilled jobs in the informal economy limits immigrants’ potential tax and social contributions (Silva, 2018). In Cabo Verde, the foreign-born population is concentrated on the islands of Santiago (57% in 2018), followed by Boa Vista, São Vicente and Sal (INE, 2019). Experts indicate that the irregular migrant population is concentrated in Praia, Santiago. These islands struggle with overcrowding and problems with access to services. Immigrants are often over-represented in low-quality housing, such as the shanty towns – or Baraccas – in Boa Vista (Marcelino, 2016). As such, policies to support the regularisation and integration of immigrants are likely to have a positive development impact.

The visa waiver for EU citizens was intended to incentivise tourism and development. However, it is not clear if this has been the case.

**Key incoherence across policies**

There are several potential sources of incoherence. Firstly, there is an inconsistency between the country’s treatment of nationals from the ECOWAS region and other countries. The implementation of entry requirements under REJ, such as proof of sufficient financial means, often interferes with the free movement of ECOWAS citizens (Tittel-Mosler, 2018). The sometimes-poor treatment of ECOWAS citizens at Cabo Verde borders and refusals of entry have been sharply criticised by the ECOWAS Parliament (Rodrigues et al., 2018). The strict requirement of proof of sufficient financial means for West African arrivals contrasts to the conditions under the recent visa exemption for Europeans, Brazilians, and North Americans, for which no such proof is required to enter.

Secondly, there are evident incoherencies which obstruct the regularisation process. For instance, the requirement of a formal work contract or suitable housing is unattainable for many migrants working in the informal economy (Do Canto, 2018). Obtaining the documents required for a residence permit involves interacting with several institutions (AAI, DEF, General Labour Inspectorate, INPS, and municipalities). Many of these documents depend on each other, which often creates insurmountable obstacles.

Another potential source of incoherency relates to the recent trend of decentralisation. Experts view the move to municipalisation as important for bringing decisionmakers closer to the people they serve, including immigrants. However, there are concerns that this will lead to an inequitable distribution of support for immigrants, which will depend heavily on the services offered in an individual municipality.

Lastly, asylum represents a policy gap. Cabo Verde has an asylum law (Law no.99/V/99 of 19th April), but it is not yet regulated. A policy was drafted at the same time as the REJ; however, it never proceeded. Cabo Verde is also not party to the 1951 Geneva Convention. As a result, there is no procedure...
to process asylum requests, nor official data on asylum seekers or refugees in the country (Rodrigues, 2017).

**Interaction with development policies**

Cabo Verde’s efforts to secure foreign investment to develop the tourism sector and infrastructure depend on and interact with immigration policies. For example, jobs in the construction and tourism sectors, together with the country’s relative level of development in the region, attract immigrant workers. Immigration is explicitly mentioned in the Tourism Sustainable Development Strategic Guidelines, see section on Main development policies.

As mentioned in previous sections, large developments in document security influence immigration policy too, with biometric ‘Residency Permits for Foreigners’ in place since 2014.

**Internal migration**

**Main policies**

Internal migration is an increasingly important phenomenon in Cabo Verde. However, to date, internal migration is unregulated and not the target of direct policy measures.

**Trends**

Internal migration and related issues have become increasingly policy relevant in Cabo Verde, first mentioned in the national development plan Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2004-2007) and subsequently in the national development plans of 2008-2011 and 2017-2021. However, this interest has not translated into an internal migration policy agenda, and there have been no direct policy-making attempts to regulate internal migration (Rodrigues, 2017).

**Impacts on internal migration**

Whilst there are no internal migration policies to analyse migration impacts, there may be migration impacts of a lack of policy. Movement from peripheral islands to larger, more populated islands, as well as rural-urban migration within islands has rapidly increased in recent years. (Government of Cabo Verde, 2016; Silva and Li, 2017). This is thought to be due to uneven development within Cabo Verde, as well as dwindling emigration opportunities in traditional destination countries in the EU and US. According to the current development plan PEDs, the result is that populations of southern islands Maio, Brava, and Fogo and northern islands São Nicolau and Santo Antão are shrinking. At the same time, São Vicente and Santiago (home to the Praia) and the two islands with significant levels of international tourism – Boa Vista and Sal – continue to grow and attract international immigrants (Government of Cabo Verde, 2016).
Impacts on development

An absence of internal migration policies likely has a development impact, as unregulated internal mobility has contributed to a fast-growing urban population, which has clear consequences for development. Rapid urban expansion has resulted in the growth of informal housing, with often poor living conditions, especially in Praia, the main destination for internal and international migrants, as well as on the islands of Sal and Boa Vista (Silva and Li, 2017). In these areas, urban planning issues include problems in access to drinking water, electricity and other services, infrastructural issues, and environmental degradation (Silva and Li, 2017; Rodrigues, 2017).

Experts also note that in rural areas with shrinking populations, due to internal migration as well as emigration, the rural economy is visibly struggling. For some islands like São Nicolau, this has had a knock-on effect of reducing travel links, with reduced accessibility having further detrimental impacts on development.

Key incoherence across policies

The absence of formal internal migration policy represents an incoherence in the country’s overall migration policy framework. A lack of internal migration policies contrasts with the relatively extensive immigration governance (see section on Immigration).

Another source of incoherence in this area is a lack of data on internal migration flows and related development implications. Data on internal movements and research on the consequences in municipalities of origin and reception, such as living conditions, is required to aid policy-making (Rodrigues, 2017).

Interaction with development policies

Issues relating to internal migration are mentioned in the current national development plan PEDS (Government of Cabo Verde, 2016). In 2020, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Spatial Planning and Housing launched both the National Housing Policy, and the National Policy for Development of Territory and Urbanism, which outline proposals for dealing with issues of rapid urban population growth, due to internal (and international) migration (Ministry of Infrastructure, Spatial Planning and Housing, 2019a; 2019b). In particular, the plans include proposals for addressing issues related to informal settlements and precarious living situations through better urban planning and specific housing projects.

PEDs also outlines an overarching objective of decentralisation – regionalização – to make each island an administrative region (and Santiago split into two regions), with the aim of increasing local decision making and civic participation. According to PEDS, another motivation behind investing in other regions is to reduce migration towards Praia and related pressures from urban population growth. Although too early to evaluate, both policies relating to urban planning and decentralisation processes are expected to have impacts on internal migration flows and/or related pressures.
Externalisation of EU migration policies

Main policies

In 2008 Cabo Verde became the first African country to enter into a Mobility Partnership with the EU. The EUMP comprises of three broad policy objectives:

1. **Mobility, legal migration and integration**, with provisions to support legal migration channels to the EU.

2. **Migration and development**, with provisions to harness contributions from the diaspora, and voluntary return and reintegration.

3. **Border management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings**, with provisions to strengthen capacity and cooperate on border management, illegal migration campaigns and readmission.

Whilst the EUMP is not legally binding, it laid the groundwork for two legally binding agreements, the VFA and RA, which both came into force in 2014 (Tittel-Mosler, 2018). The VFA allows for short-stay, multiple-entry Schengen visas for certain categories of people, see section on Emigration. The VFA is supplemented by the EU Common Visa Centre in Praia, the first centre of its kind in Africa. At the end of 2020, the EU and Cabo Verde were in advanced stages of amending the VFA. The amended agreement will simplify visa rules with a reduced fee and simplified list of supporting documents. It also extends the VFA to all groups of people beyond the current categories (European Commission, 2020a). Meanwhile the RA obliges Cabo Verde to readmit third-country nationals who travelled to the EU via Cabo Verde, as well as Cabo Verdeans irregularly residing in the EU, see also section on Return migration.

The annex of the EUMP outlines proposed cooperation projects to be financed by EU Institutions or Member States, relating to the three objectives above. There were two active migration cooperation projects in 2020. First is the Blue Sahel (2017-2020), in which the Spanish Civil Guard train and build capacity of DEF and the Cabo Verde Coast Guard on issues including irregular migration and trafficking (Enriquez et al., 2018). The second is outside of the EUMP framework, the EUTF-funded GESTDOC (2019-2022) project with Guinea-Bissau and in cooperation with Portugal. GESTDOC seeks to build capacity for document security and border management, specifically in verifying documents and preventing fraud (see section on Emigration).

Trends

There are clear thematic trends in the types of cooperation between the EU and Cabo Verde. The majority of projects under the EUMP framework have related to the third objective – **Border management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings** (Reslow, 2017). There has been increasingly close cooperation on maritime border security and irregular migration, such as through the signing of the joint border control agreement with FRONTEX in 2011 and cooperation with
Spain in the Blue Sahel and Sea Horse projects, see also section on Transit migration. Another example is the signing of the RA.

Next, early into the EUMP there were several cooperation projects relating to the Migration and development objective (Reslow, 2017). These included projects to mobilise skills transfer from the diaspora like DIAS de Cabo Verde and TRQN. Notably, there have been no projects relating to this objective since 2016, see section on Diaspora. Lastly, a minority of projects have related to the Mobility, legal migration and integration objective (Reslow, 2017), centring around temporary circular migration towards the EU, with the VFA, and bilateral agreements with France (2008) and Luxembourg (2017), see section on Emigration.

A final trend relates to the EU’s proactive role in the development of immigration policy in Cabo Verde (Tittel-Mosler, 2018). After drafting the PNI, Cabo Verde made a request to the Migration EU Expertise initiative (MIEUX) to support and build capacity for a national immigration strategy. MIEUX has continued to support Cabo Verde’s immigration policy through three more actions, including asylum policy (2011-2013), the implementation of REJ (2014-2018) and local level integration (2017-2019).

**Impacts on immigration, emigration, return migration and transit migration**

Emigration opportunities that have arisen from the EUMP are limited to short stay or temporary circular migration opportunities. As such, the impact of EU policy on emigration flows is restricted, despite high hopes for increased mobility from the EUMP on the side of Cabo Verde (Langley and Alborola, 2018). One expert speculated that in practice, the lack of viable emigration opportunities to the EU may increase irregular migration as Cabo Verdeans outstay short term visas. Projects to promote legal migration opportunities such as CAMPO were also limited in impact (Åkesson and Alpes, 2019).

In terms of transit migration, policies to increase Cabo Verde’s ability to patrol its maritime borders and cooperation with FRONTEX and other EU Member States have had a significant impact on irregular transit migration through Cabo Verde. Cabo Verde is no longer considered a country of transit from West Africa towards Europe. In terms of the impact of the RA, the statistics on involuntary return migration from the EU do not suggest a substantial increase in numbers since it came into force in 2014, see section on Return migration. Data from EUROSTAT are not disaggregated by nationality, so it is not possible to determine the proportion of third-country nationals of those readmitted under the RA.

Lastly, in the area of immigration, The REJ is not thought to have altered the scale or type of immigration to Cabo Verde, see section on Immigration. Meanwhile, the asylum policy co-drafted by MIEUX was not adopted by Cabo Verde, and there remains no fully regulated asylum law.
Impacts on development

Although ‘Migration and development’ is an explicit objective of the EUMP, the development impact of Cabo Verde’s cooperation with the EU has been minimal. The EUMP projects that related to diaspora engagement from 2008-2016 were considered to be limited in impact, see section on Diaspora. The flagship project CAMPO (2009-2011) had two aims: (1) provide information about job vacancies in Europe to support legal migration, and (2) support returnees with reintegration. However, Åkesson and Alpes (2019) critique that the ‘unwritten’ objective of CAMPO was the prevention of irregular migration to Europe.

More generally, the development impact of temporary emigration opportunities provided for in the VFA and bilateral agreements is limited, (see section on Emigration). The EU’s role in supporting the development of immigration and integration policies could be regarded as having a positive impact on development, as better integrated immigrants are better able contribute (Rodrigues, 2017).

Key incoherence across policies

The most fundamental source of incoherence is the mismatch in aims and political will between Cabo Verde and the EU. The EU first created the concept of the EUMP based on decreasing irregular migration towards the EU (and solving labour market shortages), in part through (legal) circular migration (Tittel-Mosler, 2018). The EUMP thus gives limited legal migration opportunities, in exchange for cooperation in fighting irregular migration which includes increased border management and signing the RA.

Meanwhile, Cabo Verde entered the EUMP as a means for extended labour mobility opportunities for its citizens and to further its relationship with the EU (van Stokkum, 2015). This mismatch in intentions is evidenced by the types of projects that have been implemented under the EUMP framework, which have been skewed towards the EU’s main goal of fighting irregular migration, rather than the goals favoured by Cabo Verde to extend emigration opportunities and harness migration for development (Reslow, 2017).

Another example of the mismatch in political will is in the current renegotiations of the VFA. Although Cabo Verde sought greater visa liberalisation towards the EU, the amendment does not go beyond short-stay visas (see European Commission, 2020a).

A mismatch in political will is related to another source of incoherence – the power imbalance between Cabo Verde and the EU. Cabo Verde is reliant on the EU and Member States for aid and as key countries of destination. Since EUMP projects are funded by either EU institutions or Member States, the agenda of the EUMP is ultimately dependent on the will of a handful of EU Member States.

Another example of the power imbalance was demonstrated in the signing of the RA. The RA was initially controversial in Cabo Verde due to concerns that high numbers of irregular and non-Cabo Verdean migrants would be deported at once, and that the country would struggle to cope (Van Stokkum, 2015). Cabo Verde did eventually sign the agreement, which was necessary to
also secure the VFA. Furthermore, the agreement was strategic to maintain a close relationship with the EU. Some commentators note that the RA is an example of the EU externalising its southern borders to African countries (Marcelino, 2016).

There are examples of a lack of reciprocity between the EU and Cabo Verde, despite the preamble of the EUMP stating that the partnership is based on reciprocity. There is a stark contrast between the 30-day visa waiver for EU citizens in Cabo Verde, and the strict visa requirements for Cabo Verde citizens travelling to Europe with the VFA (see section on Immigration). Although the visa waiver was a unilateral decision and no reciprocity was expected from the EU, Cabo Verde hoped it was a way to push for visa liberalisation (Langley and Alborola, 2018). This was not realised in the recent VFA renegotiations. There has been wide criticism around the lack of reciprocity on this issue, including by diaspora associations in the EU (DW, 2018a; 2018b).

Another source of incoherence is the conflicting outcomes of the EU’s policies in practice. On the one hand, policies discourage irregular migration, which, on the other hand, may increase irregular migration. As noted above, experts highlighted that a lack of longer-term visas towards the EU may increase irregular migration, as individuals outstay short term visas in the EU.

A final source of incoherence is the interaction between Cabo Verde’s relationship with the EU and its membership of ECOWAS (Marcelino, 2016). For instance, the RA, which is likely to impact individuals from ECOWAS countries, may lead to conflicts with neighbours in ECOWAS (Varela, 2016b). This is in contrast to Cabo Verde’s commitments to regional integration.

Interaction with development policies

The EU is also involved in several development initiatives outside of the EUMP in Cabo Verde. Cabo Verde and the EU have had a Special Partnership since 2007, through which they cooperate in several areas. Under the 11th European Fund to Cabo Verde, Cabo Verde received 79 million euros between 2014 and 2020, focusing on good governance (European Commission, 2020c). Of the projects which do not directly target migration, it is likely that several may indirectly impact migration flows, although experts did not highlight any examples.

Lastly, as noted already, the EUTF-funded GESTDOC project has a direct impact on migration. Experts noted that part of the motivation behind Cabo Verde’s continued investment in document security is to support efforts for visa liberalisation towards Europe.

Main development policies

The selected policies

There are several development policies in Cabo Verde which are likely to impact migration flows or the developmental impact of migration. Four
policies will be summarised below, two of which have already been touched upon in this paper.

First are policies to expand and diversify the tourism sector. Tourism plays a central role in Cabo Verde's economy, which has emerged as a top global tourist destination since the 1990s. The growth of the sector is a top development priority for the country, as outlined in the current development plan PEDS (2017-2021). PEDS sets out plans for promoting Cabo Verde as a 'tourism platform' (Government of Cabo Verde, 2018). Among its proposals for the tourism sector, PEDS also identifies promoting ethnic tourism from the diaspora to Cabo Verde, although there are no such policies yet implemented.

Policy-making in the tourism sector has been critiqued as lacking an effective strategy, always outpaced by the growth of the sector (Resende-Santos, 2019). There are concerns that there is a governance vacuum in the tourism sector, with the sector disconnected from the rest of the economy, too regionally concentrated (to a few islands only) and not diverse enough. There have been recent steps made to create a national strategy. The Tourism Sustainable Development Strategic Guidelines for 2018-2030 (GoPEDS-Turismo) were approved in 2019. The Cabo Verde Tourism Institute was created in 2019, with the mission of regulating and supervising the tourism sector, see Figure 3. Cabo Verde tourism logo. GoPEDS-Turismo outlines four pillars for the strategy: (1) competitiveness, (2) sustainability, a cornerstone of the development of tourism in Cabo Verde, (3) deconcentration through encouraging greater decentralisation and internal circulation of tourist flows between islands, and (4) maximisation of positive impacts.

One such project (yet to be implemented) under this framework is the ‘One Family, One Tourist’ programme. Launched in 2020, the project is designed to leverage rural and community-based tourism in islands without substantial tourism sectors, like Santo Antão and São Nicolau (World Bank, 2019b). The Ministry of Tourism and Transport expects the project to create over 3,000 jobs, boosting local development in all 22 municipalities, and reduce poverty among rural families over five years (Ministry of Tourism and Transport, 2018).
Secondly, there are policies to attract FDI, a government priority since it secured MIC status in 2008. FDI is encouraged by bodies such as Cabo Verde Trade Invest. A recent example of large-scale foreign investment is the Chinese (Macau) Cabo Verde Integrated Resort and Casino project in Praia, the country’s largest ever tourism investment (€250 million) (Madeira, 2017). Agreed in 2015, the hotel and casino are still in construction.

Thirdly, there are policies to decentralise governance within Cabo Verde. As discussed above, the current government seeks to decentralise the delivery of public services to the 22 municipalities, across ten islands, as outlined in the current Programme of Government and Development plan, PEDs. Each municipality has a Municipal Sustainable Development Plan within the framework of PEDs. It is anticipated that decentralisation and a focus on development at the municipal level will reduce internal migration flows.

Last are policies to improve official documentation and document security. As discussed in the section on Emigration, biometric national identity cards, passports and residence permits have been introduced, as well as increased capacity for DEF to identify fraudulent documents.

Interactions with migration-related policies

As discussed above, policies to improve civic registration and document security interact with several migration policies. For instance, document security is connected to the ability of the VFA agreement to be concluded with the EU, see section on Externalisation of EU migration policies.

In terms of policies to attract FDI, the introduction of the EIS directly interacts with diaspora policy. Introduced in 2020, the EIS offers special incentives in addition to those in the Foreign Investment Law. EIS seeks to increase FDI by harnessing the extensive diaspora, see also section on Diaspora.

In terms of tourism policy, the most recent amendment to the immigration regime allows visa-free entry for up to 30 days for individuals from the EU. This policy interacts with policies to expand the tourism sector and increase foreign investment (Madeira, 2019). The visa requirement has been replaced.
by an airport security fee which is intended to be put towards security and airport improvements (DW, 2018a). Meanwhile, the GoPEDS-Turismo guidelines include proposals for the creation of specific immigration policies to support the tourism sector, although none have been drafted. In particular, the guidelines suggest that immigration could jeopardise the country’s cultural identity in the most sought-after tourism locations, which could threaten the ‘cultural’ sustainability of tourism in Cabo Verde. It therefore suggests policies to reduce this type of immigration.

Examples of impact on migration

As discussed above, improvements in official documentation have impacted emigration opportunities (see section on Emigration), diaspora members access to consular services (see section on Diaspora), and transit and immigration (see section on Transit migration). Official documentation has also been a factor in the EU’s externalisation of migration policy in Cabo Verde (see section on Externalisation of EU migration policies).

Tourism is likely to continue to attract international and internal labour migrants to and within Cabo Verde, for instance through developments like the Integrated Resort and Casino project. It is too early to evaluate the impact of the new national strategy around tourism on migration flows, but an effective national tourism strategy and/or growing tourism sector is likely to attract more international labour migration. This has been the case since the 1990s (GOPEDS-Turismo). Only recently launched, projects such as ‘One Family, One Tourist’ have the potential to impact internal migration flows in Cabo Verde (Ministry of Tourism and Transport, 2018). Increased local economic development on rural islands is thought to reduce internal migration flows towards urban and tourism hubs on islands, such as Santiago, São Vicente, Sal and Boa Vista (Government of Cabo Verde, 2018).

Any additional information related to COVID-19

For the first time in its history, due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, movement in, out and within Cabo Verde was temporarily restricted. The pandemic is likely to have far-reaching implications for migration. For an economy that relies on tourism and remittances, the country expects to be hard hit by COVID-related travel restrictions. An economic recession is expected, with a drop of around half a million tourists, and a rise in unemployment from 18% to 20% (Macau Hub, 2020). The downturn in the tourism sector is likely to impact internal migration and international immigration flows. Meanwhile contributions from the diaspora are also likely reduce (World Bank, 2020b).

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